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Foreword by the Chief of 
Defence 
The tasks of the Armed Forces span a wide range of 
challenges in the field of security policy both at 
home and abroad.  We have moved from a situation 
in which the Armed Forces had a clearly defined and 
all-embracing threat which we were trained and 
equipped to resist – and which we could actually 
plan for – to a far more complex and unpredictable 
spectrum of possible scenarios.
 It is no longer sufficient to make concrete plans. 
Today we need to understand the possibilities and limitations of military force 
and, not least, the political and social context in which we operate. For these 
reasons a knowledge-based understanding of the role and nature of military 
force has become more important than static defence planning.
 The Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine (FFOD) is thus an 
important document. Not simply to lay down set procedures and rules for action 
– there are other documents to do that – but to serve largely as a teaching tool 
which can help the officer corps develop a common understanding, a shared way 
of thinking, a joint conceptual frame of reference and thus a foundation on which 
to build a common professional culture.
 In simple terms, the doctrine can be said to have been implemented when the 
officers pose the same questions relating to operational situations, not only when 
they come up with the same answers.
 Military operations call for commanders and staff officers who can approach 
operational problems intellectually and analytically, with the ability to assess the 
use of military force and its effect in relation to political objectives, who can 
distinguish the essential from the peripheral and who can weigh the short-term 
against the long-term. Advantages and drawbacks associated with different cour-
ses of action have to be assessed and weighed before decisions are taken and 
given force as orders. Military operations are governed by political objectives. 
There can therefore be no infallible recipe for success, apart from adhering to the 
principle that the use of force must reflect its political purpose both in the form 
it takes and the extent to which it is exercised. In these times an important 
function that a doctrine must fulfil is therefore to illuminate precisely those 
dilemmas and conflicting considerations that officers must take into account in 
an operational situation, and to contribute to the development of a creative ele-
ment that renders the use of military force more an art than a science.
 FFOD is a professional military document, and as such has to be subject to and 
adapted to the tasks and framework set out in the relevant political policy docu-
ments. It is, however, important that a military doctrine should embody an appro-
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ach and a perspective that, as far as is possible, will make it timeless and enduring. 
The development and implementation of doctrines takes time. 
 FFOD places emphasis on an operational foundation that is based on effects-
based-, network-based-, and manoeuvrist approaches to operations, while at the 
same time going more deeply into three operational methods, namely the mano-
euvre-, the attrition- and the stabilizing methods. Thus FFOD forms the foundation 
for our approach to operational challenges across the whole spectrum of tasks 
the Armed Forces may face, and it marks out the way ahead in a medium term 
perspective.
 This edition of FFOD replaces that issued in the year 2000 which was the first 
joint operational doctrine developed for the Norwegian Armed Forces. The aim 
at that time was to introduce a doctrine as ‘a point of departure’ for the further 
development of doctrine. The time has now come to take this a step further and 
to issue a revised and updated version, more closely adapted to the roles and 
tasks of the Norwegian Armed Forces in the world of today.
Sverre Diesen
General
Chief of Defence
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71. Introduction
0101. The preparation and execution of joint operations are dependent on a solid 
conceptual foundation and on Armed Forces’ personnel having a common under-
standing of the tasks to be carried out. This edition of the Armed Forces Joint 
Operational Doctrine (FFOD 07) sets out overall guidelines as to how the Armed 
Forces should approach today’s challenges and those of tomorrow. 
Points of departure and ambition
0102. FFOD 07 has the following points of departure:
•	 The greater part of the tasks carried out by the Armed Forces, and the conflicts 
with which service units have to deal, are by definition something other than 
“war” in the traditional sense. They are complex and characterised by unclear 
boundaries between peace, crisis and armed conflict. The handling of all the 
challenges that this implies requires a broad spectrum of coordinated military 
and civil contributions.
•	 The Armed Forces must be able to contribute to the nation’s defence in times 
of peace, crisis and armed conflict, either in a leading or a supporting role. The 
Armed Forces must also be able to contribute forces to operations abroad and 
to operate jointly with allies or other actors.
•	 The fundamentals for national operations and operations abroad are the same, 
and all operational units of the Armed Forces must be able to deal with ope-
rations in both settings.
•	 A well developed professional culture, based on shared values and a common 
understanding, is essential to our ability to carry out our complex tasks.
 
WHAT IS A DOCTRINE? – DIFFERENT PRIORITIES
A military doctrine can take many forms. Firstly it can constitute an aid to the com-
mand and control process, in which case it will place emphasis on the description of 
methods and processes and the definition of concepts. NATO’s AJP series (Allied Joint 
Publications) provides an example of such doctrines. Secondly a doctrine can be pro-
duced as a theoretical basis for military activities and would then be focused on 
reasoning based on military theory and security policy. Thirdly a doctrine can be ori-
ented towards the development of a professional culture within the military organi-
sation. It will then place weight on imparting those ideas, values and attitudes which 
should characterise the organisation. The earlier edition of the Armed Forces Joint 
Operational Doctrine (FFOD 2000) had both theoretical and cultural ambitions. First 
and foremost its aim was to inculcate and implement the concept of a manoeuvrist 
approach. FFOD 07 is an example of the third category.
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80103. This doctrine is intended as a tool for the development of a joint operatio-
nal culture, starting with the individual, to give robustness in complex operations 
both at home and abroad. The theoretical content is limited to what is relevant 
for the Armed Forces’ Operational Foundation and the foundation itself has an 
emphasis on how we should approach our operational challenges. Flexibility and 
the combined fundamentals of effect-based-, network-based- and manoeuvrist 
approaches constitute the joint operational culture that the Armed Forces wants 
to develop. In this context, approach means adopting as second nature the essence 
of certain theoretical attitudes at the individual level. The Armed Forces choose 
to focus on these fundamentals instead of describing exact procedures in order 
to avoid being associated too closely with definite concepts, procedures or tech-
nological solutions which can quickly become outdated. The Armed Forces’ Ope-
rational Foundation also encompasses three operational methods (the manoeuvre 
method, the attrition method and the stabilizing method) which can be combined 
to achieve the desired effect. This reflects an acknowledgement that the techni-
ques of the manoeuvre method alone are not sufficient in all operations. 
0104. The emphasis placed on developing a common operational culture means 
that FFOD 07 is toned down on the command and control side and contains few 
descriptions of procedures. On a national basis this is governed by the Chief of 
Defence’s strategic directive for operational activity (Forsvarssjefens strategiske 
direktiv for operativ virksomhet - FSDO), and internationally by those NATO doctri-
nes that Norway has ratified.
0105. FFOD 07 is the starting point for training and discussion as well as providing 
the guidelines for the development of the component doctrines, other doctrines 
and conceptual documents. This provides a common conceptual framework and 
a reference point for research and development (R&D) activities in the defence 
community. It will also act as an aid for civil partner organisations such as the 
police, the customs and excise authorities together with other government agen-
cies, non-governmental organisations and others who wish to familiarise 
themselves with the fundamental principles and ideas on which Norwegian 
defence and the Norwegian Armed Forces are based.
A DOCTRINE’S TIME HORIZON
What time horizon should a doctrine have? Too short a perspective can result in the doctrine 
failing to have an effect before a new one is on the stocks. On the other hand a long per-
spective can mean that the doctrine may in time come to be regarded as a static document 
with little relevance. The Norwegian Armed Forces take the view that work on doctrine 
should be a continuing process, not least in order to embody new trends relating to the use 
of military force. At the same time it is important to have a given document to relate to. 
This doctrine has therefore been developed with a time perspective of five to ten years.
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9The doctrine and other guidance documents 
0106. Figure 1.1 shows an overview of doctrines and doctrine-related documents 
for the Norwegian Armed Forces (full lines represent mandatory guidance and 
stippled lines represent guidelines only). Norway has no approved national doctrine 
hierarchy, but there are a number of guidance documents at national level.  
Figure 1.1, FFOD AND OTHER DOCUMENTS GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS  
0107. The doctrine takes as its starting point guidance documents from the Nor-
wegian Ministry of Defence, including the current Strategic Concept for the Armed 
Forces. The Chief of Defence’s strategic directive for operational activity (FSDO) 
gives a detailed exposition of how the Armed Forces are to employ their opera-
tional resources and it forms the basis for the development of concrete concepts 
and plans at a joint operational level. This doctrine gives guidelines for the further 
development of FSDO with associated concepts and plans. It also governs the 
development of national component doctrines which in turn form the basis for 
the development of regulations and directives applicable to the way in which 
units of the Norwegian Armed Forces conduct operations. The NATO doctrines 
provide important guidelines for the development of both FSDO and FFOD. The 
doctrines
Planning
Concepts
Plans
Conduct
Field-
manuals
Political
guidance-
documents
Component-doctrines
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NATO doctrines also give direct guidance for operational planning by providing 
guidelines for the planning process itself.
A NORWEGIAN DOCTRINE?
The Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine was first issued in the year 
2000. The main ideas on which the doctrine was based – manoeuvre theory and 
manoeuvre warfare – constituted the doctrine’s operational method. FFOD 2000 was 
based on documents including the Chief of Defence’s fundamental guidelines for the 
development and use of Norwegian forces in peace, crisis and war published in 1995. 
Prior to this there had been no written Norwegian doctrine that applied to the Armed 
Forces as a whole, although work was proceeding on the development of doctrinal 
guidelines, including tactical directives, for each of the service branches. Although 
there were no written doctrines at the joint operational level until 1995, there existed 
views within the Armed Forces on war, warfare and principles for the development 
and use of military forces at this level which were shared by the majority of serving 
officers. Such views formed the basis for teaching and operational planning and so 
to that extent constituted an implicit doctrine. Some of this thinking found expression 
in the comprehensive planning work carried out by Headquarters Defence Command 
and the Defence Commands North Norway and South Norway during the Cold War 
period.  
The structure of the doctrine
0108. The doctrine is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 sets out its underlying 
ambition and its place in a Norwegian and an allied context. Chapter 2 deals with 
the complex challenges and operational framework facing the Armed Forces in 
today’s world, as well as the way in which the Armed Forces transform these tasks 
into operations at home and abroad. Chapter 3 describes the Armed Forces’ Ope-
rational Foundation and thus forms the doctrine’s central core, while Chapter 4 
contains the theoretical and conceptual basis for this operational foundation. 
Chapter 5 describes joint operations with components and functions. Chapter 6 
describes the professional culture that the Armed Forces wish to develop and 
apply in carrying out our missions.
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2. Armed Forces’ operations and the  
operational framework
 
0201. This chapter deals with how the Armed Forces’ missions are put into practice 
at home and abroad. The chapter addresses the conditions affecting the Armed 
Forces’ operations including the current spectrum of conflict and the framework 
imposed by policy and ethical considerations, international law and technology. 
The conflict spectrum
0202. The conflict spectrum provides some measure of the level of violence invol-
ved in a conflict. The level is determined by a combination of the intensity of the 
violence, geographical extent of the conflict and its duration. 
Figure 2.1, THE CONFLICT SPECTRUM 
0203. The conflict spectrum spans the range from peace through crisis to armed 
conflict. The latter category includes what is traditionally called “war”. It is a sliding 
scale between its end points and the spectrum can be used to describe conflicts 
which swing first one way and then another. The absence of conflict management, 
or the wrong form of management, can contribute to an escalation in the level of 
conflict. Similarly, appropriate conflict management can reduce the violence and 
contribute to a resolution of the conflict. The parties’ perceptions of each other’s 
aims and capabilities are major factors in any decision to escalate the conflict. If 
one party perceives the other to be weak or vulnerable, it may consider its interests 
to be served by escalating the level of conflict in order to achieve its aims. A robust, 
clear and predictable conflict management capability can thus have a preventive 
effect. This is an important factor affecting how the Armed Forces should act both 
nationally and in missions abroad. 
Armed Forces’ tasks
0204. The tasks of the Armed Forces at any time are set out in the relevant poli-
tical documents. The substance of these tasks has remained relatively constant 
over time but the degree of detail and the way in which they are stated has 
altered. Furthermore, changes in the global security situation and a range of 
political considerations have led from time to time to some shift of emphasis 
between the various tasks. The tasks of the Armed Forces can be divided into 
those which are to be carried out nationally without assistance and those to be 
carried out in cooperation with other countries. 
Peace Crisis Armed conict
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0205. Tasks that will in most cases be carried out nationally without assistance 
are ensuring a national basis for decision-making through surveillance and intelli-
gence gathering, the exercising of Norwegian sovereignty, the exercise of autho-
rity in defined areas and the prevention and management of security-related 
crises.
0206. Task which in most cases will be carried out in cooperation with other 
countries are contributing to the collective defence of Norway and other parts 
of NATO against threats and attacks, including the possible use of weapons of 
mass destruction, as well as contributing to multinational crisis management. 
The Armed Forces also have the tasks of providing military support to diplomacy 
and of safeguarding the security of society as well as other vital tasks in the public 
interest. 
Armed Forces’ operations 
0207. The Armed Forces’ core activity is to plan and execute operations. These 
operations can be categorised in several ways. They can be divided in the same 
way as the tasks mentioned above, that is to say those which are mostly carried 
out nationally without assistance and those which are carried out mostly in coo-
peration with other countries. In the following section, however, Armed Forces’ 
operations are divided into national operations and operations abroad, since these 
are the two arenas in which operations are put into practice.   
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National operations 
0208. The Armed Forces’ operations nationally can be categorised according to 
the conflict spectrum as day-to-day operations, operations in response to natio-
nal crises and operations in armed conflict.     
Figure 2.2, ARMED FORCES’ NATIONAL OPERATIONS AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF CONFLICT
0209. Figure 2.2 shows different categories of operation which the Armed Forces 
prepare for and carry out at the various stages of the conflict spectrum. (A scale 
of intensity is shown along the horizontal axis while the requirement for robust-
ness and the Armed Forces’ degree of responsibility for the management of the 
operation is shown vertically). Since the Second World War the Armed Forces have 
been equipped and trained for operations in war; that is to say situations in which 
special wartime and emergency preparedness legislation should come into force 
and in which the Armed Forces are assigned a leading role with the principal 
responsibility for managing the conflict. The emergency preparedness legislation 
still applies but today the Armed Forces must be able to manage a broader spec-
trum of operations with the emphasis on day-to-day operations and operations 
in response to national crises.
0210. While the original total defence concept focused primmarily on civil assist-
ance to the Armed Forces in situations of crisis and war, the modernised concept 
of total defence embraces mutual support and cooperation between the Armed 
Forces and the civil community across the entire spectrum of crises from peace 
to armed conflict. It is an essential condition that the Armed Forces should be 
SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY
Exercise of sovereignty
Incident management
Exercise of authority
Surveillance
Peace
Day-to-day operations
Crisis
Operations in response to national crises
Armed conflict
Operations in armed conict
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able to contribute its available capabilities, its range of competencies and the 
resources provided to enable them to carry out their primary tasks. One conse-
quence of the modernised concept of total defence, for example, is that the Armed 
Forces must arrange their logistics so that they can function without the need 
to mobilise the resources of the civil community.
THE HOME GUARD 
The Home Guard (HV) has undergone comprehensive modernisation and today forms 
the core of Norway’s territorial defence in times of peace, crisis and armed conflict. 
The Home Guard consists of the Land Home Guard, the Naval Home Guard and the 
Air Force Home Guard, with the same specialisations as the main three service bran-
ches. The Home Guard is a flexible organisation divided into rapid reaction forces, 
reinforcement forces and follow-on forces. The Home Guard is decentralised and has 
units in all Norwegian municipalities. The Home Guard district commanders represent 
a level of command subordinate to the Joint Operational Headquarters but with ter-
ritorial responsibility which includes responsibility for operational planning. They also 
have a responsibility to the Chief of Staff of the Norwegian Home Guard for force 
production.
The Home Guard maintains contact with the civil community through a civil-military 
network based on mutual knowledge and trust. The local commanders are responsi-
ble for fostering cooperation with the police and the civil sector at local and county 
levels. 
The Home Guard protects both people and important communal functions. This entails 
the guarding of defence installations, the protection of local infrastructure, key per-
sonnel and materiél, surveillance and patrols, as well as the provision of support for 
the civil community. This is reflected in the Home Guard’s motto: WE PROTECT people 
and important communal functions! WE WATCH OVER the local community! WE ACT 
with strength!
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Day-to-day operations  
0211. The Armed Forces’ operational units uphold Norwegian sovereignty through 
territorial surveillance along the country’s land, sea and air borders, day and night, 
throughout the year. This surveillance is carried out by the Coast Guard 
and other parts of the Navy, the Army’s Border Guard and the Air Force’s 
air defence surveillance system which, together with combat aircraft 
at a high state of readiness, uphold sovereignty in Norwegian airspace. 
The Coast Guard and the Army’s Border Guard have special responsi-
bility for the exercise of authority within specific areas. Other examples 
of day-to-day operations are the Air Force’s round the clock, nationwide 
search and rescue service operated on behalf of the Ministry of Justice 
and the Police, H M The King’s Guard’s protection duties and the Armed Forces’ 
routine explosives and bomb disposal service.
0212. Other parts of the Armed Forces are involved in administration and force pro-
duction. These are mentioned not as day-to-day operations but rather as day-to-day 
activities. Force production covers the development of equipment, tactics, organi-
sation and personnel together with education and training.
THE COAST GUARD
The primary task of the Coast Guard is to uphold Norwegian sovereignty and associated 
rights in sea areas under Norwegian jurisdiction and in inner coastal waters. The Coast 
Guard carries out fishery inspection duties, customs and excise inspections and other 
inspection duties including those associated with the Schengen agreement and the 
regulations governing the seaworthiness of shipping. In addition the Coast Guard car-
ries out sea rescue missions and provides general assistance both at sea and to the 
police and other national agencies, as well as conducting checks in connection with 
port visits by foreign non-military vessels. The activities of the Coast Guard are regula-
ted by the Coast Guard Act of 1999. The Coast Guard is assigned limited police authority 
and authority to conduct inspections and checks. It has the right to use measures for 
enforcement. The motto of the Norwegian Coast Guard is: EVER PRESENT!
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Operations in response to crises
0213. A national crisis is an event which puts national resources to the test. Such a 
crisis implies that one single authority or agency will not have sufficient resources 
to manage what has happened. Instead it will be necessary to concentrate all or 
parts of the nation’s relevant resources. Examples of such situations range from 
unpredictable events such as natural or environmental disasters, through mass 
refugee movements, major catastrophes and pandemics to deliberate acts in the 
form of episodes in Norwegian sea areas, terrorist actions against people, industry 
or the infrastructure of society, up to and including limited armed attack. 
EVENTS, SITUATIONS, EPISODES AND CRISES
Day-to-day operations and operations in response to national crises are triggered by 
circumstances of varying degrees of gravity. One commonly used way of categorising 
these circumstances is to use the scale event, situation, episode and crisis, where event 
signifies the lowest level and crisis the highest. These concepts, however, are not 
absolute and in many cases it is only possible to determine the category with hind-
sight. Nevertheless the concepts do have value when relating to the types of operation 
carried out by the Armed Forces. Events and situations are managed as day-to-day 
operations, crises are managed as operations in response to national crises, and episo-
des lie somewhere in the border region between these two categories and are mana-
ged either through the normal organisation or by combining resources, and/or co-
operating with, other organisations.
0214. A political security crisis is a military responsibility when it affects the territo-
rial integrity or political sovereignty of the state. The crisis will often come as a 
surprise turn of events, or as a gradually escalated demonstration of strength by an 
actor who is perceived to be threatening. The crisis will often be characterised by 
limited time available between decision and action, and by the possibility that an 
inadequate reaction may have serious consequences. 
CRISIS MANAGEMENT: THE RESPONSIBILITY, PROxIMITY AND SIMILARITY 
PRINCIPLE 
The responsibility principle implies that whoever is responsible for a particular sector 
is also responsible for implementing the necessary damage preventive measures and 
contingency preparations. The proximity principle implies that crises should be mana-
ged at the lowest level possible. In practice this means that the municipalities themselves 
and the local police should at the outset have responsibility for managing the majority 
of crisis events in peacetime. The similarity principle implies that organisation in dealing 
with crises should be as similar as possible to that existing under normal conditions.
The proximity principle does not apply to political security-related crises or nuclear 
accidents which will always be managed at the central level.
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0215. Assistance rendered by the Armed Forces will normally be a supplement to 
the civil authorities’ crisis management. The main principle is that support from 
the Armed Forces will be appropriate first and foremost when the 
nature of what has happened is such that the civil authorities, who 
have the primary responsibility, are not able to deal with the crisis 
solely with their own resources. Armed Forces resources can be utili-
sed for transport, communications, treatment of the sick or wounded, 
food and accommodation, area surveillance, clearance and disposal 
of explosives, chemical decontamination, traffic control, guarding and 
security duties. The Armed Forces can contribute manpower for vari-
ous purposes including the temporary repair of infrastructure such as embank-
ments, roads and bridges.
0216. As a basis principle, the Armed Forces will provide support to the civil com-
munity in areas where we have a unique competence or where we possess resour-
ces which other authorities do not have. The Armed Forces are able to contribute 
a broad spectrum of robust capabilities including naval, air and specials forces. 
The latter will for example be able to contribute to the management of highjack 
or similar situations.  Terrorist attacks are essentially criminal in nature and thus 
the responsibility of the police except in situations where the Armed Forces have, 
or are assigned, the primary responsibility.
0217. The Armed Forces have primary responsibility for dealing with terrorist 
actions which are deemed to constitute an armed attack on Norway which trig-
gers the right of self-defence under international law. In addition, the Armed 
Forces have an independent responsibility in peacetime for dealing with the fol-
lowing situations which are beyond the capabilities of the civil authorities. Firstly, 
a massive attack on oil installations where there are political or security-related 
connotations. Secondly, situations involving chaos on a national scale, for exam-
ple widespread sabotage where it is not 
clear whether Norway is facing a crisis 
or armed conflict. Thirdly, the Armed 
Forces have an independent responsibi-
lity to deal with situations which require 
the alerting of combat aircraft and the 
engagement of air targets in order to 
prevent a terrorist attack from the air. 
Responsibility will also lie with the 
Armed Forces if air defence systems are 
required to defend Norwegian airspace 
or if submarines are required for sub sea 
security or the engagement of under-
water targets. 
FFOD Engelsk.indd   19 13-03-08   09:49:03
20
ASSISTANCE TO THE POLICE 
The Armed Forces can assist the police when this is compatible with the primary tasks 
of the Armed Forces and the police do not have sufficient human and/or material 
resources. See Instructions for Armed Forces’ Assistance to the Police (Instruks om For-
svarets bistand til politiet) laid down by Royal Decree of 28 February 2003. Assistance 
means any form of human and/or material support. A distinction is made between 
administrative, operational and enforcement assistance.
Administrative assistance: The Armed Forces can assist the police with transport and 
other administrative support, including assistance in cases where the Armed Forces 
have a particular capability or competence which does not directly involve the military 
assistance unit in the operational police work of resolving the situation. Any request 
for assistance in such cases should be made directly by the chief of police to the Joint 
Operational Headquarters (FOHK) where the request is considered and any eventual 
assistance put in motion.
Operational assistance: In the event of accidents, including search for missing persons, 
natural disasters and similar situations, the Armed Forces can assist the police. In such 
situations service personnel can be deployed on traffic control duties or on guard and 
security tasks although these latter tasks will not normally be carried out if they 
involve contact with the civilian population. The Armed Forces can also provide assis-
tance in the disposal of explosive devices or rendering them harmless. FOHK will 
receive and assess requests and allocate any resulting tasks.
Enforcement assistance: The Armed Forces can assist the police in search for and appre-
hending dangerous persons when this is necessary to avert danger to life or health. 
The military contribution will then preferably be concentrated on maintaining watch, 
ensuring safety and providing cover for the police who should actually apprehend the 
person(s) concerned. The Armed Forces can also provide assistance if there is a risk of 
a conspiracy which is either extensive or of an otherwise particularly damaging nature 
and which is directed against the essential interests of the public, or in order to prevent 
or counter such conspiracies. In these circumstances service personnel may assist the 
police on traffic control duties or on guard and security tasks.
If the provision of assistance can endanger service personnel, or give rise to questions 
which touch on matters of principle or have a political dimension, the police should 
channel their request via the National Police Directorate to the Ministry of Justice 
and the Police. The Ministry of Justice and the Police will then request assistance from 
the Ministry of Defence which will make a final decision and give guidelines to the 
service units concerned.
0218. Operations in response to crises can be carried out making use of certain 
principles from the stabilizing method which, together with the manoeuvre and 
attrition methods, are described in the Armed Forces’ Operational Foundation. In 
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addition, principles from the manoeuvre and attrition methods will be appro-
priate in the event of an escalation in the scale of a crisis.
In the survey of the Armed Forces’ operations, reference is made to various types of 
actors and different operational methods. The actors are described in section 0265 et 
seq. and the operational methods are described in Chapter 3. 
Operations in armed conflict
0219. Armed conflict implies an attack directed against Norway or Norwegian inte-
rests, carried out by regular or irregular forces, and which exceeds a level which can 
be regarded as criminality. In armed conflict the Armed Forces have a leading role 
and the rest of the community will provide support. The Armed Forces will then 
set in motion military operations in accordance with national legislation. Of central 
importance here is Act no. 7 of 15 December 
1950 relating to special measures in time of 
war, threat of war and similar circumstances 
(the Preparedness Act). (Lov av 15. desember 
1950 om særlige rådegjerder under krig, krigs-
fare og liknende forhold – beredskapsloven).
This Act can also permit the initiation of mili-
tary operations without the involvement of 
the rest of the community.
0220. Operations in armed conflict natio-
nally can include combat against regular or 
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irregular forces. Combat against regular or irregular forces requires the ability to 
engage in joint and combined operations with NATO and other partners. The 
operations are conducted using a combination of the manoeuvre- and attrition 
methods with the accent on the former.
0221. In combat against regular or irregular forces, principles from the stabilizing 
method can be a necessary supplement in order to secure operational areas and 
protect the local population. Principles from this method can, moreover, be essen-
tial in the chaotic situation which will often arise when combat ceases. It is of 
decisive importance to handle this situation correctly in order to increase the 
possibility of gaining political advantage.
 
THE CONCEPTS OF “WAR” AND “ARMED CONFLICT”
The concept “war” can have different meanings depending on the context and who is 
using it. What constitutes war in a legal sense and what is normally understood by the 
concept do not necessarily coincide. Today the traditionally sharp distinction between 
peace and war is far less clear than in the past, and the concept of war can be discussed 
from differing perspectives.  
Social science and political perspectives: The war concept is often used in reference to a 
group’s, or a state’s, ultimate use of force in order to pursue its own interests. War can 
be seen as organised force between groups, first and foremost states, but also between 
groups of people within a state or a territory. Such a definition perhaps describes the 
war’s rationality, that is to say the use of force to pursue interests, but it scarcely says 
anything about the emotional or legal and ethical aspects.
Emotional perspectives: People who experience extreme violence, chaos, suffering and 
death often use the concept “war” to describe their experiences. The war concept then 
reflects the experience of cruelty and does not depend on whether it is war in the 
political or legal sense. This illustrates the emotionally loaded nature of the concept. 
“Going to war” implies that the state has put to use its ultimate instrument, and that 
those taking part have assumed the ultimate responsibility for that state’s survival. The 
individual will feel his own contribution to be important and will expect the state’s 
gratitude and support. If the state’s support is not forthcoming, or if the fighting is 
defined as something other than war, the individual may feel that his efforts are being 
undervalued.
“War” is often used when an actor wishes to signal that he is prepared to go a very long 
way in fighting against something, for example “war on drugs” or “war on poverty”. 
Since 2001 the American administration’s use of “war on terror” has contributed towards 
the complication of the war-concept. The original intention behind this use of the con-
cept was probably rhetorical in that it emphasised that the fight against terrorism had 
the highest priority and that it would be fought with all possible means. Subsequent 
events, however, have shown that many of the actions taken do in fact lie within the 
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political and legal perspectives of the concept of war. This implies a shift from being 
at war with someone to being at war with something, which itself is problematic in 
the perspective of international law. 
International law perspectives: Up to the time of the Second World War, the position 
in international law was that the initiation of war required a formal “declaration of 
war”. This was done in conformity with requirements formulated in the third Hague 
Convention of 1907. Since the Second World War, little or no use has been made of 
declarations of war. If rules for the protection of the individual in war are to depend 
on the parties to the conflict first having declared war, this implies among other things 
that states and other parties to a conflict are themselves able to choose which rules 
for warfare and the protection of individuals are to be employed. This formed part of 
the background to the use by the International Red Cross, in the framing of the four 
Geneva Conventions, of the expression “armed conflict” rather than the concept of 
war in defining the conditions under which the Conventions are to apply. The concept 
of armed conflict is also used in the UN Treaty regulating the use of armed force. Here 
the war concept is used only to refer to wars of the past. There are no set criteria for 
the thresholds of violence which have to be crossed before the conflict can be termed 
an armed conflict. This is determined by the particular circumstances but the basic 
premise is that the conflict must be extensive in duration or intensity.
National legality perspectives: In Norway one of the administrative distinctions bet-
ween war and peace has gone with the implementation of the “Preparedness Acts” 
of which the most central and general is that of 15 December 1950 (Act no. 7 relating 
to special measures in time of war, threat of war and similar circumstances). This Act 
uses the words “war, threat of war and similar circumstances” in defining situations 
in which the Act applies. Even though the Act uses the expression “war”, there does 
not have to be a declaration of war for the Act to apply. The Preparedness Act Com-
mission (Beredskapslovutvalget), in its report NOU 1995:31, has assumed that the Act 
can be brought into force when there is “imminent danger of international armed 
conflict which can affect Norwegian territory or the territory of one or more of our 
NATO allies”.
The Armed Forces’ operations abroad 
0222. The Armed Forces’ operations abroad are categorised in relation to the con-
flict spectrum and designated as military contribution in peacetime, stabilization 
operations, combat against irregular forces and combat against regular forces. 
Such a categorisation is an aid to describing which operational methods, which 
force structure and what kind of conduct is necessary under differing environ-
ments and conditions. It is important to be clear that these four main types of 
operations are partially overlapping and that they will therefore not necessarily 
match a single category exactly.
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Figure 2.3, THE ARMED FORCES’ OPERATIONS ABROAD
0223. Figure 2.3 shows the various categories of operations undertaken by the 
Armed Forces abroad. (A scale of intensity describing the situation in the opera-
tional area concerned is shown horizontally while the requirement for robustness 
is shown vertically). The figure says something about intensity and the require-
ment for robustness but scarcely anything about the complexity of the operations. 
Stabilization operations and combat against irregular forces can often be cha-
racterised by greater complexity than combat against regular forces. All the ope-
rations engaged by the Armed Forces abroad are for the purpose of bringing a 
conflict to a lower level of tension, a factor which governs the choice of methods 
and means employed and which forms an important part of the Armed Forces’ 
effect-based approach. In stabilization operations the main emphasis will be pla-
ced on principles from the stabilizing method. In combat against irregular forces 
the main weight will be principles from the attrition method, and in combat 
against regular forces the main weight will be on principles from the manoeuvre 
method.
Peace Crisis Armed conflict
Military contribution in peacetime
Stabilization operations
Combat against irregular forces
Combat against regular forces
Attrition Manoeuvre
Stabilizing
Attrition Manoeuvre
Stabilizing
Attrition Manoeuvre
Stabilizing
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Military contributions in peacetime
0224. Military contributions in peacetime are activities which have as their objec-
tive the underpinning of political and security-related stability. These activities can 
take the form of education and training programmes or exer-
cises conducted jointly with allies and other nations. They can 
involve fixed force contributions to standing NATO forces, co-
operation in border control and surveillance, or contributions 
in the event of natural disasters and major incidents abroad 
including air transport operations and medical assistance. 
International collaboration in the field of defence equipment 
is a related activity although one not directly associated with 
the Armed Forces’ operational activities.  
0225. Military contributions in peacetime are normally activities with a long term 
perspective. The level of risk associated with such contributions is most often low. 
At the same time it is important to be clear that units engaged in such contributions 
can be targeted by terrorists or others who wish to affect developments in the area 
or to cause harm to Norway. 
PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS 
The Armed Forces’ operations abroad will often form part of a peace support operation 
mandated under Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter. UN and NATO operate with the 
following categorisation of peace support operations:
Preventive Diplomacy: Action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, prevent 
existing disputes from escalating into military conflicts and to limit the spread of the 
latter when they occur. Preventive diplomacy can cover confidence-building measures, 
the preventive deployment of military forces or the establishment of demilitarised 
zones. 
Peacekeeping: Operations legitimised under Chapter VI of the UN Charter (peaceful 
resolution of disputes) and requiring the consent of the parties before they can be 
set in motion.
Peace Building: Operations which can be set in motion for the purpose of implemen-
ting a comprehensive peace arrangement which has the prior approval of all parties 
concerned. 
Peacemaking: Operations for the purpose of bringing an end to a conflict, essentially 
through peaceful means as described in Chapter VI of the UN Charter.
Peace Enforcement: Operations with a mandate in Chapter VII of the UN Charter but 
which do not require the consent of the parties concerned before being set in motion. 
Peace enforcement operations will often involve combat against regular or irregular 
forces.
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Stabilization operations 
0226. A stabilization operation is intended to lower the level of conflict between 
two or more parties in order to preserve or re-establish peace. Such an operation 
is often concerned with ensuring that existing agreements are observed and with 
the creation of a secure environment for non-military activities. This can involve 
surveillance and policing tasks as described in the section on the stabilizing met-
hod. Stabilization operations constitute a separate category since they are nor-
mally conducted at lower levels of conflict than combat against irregular or regu-
lar forces. A stabilization operation can, however, at times escalate into combat 
against irregular or regular forces. The robustness needed to deter or handle any 
such escalation is therefore essential to the effective conduct of stabilization 
operations. Experience has shown such operations to be of long duration and to 
call for a high degree of patience, both political and military. 
0227. Stabilization operations are conducted mainly with the aid of the principles 
described in the section on the stabilizing method. Different phases of the oper-
ation may, however, require the use of principles drawn from the attrition or 
manoeuvre methods. Units at the tactical level may, during a stabilization oper-
ation, have to carry out operations according to the attrition or manoeuvre 
 methods in order to fight an irregular or regular force.  
FFOD Engelsk.indd   26 13-03-08   09:49:47
27
LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS (LIC)
The majority of conflicts in which Norwegian forces are engaged can be described as 
low intensity conflicts. The concept originated in the 1970s even though the pheno-
menon as such was described in writings far further back in time. The origin of the 
concept during the Cold War period, and with both world wars in mind, explains the 
categorisation of high, medium and low intensity conflicts. 
High intensity conflicts were defined as conflicts in which the existence of the state 
was at stake and where the entire population had to be oriented towards war. Such 
a conflict would be characterised by conventional forces facing one another and the 
methods used being chosen accordingly. In the last resort there was the possibility 
of an escalation involving the use of nuclear weapons. The last century’s two world 
wars were high intensity conflicts.
Conflicts of medium intensity were then defined as regionally limited wars employing 
conventional weapons. The war between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s is an example of 
such a conflict. At that time the concept of low intensity conflicts was applied to “all 
the others”. 
Low intensity conflicts can be defined as politico-military struggles to achieve political, 
military, social, economic or psychological aims. They are often long-lasting and can 
cover everything from diplomatic, economic and psychological pressure to terrorism 
and rebel movements. Low intensity conflicts are generally limited to a specific geo-
graphical area and are often characterised by limitations on weapons, tactics and the 
level of violence. LIC cover the use of traditional military means up to the level just 
below that of combat with regular forces. 
The scale of low, medium and high, however, does not harmonise well with today’s 
conflicts, especially since it can give the impression that the level of violence is low in 
“low intensity conflicts”. With the exception of the Gulf War in 1991 and the initial phase 
of the Iraq War in 2003, it is true to say that most of the conflicts of the last fifteen years 
can be called low intensity conflicts. At the same time, many of the conflicts in this 
period have involved a level of violence, and numbers of dead, that far exceed those of 
many medium intensity conflicts. Examples here are Rwanda, Somalia, Iraq and Afgha-
nistan. The terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 are other 
examples showing that the concept is ambiguous and difficult to define.
In reality low intensity conflicts are today an umbrella concept covering everything from 
guerrilla warfare, terrorism and asymmetric warfare to those operations which are 
intended to counter these forms of warfare, including stabilization operations. Further, 
the concept is used either to describe the nature of a conflict or to describe a deliberate 
strategy. Such a strategy is about inflicting losses on an enemy with the aid of limited 
resources, and winning the support of the population at large by various means. Mao 
Tse Tung’s guerrilla warfare is often cited as an example of this type of strategy.
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Combat against irregular forces
0228. Irregular forces can cover a spectrum ranging from well-organised rebel 
movements, local warlords and their followers to criminal groups. Combat against 
irregular forces can occur within the framework of a stabilization operation but 
is nevertheless described as a separate category of operations because the use 
of force will generally be more comprehensive than would normally be expected 
of a stabilization operation. The use of force can sometimes become very exten-
sive in combat with irregular forces.
0229. In operations against irregular forces it is often necessary to combine poli-
tical, military, economic and psychological means in order to combat the rebel 
movement and its external support, and to isolate the movement from the inha-
bitants themselves. Combating irregular forces will often, as in stabilization ope-
rations, require considerable time. 
0230. Combat against irregular forces is conducted mainly using principles from 
the attrition method. Experience shows that it is necessary to bring about a long-
term and systematic breakdown of both the will and the capability of the irregu-
lar forces in order to stop them. This is due to two factors. Irregular forces are often 
ideologically motivated and largely 
unaffected by the type of rationality 
that underlies the manoeuvre met-
hod – that the opponent must rea-
lise that it is useless to continue the 
struggle. Irregular forces also often 
take the form of small units without 
an overall command structure, a 
factor that can mean that there is 
no central decision-maker who can 
be out-manoeuvred. In combat 
against irregular forces, principles 
from the manoeuvre method can nevertheless be effective at lower levels. The 
Armed Forces will also be able to employ principles from the stabilizing method, 
primarily to protect the civil population and their own area of operations as well 
as making it possible for civilian agencies to operate in the area.  
Combat against regular forces
0231. Combat against regular forces is most often combat against the forces of 
other states conducted in accord with the traditional picture of military combat 
as described in military theory and doctrines. Combat against regular forces is 
characterised by a high level of violence and will often be conducted over a shor-
ter period than in the case of stabilization operations or operations against irre-
gular forces.
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0232. Combat against regular forces will often take place during the introductory 
phase of a campaign in which, at a later stage, the emphasis will shift towards 
stabilization operations or combat against irregular forces. It is important to be 
clear that the distinction between combat against regular forces on the one hand 
and combat against irregular forces on the other will often be blurred. Combat 
against regular and irregular forces may also be conducted in parallel.
0233. Effective combat against regular forces requires the ability to conduct joint 
operations in multinational 
environments. Such operations 
are most often conducted 
using a combination of the 
manoeuvre and attrition met-
hods with the emphasis on the 
former. The stabilizing method 
can also be employed as neces-
sary to protect own or allied 
forces, or a third party.
Armed Forces’ rationale 
0234. Taken overall, operations at home and abroad suggest that the Armed For-
ces must today be capable of preparing and implementing operations across the 
entire conflict spectrum. The Armed Forces are thus dependent on a wide range 
of capabilities. It is, however, the capability to engage in armed combat in high 
intensity conflict situations that constitutes the principal rationale of the Armed 
Forces. A capability that makes particularly stringent demands with regard to 
robustness and the ability to carry out joint operations, and therefore must form 
the basis for the further development of the Armed Forces.  
The overall approach to complex conflicts
0235. The precondition for a lasting peace is that the underlying causes of the 
conflict have been addressed. Operations today will often involve initially putting 
a stop to the violence and addressing the problems of disease, hunger and poverty. 
It will then be important to disarm the opposing groups and to lay the foundations 
for the peaceful development of the community. Against this background, military 
means will often have a limited role, primarily focused on creating and maintai-
ning a secure environment in which other activities can safely be conducted. 
0236. Today the ambition internationally is to link military and civil means more 
closely together. Within the UN system and in an EU context the concept of 
Integrated Missions is frequently used. In the UK this is often referred to as the 
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Comprehensive Approach while in NATO the concept is more generally called the 
Effects Based Approach to Operations (Chapter 4). Even though the content of 
these concepts may vary somewhat, they are all based on an acknowledgement 
that the handling of complex conflicts often requires the coordination of diplo-
matic, economic and military means. In many cases there will also be a need for 
coordination between different states, organisations and other actors.  A cor-
responding overall view of conflict management forms a central element of effect-
based approach in the Armed Forces’ Operational Foundation (Chapter 3).
Operations – the political framework
We see, therefore, that war is not merely a act of policy, but a true political instrument, 
a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. What remains 
peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means. 
Carl von Clausewitz
0237. The use of military force is politics and the political objectives are always 
of overriding importance in the conduct of a military operation or campaign. The 
political framework has both a national and an international dimension. Natio-
nally the political objectives are shaped by weighing the relative importance of 
various considerations such as opinion at home, opposition and the media. Inter-
nationally, during the conduct of multinational operations, the contributing nati-
ons varying interests and objectives have to be taken into account, something 
which means that the aims stated are often characterised by compromises.
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0238. It is common to operate with four levels, the political, the military/strategic, 
the operational and the tactical. Figure 2.4 illustrates the connection between 
the various levels. The political level embraces all the others. Among other things 
this means that each action, right down to the tactical level, must be in harmony 
with the overriding political objectives.
Figure 2.4, THE OPERATIONAL LEVELS, THE BIG PICTURE AND POLITICAL CONTROL
WHY FOUR LEVELS?
This subdivision into four levels was developed during the inter-war years and its prac-
tise was a central feature of the operations of the Second World War. The need to coor-
dinate the war effort on the different fronts and sectors with the military/strategic 
objectives required there to be a linkage between the strategic and tactical levels. The 
establishment of a so-called operational level of war was an essential requirement if 
the strategic level was to be at all capable of conducting ever greater and more complex 
operations on several fronts. That in turn was essential if a united war command (poli-
tical and military) was to progress towards achievement of the common aim (first the 
German, and then the Japanese capitulation). This multi-level structure was carried 
forward with the establishment of NATO’s military command structure at the beginning 
of the 1950s for which it still remains the key foundation. In the 1980s the operational 
level as we know it today was developed in the United States and the NATO countries. 
Political level
Military/strategic level
Operational level
Tactical level
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0239. One consequence of today’s complex security picture and conflict spectrum, 
in which the boundaries between peace, crisis and armed conflict are often 
unclear, is that there is an element of political control at all levels in a military 
operation. Information technology increases the possibility of exerting political 
and military/strategic control and also means that individual events in the conflict 
area can be broadcasted around the world with possible repercussions at many 
levels. In addition, Norway operates most often with various coalition partners 
with whom many political, historic and cultural factors come into play at all levels 
of decision-making. Partly as a consequence of these conditions, some elements 
of the strategic leadership (the Chief of Defence and his strategic functions) are 
integrated with the Ministry of Defence.  
LEVEL: AREA OF RESPONSIbILITy: ORGANISATION:
Political/strategic Develops and defines the political 
objectives, sets frameworks and allo-
cates resources. 
Norway: Government 
NATO: North Atlantic        
 Counsil (NAC)
Military/strategic Produces the relevant forces. Provides 
military advice to the political level. 
Coordinates all military means, looks 
after cooperation with civil authorities 
and organisations centrally.
Norway: Chief of
 Defence 
NATO: Supreme HQ
 Allied Powers
 Europe (SHAPE)
Operational Acts as the link between the political/
military/strategic level and the tactical 
level. Converts political objectives into 
realistic plans and operations. 
Norway: Joint Operational 
 Headquarters
 (FOHK) 
NATO:  Joint Forces 
 Command (JFC)  
Tactical Carries out concrete tactical tasks asso-
ciated with the operational objecti-
ves. 
Norway:  Tactical staffs 
NATO:   Component  
              Commands
Figure 2.5, THE LEVELS WITH THE ASSOCIATED NATIONAL AND ALLIED INSTITUTIONS  
0240. The often indistinct boundaries between the levels can in practice mean 
that military operations have closer links to the political level that has previously 
been the case. This in turn can entail the operational level having a less central 
role in the preparation and execution of operations. In certain situations, especi-
ally politically sensitive situations that can develop rapidly, it will not always be 
appropriate to have many levels and the political leadership may have a strong 
need for first-hand information and more direct control over the situation. It is 
important, however, to be clear that the operational level alone has the compe-
tence and capacity required for the preparation and execution of major joint 
operations.  
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Operations – the legal framework 
0241. International law is an umbrella term for that part of the law which governs 
relations between states in peace and during armed conflict. International law 
includes law of peace, law preventing war and law of armed conflict. International 
law also includes rules relating to international organisations, and, to a certain 
extent, individuals and non-governmental actors. International human rights are 
a part of international law and the most fundamental guarantees of human rights 
in situations of armed conflict. Areas covered by International law cover the law of 
the sea, rules for determining land borders, rules for diplomatic relations and agre-
ements associated with international finance and trade. 
0242. Law aming at preventing war ( jus contra bellum) is contained in the UN 
Charter and includes the right of self-defence ( jus ad bellum) and the powers 
vested in the Security Council to autorise the use of armed force. Law of Armed 
Conflict ( jus in bello) sets out what the parties in an armed conflict may legally 
do, including the means that it is permissible to use including disarmament 
treaties. The use of Norwegian forces and the conduct of Norwegian soldiers in 
military operations is further governed by Norwegian law which in some cases 
may set further limits within the relevant framework of international law and 
human rights. 
 
Jus ad bellum – the regulation of the use of force
0243. The UN Charter’s Article 2.4 requires states to refrain from the threat of or 
use of force in their relations with other states. This prohibition of the use of force 
is later emphasised in the UN’s Friendly Relations Declaration in requiring full 
respect for the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and 
cooperation among states. The prohibition of the use of force covers war of aggres-
sion, military occupation and the use of force or threats of use of force for any 
other reason.
0244. The UN Charter describes two exceptions from the prohibition on the use of 
force. Firstly the right to use military force in self-defence in the event of an armed 
attack (UN Charter Article 51), and secondly if there is a mandate from the Security 
Council (UN Charter Chapter VII). In addition, it would not contravene the UN Charter’s 
system to use force on the territory of another state with the consent of that 
state.
0245. The right to use military force in self-defence applies only in the event of 
armed attack and is limited by the principles of necessity, immediacy and propor-
tionality. An attack can be classified as armed with regard to Article 51 if the attack 
is either occurring, or is clearly imminent, and qualifies as an armed attack both in 
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terms of frequency and level. Mere border incidents and isolated episodes will not 
normally be considered to be of such an extent that they can be classified as armed 
attack according to the UN Charter. The UN Charter does not, however, prohibit 
states from defending their territory by military means, for example in the event 
of border incursions, as long as the use of force is not directed towards another 
state’s territorial integrity, political independence or in any other way not compa-
tible with the purposes of the UN Charter.
Jus in bello – the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)
0246. The LOAC covers the rules of international law relating to international and 
non-international armed conflicts. The purpose of the LOAC is to reduce human suf-
fering and the infringement of rights among soldiers and civilians as well as preven-
ting unnecessary material destruction. The main part of the LOAC is regulating 
interstate armed conflicts while a limited number of rules deal with armed conflicts 
within a state. Today account needs to be taken for the fact that many armed conflicts 
are intrastate, where at least one of the parties is a non-state actor. Those rules and 
limitations which apply between states are considered to a substantial degree to 
constitute a customary law basis also for rules applicable to conflicts within a 
state.  
0247. The LOAC is based on a number of general principles. The most important 
of these are:
 
•	 The principle of proportionality: It is prohibited to launch an attack which can 
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage 
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in rela-
tion to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
•	 The principle of precaution: Every effort shall be made to minimise incidental 
loss of civilian life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian property (this 
follows as an extension of the principle of proportionality).
•	 The principle of distinction: There shall be a distinction between the civilian popu-
lation and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives.
•	 The principle of necessity: Only those actions that have a legitimate military 
rationale may be taken. Military necessity justifies the use of force not other-
wise prohibited by the LOAC to the extent necessary for the purpose of the 
armed conflict. 
•	 Principle of humanity: Not even military necessity can justify unlimited human 
suffering. It is also a requirement that the sick and wounded in one’s care 
should be treated. 
 
The Martens Clause states that in the absence of specific rules under international 
law, the requirement for humanity shall still apply.
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THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
The best known collection of rules governing the conduct of war ( jus in bello) are 
contained in the Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols as well as in seve-
ral treaties regulating specific means of combat. The Martens Clause is an interpreta-
tive rule included in the Hague Convention. 
0248. LOAC does not address the question of whether the resort to use of force 
was lawful or not ( jus ad bellum). Nor is LOAC formulated to affect the outcome 
of a conflict. Whether or not a party has the right to resort to force under the 
terms of the UN Charter the rules of war must be obeyed. Conversely, abiding by 
the LOAC cannot be used to legalise an act of aggression which is essentially 
incompatible with the purposes of the UN Charter. The purpose of LOAC is to 
ensure that the use of force is directed towards targets of military significance 
and not against persons, places and objects which have no such significance. 
Human rights
0249. Human rights are laid down in international treaties, among others the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Fundamental human rights include the 
right to life, the right not to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment and the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of liberty. 
0250. The human rights limit the rights of states to arbitrary exercise power over 
individuals in times of peace, crisis and armed conflict. Some of the human rights 
are non-derogable, even in ex-
treme situations which can arise 
in armed conflicts. During recent 
years the international focus om 
human rights has increased. 
Among other things this has led 
to increased international pres-
sure on, and willingness to inter-
vene in, states where there have 
been serious violations of human 
rights. Grave breaches of human 
rights are an international pro-
blem and this has been used to 
justify military intervention, as 
for example on the occasion of 
the war in Kosovo in 1999.
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Armed Forces’ teaching on human rights and international law as applied to war 
(the law of armed conflict)
0251. Armed Forces personnel are to receive instruction and training to ensure 
that all have knowledge and understanding of human rights and the LOAC. This 
is important in ensuring the Armed Forces’ ability to deal with different situations 
during an operation without causing unnecessary suffering. The instruction and 
training is to be adapted to the needs of the particular functions that individuals 
will be performing. The Chief of Defence’s Rules for Soldiers of 14 January 2005 
summarises some of these rules which are of central importance. NATO regu­
lations (STANAG 2449) make it mandatory for all participants in international 
operations to provide their personnel with such training.  
Figure 2.6, The ChieF OF DeFeNCe’S SOLDierS’ ruLeS OF 14 JANuAry 2005. 
THE 10 SOLDIERS’ RULES
Issued by the Chief of Defence, 14 January 2005
Only attack military objectives. In addition to armed forces, military 
objectives also include objects which, by their nature, position, 
purpose or use, make an eective contribution to military actions.
Civilian persons or objects must not be attacked but must be 
respected and, as far as possible, protected against the dangers 
arising from military actions. Looting is forbidden. 
Arbitrary attacks are forbidden.
You must not carry out attacks which may be expected to cause 
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian 
objects, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated.
You must not attack persons “hors de combat” the sick, wounded or 
shipwrecked, or personnel parachuting from an aircraft in distress, 
but must rather respect and protect them. 
Personnel, transport and objects which are marked with interna-
tional protective emblems must not be attacked but must be 
respected and protected.
Misuse of protective emblems, or pretending to have the status of a 
protected person, is forbidden (perdy). You may combat the enemy 
by ruses of war (misleading information, camouage etc).
Enemy personnel who surrender, or who are taken prisoner by other 
means, must be treated humanely and protected. They must be 
disarmed and handed over to a superior ocer. Mistreatment or 
physical abuse must not take place. 
As a prisoner of war you have the right to retain personal protection 
equipment, clothing and uniform, identity papers and identity tags, 
and personal belongings. You must only give your name, rank and 
personal or serial number. 
Do your best to prevent any breach of the LOAC. Refuse to obey 
orders which violate the LOAC. Report any breaches to a superior 
ocer. 
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION SIGNS
Military and civilian medical
units (personnel, vehicles,
buildings etc), Chaplains
Medical and safety zones
Cultural buildings
or objects
Civil Defence
Parliamentary ag
Installations with hazardous
facilities (dams, dikes,
nuclear powerstations)
Prisonerof war camp
Place of civil internment
PW or PG
IC
or
RED CRYSTAL
Since the Chief of Defence’s Soldiers’ rules were issued, 
the Red Cross and the Red Crescent have been comple-
mented by the Red Crystal as a protection symbol for 
military and civilian medical units.
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Rules of Engagement (ROE)
0252. Rules of Engagement, ROE, are directives to military forces that define con-
ditions, degree and manner in which force may be applied. ROE are used in all 
types of operations nationally and internationally. They are worked out at an 
operational or at a military/strategic level and are approved at a political level. 
Within NATO they are approved by the political authorities represented by the 
North Atlantic Council/Defence Planning Committee (NAC/DPC) and in Norway 
they are approved by the Ministry of Defence. 
Figure 2.7, FACTORS GOVERNING THE FRAMING OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
0253. A mandate, often in the form of a UN Security Council resolution forms the 
basis on which ROE are framed. Such a resolution will normally be based on a 
compromise and will therefore often be formulated less precisely than a military 
commander would have preferred. Resolutions therefore have to be interpreted 
and in many cases it is a challenging task to ensure that the ROE provide the 
greatest possible flexibility for the forces concerned without leaving the forces 
open to the possible allegation that the UN’s intentions have been misunderstood 
and the mandate misinterpreted.  
0254. Rules of engagement must always be given by a competent authority. They 
are framed as a result of weighing three factors against one another. Militarily 
it is important that the forces have the mandate and the robustness to deter and 
deal with a possible escalation. Politically it is important that there is no use of 
ROE
International
and national law
The mission
requirements
Political aims and
diplomatic considerations
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force which conflicts with the political intentions and that no use is made of 
degrees or types of force that are politically unacceptable. Legally it is important 
that the force and the procedures which are prescribed should not contravene 
international law and that the use of force which has been authorised is in accor-
dance with the national law of the countries participating in any multinational 
force. The rules of engagement may be changed during the course of an opera-
tion. 
0255. The commander who authorises a mission is responsible for ensuring that 
those who are to carry out the mission have the relevant rules of engagement. 
A subordinate must never be put in a position where inadequate or unclear rules 
of engagement leave doubt as to which rules in fact apply. Rules of engagement 
are delegated downwards through the organisation in the form of orders. Rules 
of engagement are regarded as implemented when they have been imparted to 
individuals within a unit and when training in the procedures described in the 
rules of engagement concerned has been carried out. 
0256. At the individual level, rules of engagement are often provided in the form 
of a soldier’s card which describes the procedures which apply during the execu-
tion of mission. The soldier’s cards must be 
readily understandable and must give unam-
biguous instructions regarding the use of force: 
which procedures are to be followed and which 
limitations apply to the actual use of force in 
different situations.
0257. In today’s operational environments 
situations will often arise in which rules of 
engagement and pre-defined procedures may 
be insufficient. Individuals must then use their 
own personal judgement, something that is 
fundamental to the military profession (see Chapter 6). It is therefore of outmost 
importance that the individual has a good situation awareness and understading 
of the overall aims of the operation.  
0258. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT NEVER LIMIT THE RIGHT TO SELF DEFENCE
Individuals and units have the right to defend themselves against an attacker 
or an immediately imminent attack. This is governed by the principles of inter-
national law and by national laws and is never limited by rules of engagement. 
Self defence is the use of necessary and proportional force, including lethal force, 
to defend oneself.   
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0259. In multinational operations all forces under the same command are in prin-
ciple bound by unified rules of engagement, just as would always be the case in a 
national operation. At the same time it will be possible at the political level to impose 
limitations on one’s own national force contributions even within a multinational 
framework. Individual countries can also impose on their own forces special natio-
nal restrictions and/or amplifying instructions which are not associated with the 
ROE, so-called caveats. These will often take the form of limitations which are neces-
sary for political reasons, inadequate equipment or insufficient training.
0260. Unless otherwise agreed, Norwegian units under NATO command are to 
follow the rules of engagement laid down by NATO for the operation and imple-
mented by the force commander. Principles for dealing with ROE within NATO are 
described in MC 362/1, Rules of Engagement. In cases where national rules of enga-
gement have been laid down for a unit under NATO command, it is the national 
rules that are to apply. 
The operational environment 
0261. The operational environment consists of everything that surrounds a mili-
tary operation. This can be divided into two categories: physical environment and 
actors. Physical environment covers factors such as geography, climate and infra-
structure. The actors are the hostile forces, civil organisations, individual actors, 
the local population and representatives of the media with whom the Armed 
Forces’ personnel have to deal in the course of an operation. 
Physical environment 
0262.Norwegian forces have their primary operational areas in Norway and the 
adjacent sea areas. A solidly-based capability to handle extreme climatic conditions 
and rugged terrain on land, especially in the northern regions, is therefore a critical 
factor determining the nature of both training and equipment. The Armed Forces’ 
participation in international operations means, however, that the Armed Forces 
must also be trained and equipped with materiél for operations in jungle and desert 
conditions. 
FFOD Engelsk.indd   39 13-03-08   09:50:57
0
0263. Norway’s civil infrastructure is well-developed and well-functioning. Even 
if parts of it could be knocked out and disrupted 
by an attack on Norwegian territory, the sum of 
the country’s military and civil capacity would 
require any attacker to devote huge resources in 
order to negate the Armed Forces’ use of the 
domestic infrastructure. In war-torn areas the 
infrastructure might be incapacitated to a greater 
or a lesser degree. Military units deployed in such 
areas will often require solidly-based logistic sup-
port in order to be able to operate during the 
period until the local infrastructure has been suf-
ficiently restored. If the general structure of the 
operational area has been comprehensively 
destroyed, the use of military resources will often 
be needed for reconstruction, especially if the security situation puts civil efforts 
at risk of attack.
0264. Urbanisation is a characteristic pattern of development in large parts of 
the world today. To an increasing extent military forces have had to adapt to the 
requirements of operations in urban areas. 
Towns are often important in ensuring the 
safety of the infrastructure, social develop-
ment and maintaining the support of the 
local population. Irregular forces often see 
towns as attractive areas for their opera-
tions. Towns provide good opportunities 
for concealment and access to resources 
and re-supply is good. Large towns and 
cities are characterised by low visibility 
due to man-made structures of different 
shapes and sizes. City structures can cover 
large areas, have many sub-ground storeys 
and perhaps tens of storeys above ground. Thick floors, walls and roofs of rein-
forced concrete provide good possibilities for cover. A large number of civilians 
in the area greatly complicates regular combat operations both technically and 
from a legal and ethical standpoint.
Actors
0265. In the operational area there will be a range of different actors, hostile and 
non-hostile, military and civilian. The following section describes regular and 
irregular forces as well as other actors such as the local population, aid organisa-
tions, private commercial enterprises and the media.
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Regular forces
0266. Regular forces are essentially those under the control of a state, often part 
of an alliance, and they may consist of traditional land, sea and air forces. Their 
command structure is often traditional and hierarchical. Such an opponent will 
possess the competence that is required to co-ordinate his force components. 
The operations may be supported by special forces and information operations. 
A proliferation of relatively cheap and easily accessible rocket and missile tech-
nology has made cruise missiles and short to medium range missiles with chemical 
or biological warheads into a possible threat. A regular opponent is able to change 
his modus operandi if his original way of operating is not bringing results and to 
switch from regular operations to guerrilla operations. 
0267. A weakened regular force is under the control of a state or a powerful war-
lord and may consist of relatively small land forces possibly augmented by some 
seaborne vessels and aircraft. In addition they may often include irregular land 
and seaborne forces of limited combat capability. The force will frequently operate 
with no direct coordination between components but will be able to take good 
advantage of local knowledge and the ability to make use of local infrastructure. 
Anti-ship missiles and anti-aircraft guns and missiles may be used against ships 
and aircraft. Civil information structure may be used for information operations. 
A weakened regular force will be capable of using relatively inaccessible terrain, 
the urban landscape and the civil inhabitants for concealment and logistic 
 purposes. 
Irregular forces 
0268. Irregular forces are most often under non-state control and may, for exam-
ple, consist of militia groups, rebel movements, terrorists and criminal groups. A 
common characteristic of irregular forces is often their aim is to acquire power 
and influence in the conflict area based on political interests, ethnic or religious 
reasons or simply for financial gain. 
0269. Irregular forces are seldom in uniform and are therefore difficult to distin-
guish from the local inhabitants. Their organisation is often based on a cell struc-
ture and a network with decentralised leadership. They often use elements of the 
local infrastructure such as mobile phones and the Internet for communication. 
They employ unconventional methods and will seek to avoid direct encounters 
with regular combat units. They can use man-portable surface-to-air missiles and 
anti-aircraft guns to provide an airspace threat and by employing sabotage against 
ports and airfields they are able to threaten the other party’s freedom of action 
at sea and in the air. In many cases they have the ability to conduct information 
operations. Irregular forces can be defined as combatants if, among other things, 
the conditions set out in the first Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, 
Article 43, are fulfilled. If they are not defined as legal combatants, they will be 
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seen as civilians who are actively participating in an armed conflict and, as such, 
they may be made the direct target of military operations.
0270. An insurgency is an organised force which seeks power centrally or regio-
nally. Insurgencies are the type of irregular forces which are often the best orga-
nised and they may be capable of representing the greatest challenge for Nor-
wegian forces. Combating an insurgency cannot be isolated as a local or regional 
problem but the relationship between different insurgencies, their strategies and 
any external supporting players, must also be taken into consideration.  
COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS
NATO designates operations against insurgencies as Counter Insurgency Operations 
(COIN). Such operations combine military, diplomatic and economic measures designed 
to combat the movement, its external support and support from the local inhabit-
ants. 
0271. An insurgency will attempt to achieve its aims through methods such as 
subversion, propaganda, infiltration or violence, including armed combat. Their 
actions may be directed against the local population in order to win, or force their 
support, or against other parties to the conflict. They may also be directed against 
international civil actors or directly against the stabilization force in order either 
to attract attention or create international splits or disunity. Effective insurgencies 
will adapt their methods and tactics to the existing circumstances and will be 
dependent on:
•	 support from the local population,
•	 a clear, unified leadership,
•	 strong and consistent organisation and a clear shared vision, 
•	 external support in the form of resources and safe areas for recruiting and 
training, 
•	 the ability to form conventional units and possibly to operate together with 
conventional forces from supporting or allied organisations. 
0272. Terrorists and criminal groups seldom have the capacity to operate in military 
formations. Ideology, visions and aims may have a global dimension even though 
the action itself may be local or regional. Their strategy may be to combine actions 
in the operational area with direct attacks on states that they see as hostile. The 
groups prefer to operate “underground” but can be provoked into attacks or acts 
of terrorism if their primary activities are threatened. They often operate among 
the local population and make use of towns and civil infrastructure for operations 
and attacks. Target groups are then preferably soft targets such as civilians or 
lightly armed military units.  In general, civilians who make use of terror to achieve 
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their aims must be regarded as criminals. Under international law this category 
is not given rights and obligations other than as individuals. The main responsi-
bility for combating criminality lies with the police but if terrorists or criminal 
groups participate actively in an armed conflict, they may legally be targets for 
military operations even if they are not actual combatants. In such cases this will 
normally be covered by the rules of engagement. 
CONFLICT ENTREPRENEURS
A characteristic feature of the armed conflicts which have dominated the internatio-
nal scene since 1990 are the so-called conflict entrepreneurs. They live off wars and 
conflicts and amass power and riches by exploiting the anarchy and lack of central 
control that typifies an armed conflict. Thus they are not interested in rapid solutions 
but would rather work for the continuation of the conflict for as long as possible. 
Conflict entrepreneurs will often avoid a direct encounter with a military force. Their 
strategy would rather be to avoid losing in the long term. The patience and endurance 
of the international community is limited and, sooner or later, more precarious situa-
tions will find their way onto the international agenda. 
The local population
0273. In armed conflicts civilians must not become the targets of military attack 
and the local population in the operational area must be protected. Experience 
shows, however, that it is often the civilian 
population that suffers most. War and con-
flict have often created very difficult living 
conditions for those living in the conflict 
area. Civilians are often under great stress 
due to illness and loss of family members, 
their sources of income and their homes. In 
such situations events that might in our 
eyes seem trivial can have serious repercus-
sions expressed, perhaps, in the form of 
aggression, rioting and acts of violence. 
0274. People who experience stress and 
insecurity will, naturally, hope for a rapid improvement in the situation. This means 
that there will often be fertile ground for populism, with charismatic leader figu-
res gaining a large following, or that parties to the conflict who promise a swift 
improvement in local living conditions will win support. Dealing with the local 
inhabitants requires a general insight into how human relations are affected by 
stress and a specific understanding of the culture and traditions of the area con-
cerned. 
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Aid organisations
0275.International organisations (IO) which operate in conflict areas are a large 
and varied group, but can be divided roughly into non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and organisations which have state affiliations. A common feature of 
these organisations is that their work is based on the principles of humanity, 
impartiality and neutrality. Humanity implies stopping human suffering. Impar-
tiality implies that all individuals, irrespective of gender, ethnic background or 
religion, have a right to support, and that the prioritisation of support should be 
based on need. Neutrality means not taking sides for or against any of the parties 
in conflict. 
0276. A military force is dependent on well functioning cooperation with aid 
organisations for the success of an operation. (In Integrated Missions such 
cooperation is an essential precondition). Such cooperation requires mutual know-
ledge of one another, dialogue and a mutual respect for the various mandates 
identities, priorities, time perspectives and organisational cultures that military 
organisations and aid organisations represent.
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INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
International organisations with state affiliations have their origin in agreements 
reached between states at national level and are often financed and operated through 
the UN. Examples of such organisations are UNHCR (The United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees) and UNHCHR (The Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights), or OCHR (Office for the Coordination of Human Rights) and UNICEF (United 
Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund). These and similar organisations are 
directed towards mitigating human suffering. 
The Red Cross and Red Crescent occupy a special position compared with the other aid 
organisations. They originated from private initiatives while at the same time they 
have their role and status enshrined in the Geneva Conventions and its Additional 
Protocols. They are acknowledged to be impartial and independent organisations 
which, on a humanitarian basis, work to protect life and support those who suffer as 
a result of armed conflict. In addition they monitor how the parties to a conflict treat 
and exchange prisoners of war. 
Non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) are voluntary organisations. 
They differ from organisations with 
state affiliations in that they 
themselves decide on their pro-
grammes and tasks. The concept of 
an NGO is a broad one which covers 
everything from large international 
organisations and organisations 
associated with particular faiths (in 
Norway, for example, the missio-
nary organisations have traditio-
nally occupied a central position) to smaller regional or local organisations engaged 
in aid work in various areas. Some examples of NGOs are Médecins Sans Frontières, 
Amnesty International and Norwegian Church Aid. 
Private commercial enterprises
0277. Private commercial enterprises often feature in many of the areas in which 
Norwegian forces may have to operate. These enterprises and their employees 
are not, in general, working under any mandate or for any humanitarian cause, 
but for business and financial reasons. Apart from this common denominator, 
such enterprises constitute a very broad category ranging from multinational 
companies to local one-man businesses. In a reconstruction phase such private 
commercial enterprises will have a part to play in creating employment and, in 
the longer term, helping to build a fully functioning society.  
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PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES
Private military companies can be divided into three categories: those that supply 
purely military services, those that supply support for normal military operations and 
those that provide consultancy services to normal military organisations. 
The use of mercenaries is prohibited while the use of civilian contractors is permitted. 
Suppliers of purely military services often offer guard and security services, something 
that raises questions under international law. Suppliers of purely military services 
prefer to recruit former elite forces personnel in return for very favourable pay and 
insurance terms. Examples of such enterprises are Executive Outcome, which recruited 
personnel from the former South African regime’s defence forces when it was set up 
in 1989, and the British company Sandline which, among other things, carried out a 
military intervention in Papua-New Guinea in 1997. In more recent times such firms 
have signalled that they are ready to take on more extensive missions. The American 
firm Blackwater stated in 2006 that they were in a position to undertake peacekeeping 
missions in Darfur with a full brigade-strength combat group. Following the collapse 
of the Soviet Union there has been a marked increase in the number of such compa-
nies in the East and they have been used in areas including Chechnya. 
The second category, private military companies that supply support for normal mili-
tary operations, has now assumed a very central role in many countries, especially in 
the United States. These companies support military operations in a whole range of 
areas, particularly on the logistics side but also, for example, in the area of guarding 
and security. They like to recruit former military personnel and can become indispen-
sable when major operations are to be carried out. One example is Kellogg, Brown 
and Root in the United States with more than 20,000 employees and currently respon-
sible for vital supplies to the US military. 
The third category is firms that supply military consultancy services. One example is 
Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), which is mainly staffed by retired 
US officers. The company’s services include studies, reports and exercise planning for 
the US military.  
0278. Companies engaged to support the Norwegian forces must have their acti-
vities regulated by agreements and regulations and they must be open to over-
sight regarding, for example, how they conduct their business and those areas 
relevant to the maintenance of operational security (OPSEC). In accordance with 
limitations laid down by Parliament, the Norwegian Armed Forces may not enter 
into contracts with private commercial enterprises for any combat functions or 
in connection with the handling of prisoners. In addition, caution must always 
be exercised in concluding other types of contract with private enterprises and 
particular weight must be given to considerations of human rights and interna-
tional law.    
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Media
0279. The media have the right to report from conflict areas in which the Armed 
Forces are operating. The status of war correspondents is governed by the provi-
sions of the Geneva Conventions. It is important to ensure good relations with 
the representatives of the media who are present in the operational area in order, 
for example, to help to ensure that they convey a true picture of the area and of 
the Armed Forces’ operations. Contact with the media, however, entails a difficult 
balance to strike between meeting the needs of the media for information and 
the need to maintain operational security. The operational staff will have a press 
and information section which is responsible for taking care of contacts with the 
media and the production and distribution of a media policy for the operation 
concerned. 
0280. The media play a central role in today’s conflicts. Live pictures from the area 
of operations are often broadcasted direct and affect public opinion both domes-
tically and internationally. There have been cases in which hostage-taking and 
other high-profile actions have been used to influence an actor or to affect public 
opinion at home. In certain cases such actions have contributed to the changing, 
or even the termination, of military involvement. 
0281. Potent pictures of soldiers abusing other military personnel, or local civilian 
inhabitants, are of major significance to the legitimacy of an operation. The Inter-
net has turned cameras and mobile phones into global instruments of informa-
tion. Any individual action, incident or operation can in seconds be transmitted 
worldwide – and can thus be used for either good or evil. 
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The technological dimension
0282. Technological developments and military operations are closely interlinked. 
Technology which is developed and used in a military context has as its objective 
to support the military activity in achieving its desired effect. At the same time 
it is important to be clear that armed conflict is won or lost by people, not by 
technology. It is the personnel of the Armed Forces who, in the end, will determine 
whether an operation succeeds or fails.  
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 
Technological development can be divided into two categories: Technology which 
gradually improves/reforms warfighting ability and technology which revolutionises 
warfare. Under the latter category would be, for example, the expansion of the rail 
and telegraph networks in Europe and the development of the machine gun in the 
latter half of the 19th century. Another example would be the development of air 
combat technology and nuclear weapons during the last century. More recently the 
development of the microprocessor and the associated technology for the processing 
and distribution of information has played a similar role. 
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New possibilities and threats 
0283. New technology allows greater precision and security in military operations. 
Advanced sensors and processors make it possible to discover threats, process 
information and implement countermeasures more quickly than would have 
been possible a few years ago. At the same time this same technology has also 
created new threats. The terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 
2001 showed how commercial, and originally harmless, technology can be used 
in attacks which have powerful effects, both direct and indirect, on many levels.
0284. The latest gene-technology makes it possible to produce advanced biolo-
gical weapons in substantial quantities at low cost. Access to fissile material 
worldwide could make it possible for new actors to acquire nuclear weapons or, 
perhaps more likely, conventional bombs contaminated with easily spreadable 
radioactive material, so-called “dirty bombs”, which could have a hugely damaging 
effect in densely populated areas. 
0285. Information technology and society’s dependence on such technology is 
perhaps the area in which the threats and society’s vulnerability are greatest. It 
is true that information technology has opened up new and effective ways in 
which operations may be carried out, but at the same time it has created new 
possibilities with adverse connotations. For instance the Internet has created a 
new arena in which persons with limited resources can act in ways that have a 
significant effect on public opinion, for example through hostage taking or extor-
tion. The Internet can also be used in terrorist actions, for example as a means of 
command and control. 
Technology trends in today’s operational environments
0286. Today’s operational environments make partially conflicting demands on 
technology and current developments in military technology are heading in many 
different directions. The Armed Forces, however, see four lines of development as 
being especially worthy of attention. 
0287. Firstly, the opponents encountered by Norway and our allies in the course 
of operations in recent years have been equipped with low-technology conven-
tional weapons. These actors have been reliant on a level of military technology 
corresponding to that current in the West in the 1960s and 1970s and their air-
borne and maritime combat forces have been relatively insignificant. These 
opponents, however, have often chosen to operate in a way that renders the state 
of technology largely irrelevant. They have made use of old technology, for exam-
ple in home-made roadside bombs (Improvised Explosive Devises, IED) and suicide 
bombers. They have also combined these and similar methods with the use of 
new civil technology, for instance, use of mobile phones and the Internet. 
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0288. One conclusion might be that the Armed Forces should not invest in new 
and expensive technology but rather focus on existing technology and materiél. 
However, such a conclusion could be too hasty: The Armed Forces could in future 
be faced by high-technology opponents. Alternatively the Armed Forces could con-
centrate on the development of technology in such a way that it is constantly 
adapted to relevant operational environments. Such a course of development is 
already under way. In parallel with the development of new and advanced military 
technology, for example, attention is being focused on sensors for the detection of 
explosives in public places, on technology which can prevent or interfere with the 
remote detonation of bombs, and on a broader spectrum of non-lethal weapons.
0289. Secondly, there is naturally a very low level of tolerance regarding the injury 
or loss of own personnel, the unnecessary use of violence, or the infliction of 
unintentional damage (collateral damage). This makes severe demands on the 
development of technological solutions and has contributed to acceleration in 
the development of precision guided weapons delivered from platforms at a safe 
distance from the conflict area. The low tolerance regarding the injury or loss of 
personnel has also led to increased investment in unmanned platforms and 
sensors as well as non-lethal weapons.
0290. Thirdly, technology development today is, to an extent, forced to focus on 
system integration and interoperability with our allies. The Norwegian Armed 
Forces have to go along with the technology developments taking place within 
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NATO if we are to be capable of operating jointly with our allies. This applies 
especially to the development of interoperable information and command and 
control systems where we have to be able to operate in networks.
0291. Fourthly, today’s operational environments are complex and coordination 
with civil actors, both nationally and internationally, is very important. This com-
plexity has made it necessary to develop command and control and surveillance 
systems which are, or can be made, interoperable with a broad spectrum of civil 
systems. 
Norway and technology development 
0292. The principle challenge facing the Armed Forces with regard to technology 
development is to maintain current operational capability at a sufficiently high 
level while at the same time develo-
ping future capability within the rele-
vant budgetary constraints. Today the 
cost of technology development in 
the military sector is very high. One 
consequence is the increased use of 
civil technology for military purposes. 
Another consequence is that small 
and medium-sized states are to an 
increasing extent coordinating their 
research and development in this 
area, in the interests, of developing 
common technology which can then 
be applied in a range of platforms and 
sensors. It is clearly not possible for 
Norway to maintain a leading position across many different fields of technology. 
The Norwegian strategy is therefore to win a position at the forefront in a few 
chosen areas, to participate in international research and development in others 
and, where possible, to buy ready developed products on the market. 
0293. The Norwegian Armed Forces’ strategy with regard to keeping up with 
developments in technology is to maintain its own R&D environment; to engage 
in close cooperation with industry, including the defence industry; and, at the 
same time, to enter into collaboration arrangements for the procurement of 
defence equipment within NATO, in the Nordic area, and with other countries as 
appropriate.
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3.  Armed Forces’ Operational Foundation 
0301. This chapter describes the Armed Forces’ Operational Foundation. It starts 
by outlining the ideas that form the foundation, then describes what the concept 
of flexibility means and concludes by identifying the Operational Foundations´ 
three operational methods. 
   
Figure 3.1, ARMED FORCES’ OPERATIONAL FOUNDATION  
0302. The ideas on which the Operational Foundation is based consist of the 
effects-based, network-based and the manoeuvrist approaches. These three appro-
aches together constitute a culture which the Norwegian Armed Forces wants 
to develop both at the individual level and in the organisation as a whole. The 
effects-based approach is about focusing on the result, not the action in itself, 
and to see your own operation in a wider context. The network-based approach 
focuses on organising all resources in the most appropriate way in order to achieve 
the best possible situation awareness and system integration. The manoeuvrist 
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approach is about mastering the psychological dimension of combat by under-
standing combat as a battle of wills characterised by uncertainty, chaos and fric-
tion. The concept of flexibility means to be flexible in the choice of method, orga-
nisation, decision level and conduct. The manoeuvre method, attrition method 
and the stabilizing method are described as ideal types and the operational com-
mander chooses how he or she combines them to produce the desired effect.
0303. The Operational Foundation is formulated to give a good overall description 
of how the Armed Forces’ resources shall be used to achieve given tasks. Firstly 
it contributes to the efficient use of the Armed Forces’ human and material resour-
ces. Secondly it ensures interoperability both internally within the Norwegian 
Armed Forces and with allies. Thirdly the Operational Foundation can be employed 
over the entire conflict spectrum and in all types of operational environments at 
home and abroad.
0304. The Operational Foundation applies primarily to the planning and execution 
of operations but also forms a basis for education and training, materiel procu-
rement and the development of concepts at lower levels. 
In this Chapter the various parts of the Armed Forces’ Operational Foundation are 
described briefly – with the emphasis placed on conveying the overall picture. The 
underlying theories and concepts are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.  
Fundamental ideas
0305. The Armed Forces’ Operational Foundation makes use of the concept of an 
approach. In this context the concept means implanting the essence of theore-
tical schools of thought as a culture – as a tool with which to approach problems 
– at an individual level. The theoretical schools of thought have been chosen 
because they supplementary describe the otimal use of our resources and are 
relevant to the achievement of a broad spectrum of tasks. They also harmonise 
with our allies’ doctrines and concepts, enhancing interoperability without making 
it necessary for the Armed Forces to become locked to specific procedures and 
technical solutions. Common fundamental ideas also make it possible to develop 
specific concepts and systems at a tactical level which can then be integrated in 
joint operations.
Effects-based approach
0306. The effects-based approach is firstly to see the Armed Forces’ operations 
in a wider context, where own actions are coordinated with other military and 
civil actions. Secondly it is about analysing oneself, the opponent and other actors 
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as complex systems in which many factors interact. Thirdly – and most impor-
tantly, an effects-based approach means focusing on the effects that are to be 
achieved amongst the opponent and other actors in order to succeed in the task 
and, in the final instance to fulfil the desired political and strategic aims. In the 
effects-based approach it is of fundamental importance to focus on the effects 
which are to be achieved, and not on the means one possesses. 
0307. The effects-based approach requires that decision makers at all levels in 
the military organisation are in a position to:
•	 analyse which effects that must be achieved in order to accomplish the task, 
and to choose the means on the basis of this analysis,
•	 understand that all the actions, and the particular means chosen, will result 
in effects on the opponent, other parties in a conflict, allies, the civilian popu-
lation in the operational area and on opinion generally both at home and 
abroad,  
•	 integrate ones own contribution with the broader picture in which the effect of 
one’s own actions are seen in context with other actions, both military and civil, 
and which are designed to achieve the desired effects on a political level.
  
0308. It is important to be clear that the need to analyse the effects of one’s own 
actions becomes more pressing the more powerful the means at one’s disposal 
and the higher one is placed in the organisation. The effects-based approach is 
certainly dependent on good access to information, and analysis of that infor-
mation, but the effects-based approach must not lead to an exaggerated search 
for information about, and analysis of, all the conceivable effects of a course of 
action. Combat will always be chaotic, characterised by complexity and the fact 
that not all information can be available to all at any given time. An exaggerated 
focus on effects can lead to action paralysis. 
Network-based approach
0309 The network-based approach is about developing people, organisation and 
technology. It is about organising one’s resources as effectively as possible in 
order to achieve the highest possible degree of system integration, situation 
awareness and understanding of the commander’s intentions. This doctrine makes 
use of the idea of a network-based approach to emphasise that the concept of 
Network-Based Defence (NBD) must not be regarded as the ultimate and “right” 
condition, but that basing the Defence Forces on networks should rather be seen 
as a continuous process of development which is progressed through mutual 
interaction between organisation and individual. 
0310. The network-based approach requires that decision makers at all levels in 
the military organisation contribute to: 
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•	 the development of a common culture of information sharing based on the 
will and ability to find new solutions for the exchange of information,
•	 the development of systems for the transfer of information between weapon 
systems and service branches, and between the Armed Forces and relevant 
civil collaborative partners,  
•	 the development of staffs and decision processes to ensure that use can be 
made of real time information,
•	 the development of flexible military units which can be modified and combi-
ned to form small, independent forces on an ad hoc basis,
•	 the development of networks which include both military and non-military 
actors, based on direct communication between the actors,  
•	 the development of commanders who can make use of the possibilities offe-
red by networks for the gathering and distribution of information and for the 
exchange of information between centralised and decentralised decision pro-
cesses in a given situation.
0311. It is important to be clear that the developing trend towards network basing 
will require new equipment and new forms of organisation. At the same time, 
the development towards network basing can be progressed with existing mate-
riel and organisational structures, possibly with minor modifications, through 
better and more rational utilisation and by using them in entirely new ways.  
Manoeuvrist approach
0312. The manoeuvrist approach is to understand the psychological aspect of 
combat. Combat is a battle of wills, characterised by uncertainty, friction and 
chaos. By mastering these challenges more effectively than the opponent, we 
can actually turn them to our advantage. 
0313. The manoeuvrist approach requires that decision makers at all levels in the 
military organisation:  
•	 can live with uncertainty, friction and chaos and turn them to their own advan-
tage,
•	 are focused on the opponent with an unyielding will to succeed,  
•	 have the ability to analyse how the available means can be deployed to achieve 
as much as possible of the desired effect on the opponent – with the least use 
of one’s own resources, 
•	 have confidence that the right actions, taken at the right time, will force the 
opponent to yield to our own will, and that this can make it possible for a small 
force to overcome a larger one,
•	 take action in line with mission command with decentralised decision making, 
which is the fundamental philosophy of the Armed Forces for the command 
of operations.
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0314. The manoeuvrist approach is on a general level and not to be confused with 
the manoeuvre method. The latter is an operational method encompassing a set 
of operational techniques. The manoeuvrist approach can be used at all levels 
and applies to all operational methods even if it has its most concrete expression 
during operations based on the manoeuvre method.  
Flexibility
0315. Flexibility is the ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Flexibility is the 
most important, but at the same time the most difficult, capability to develop 
for the Armed Forces. Flexibility makes great demands on the individuals, the 
organisation and the materiel involved in an operation, and on those factors 
which together create combat capability. 
0316. Flexibility comes partly from being trained and equipped for tasks across 
the whole of the conflict spectrum and partly from possessing the ability to adjust 
the operational methods when circumstances change during the course of an 
operation. The Armed Forces’ Operational Foundation describes general flexibility 
as applying to ideas and a way of thinking, and specific flexibility as applying to 
the choice of decision level, organisation, conduct and operational method.
Flexible decision level
0317. A flexible decision level implies having the ability to make decisions at that 
level in the organisation which has the best situation awareness and is thus best 
placed to make the right decisions. But this can pose a dilemma. On the one hand 
the fundamental philosophy of the Armed Forces advocates mission command; 
that is to say a form of command in which responsibility and authority are dis-
tributed and decisions are taken at the lowest possible level. On the other hand 
it can be difficult to combine mission command with the wider view and longer 
term perspective which are necessary if an operation is to achieve the desired 
effects right up to the political level. In today’s organisation it is mainly the stra-
tegic and operational level that possesses this capability. Situations can thus arise 
where the central level has the best awareness of the situation and where the 
tempo can best be maintained by centralised command.  
0318. The Armed Forces face the challenge of developing commanders and techni-
cal systems in such a way that decisions can be made at different levels in the 
organisation. It is a particular challenge to develop commanders at all levels in 
such a way that they are routinely capable of taking the initiative and making 
decisions at their own level while at the same time be able to respond rapidly to 
direct orders from a higher level. Switching between centralised and decentrali-
sed command is one of the greatest challenges associated with Network Based 
Defence.
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Flexible organisation 
0319. Flexible organisation entails the ability to switch between large, permanent 
organisational units on the one side and task organisation on the other. This 
means that it must be possible for detachments and units right down to a single 
platform to be assembled to form customised units with the specific properties 
required in a given situation. It must also be possible to change the organisation 
rapidly during the course of an operation. This type of flexibility makes stringent 
demands on logistics, for example, because the various systems require different 
forms of logistic support. The ability to distribute materiel, and the competence 
required to support different systems, will often be decisive in determining how 
far down the organisation it is possible to practise task organising. The Armed 
Forces thus attach much weight to developing their capabilities in these areas. 
0320. Development in the direction of a flexible organisation must be a gradual 
process which needs to be kept under continuous evaluation. Experience shows 
that a random assembly of units which is not adapted and trained for this situa-
tion is likely to perform a task less well than would be the case if the task was 
performed by the units individually. 
Flexible conduct
0321. The broad spectrum of the Armed Forces’ tasks, and the different methods 
described, make substantial demands on the Armed Forces as a whole and on 
individual members of the services. With the manoeuvre method, the force will 
strive to act unpredictably and at a high tempo and with the use of force. With 
the stabilizing method the same force will endeavour to act predictably and to 
build confidence. In stabilization operations, and in combat against irregular for-
ces, this can be extremely challenging. Such operations will often take place in 
environments that make extreme demands on the individual. Success in these 
operations is dependent on broad support from the local population and in public 
opinion generally. This means, for example, that military personnel must on the 
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one hand act in a way that creates confidence and invites dialogue. On the other 
hand the same personnel must from time to time carry out pure combat opera-
tions in which the aim is to defeat the opponent. The conduct of such operations 
must then be characterised by decisiveness, the use of force and unpredicta-
bility.  
0322. The ability to behave flexibly at an individual level can only be achieved by 
recruiting the right calibre of people and by providing them with thorough edu-
cation and training as well as the appropriate equipment. This also means that 
the personal development of service personnel must place emphasis not only on 
the traditional skills associated with combat but also on knowledge in history 
and culture. 
THE THREE BLOCK WAR
The concept of “The Three Block War” was devised in the late 1990s by General Charles C. 
Krulak (US Marine Corps). The concept describes the need for flexibility not only between 
different operations but also within a single operation. The Three Block War is a metaphor 
to describe the complexity of today’s operations in which soldiers may have to conduct 
high-intensity operations, stabilization operations and humanitarian operations all within 
three contiguous city blocks.    
Flexible choice of method
0323. Flexibility in choice of method is about having the ability to combine prin-
ciples from the manoeuvre, attrition and stabilizing methods in order to achieve 
the desired results in different types of operations. An operational force must 
also have the ability to adapt and adjust the chosen method continuously while 
carrying out the task.  
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Armed Forces’ operational methods
0324. The Armed Forces’ Operational Foundation covers the manoeuvre method, 
attrition method and the stabilizing method.  These are ideal types and are seldom 
employed in their pure forms in the conduct of operations. The circle in Figure 3.2 
shows how the methods can be combined and how emphasis on the various met-
hods can be altered depending on the type of mission and the effects desired.
Figure 3.2, THE ARMED FORCES’ OPERATIONAL METHODS 
0325. The three operational methods can be applied to Armed Forces’ operations 
both at home and abroad. 
•	 The manoeuvre method covers mainly principles for crisis management at high 
conflict levels and armed conflict nationally, and combat against regular forces 
abroad.
•	 The attrition method covers predominantly principles for crisis management 
at relatively high conflict levels and armed conflict nationally, as well as com-
bat against irregular and regular forces internationally. 
•	 The stabilizing method covers mainly principles for crisis management at low 
conflict levels nationally and the conduct of stabilization operations. 
 
0326. The choice of operational method can vary through the various phases of a 
conflict. Choice of method can also vary between the different levels within a par-
ticular operation. An operation which is first and foremost stabilizing in nature at 
a strategic level may require use of principles from the manoeuvre method or the 
attrition method at the operational and/or tactical level. Deterrence through ope-
rations according to the attrition method can be the right answer during an initial 
phase of a conflict, but if the deterrence does not yield the desired result it will be 
possible to switch to a form of action dominated by the manoeuvre method. 
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The manoeuvre method 
0327. The manoeuvre method’s objective is to influence the adversary’s will to 
continue the combat. The manoeuvre method builds on the presumption that 
the adversary is a rational actor and that he has a command structure and orga-
nisation that causes him to give up when he experiences defeat and power-
lessness. The method is thus mainly designed with combat against regular forces 
in mind. In using the manoeuvre method, emphasis is placed on the techniques 
of surprise, initiative, indirect method, tempo and mission command.
0328. An operation in accordance with the manoeuvre method is characterised 
by the prioritising of high tempo and willingness to take risks rather than nume-
rical superiority and safety, and by achieving surprise through offensive operations 
at places and times least expected by the adversary. In such an operation one 
avoids the adversary’s main force and directs action instead against his critical 
vulnerabilities, for example his command apparatus and logistics. A breakthrough 
in the adversary’s defences is immediately exploited in depth in places and at 
times of our own choosing. Decisions are made at a decentralised level in order 
to give units at lower levels opportunities to take the initiative and thereby place 
the adversary under constant pressure. 
0329. The manoeuvre method is a demanding operational method. It requires a 
generally high standard of training, forces capable of high tempo and mobility, 
and commanders with the will and ability to take calculated risks. An operation 
in accordance with the manoeuvre method will be suitable when the aim is to 
defeat an adversary. The emphasis placed on the use of force and the collapse of 
the adversary can, however, give rise to difficulties in the end phase and subse-
quent reconstruction in the area of operations. The manoeuvre method must 
therefore often be complemented with operations in accordance with the stabi-
lizing method.
0330. History and experience have shown that the actors involved seldom react 
in line with the expectations held at the time when an operation in accordance 
with the manoeuvre method is launched. On the contrary, it has been shown on 
many occasions that the systematic defeat of the adversary’s combat forces (the 
attrition method) has been an essential precondition in forcing the adversary to 
give up. In practice, therefore, operations against a regular or irregular adversary 
will often consist of a combination of the manoeuvre and attrition methods. 
Nevertheless, by mastering and utilising principles from the manoeuvre method, 
favourable situations can be created with a view both on destroying the adversary’s 
capability and breaking down his will.  
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The attrition method
0331. The attrition method is intended, as its overall objective, to influence the 
adversary’s ability to continue combat. The attrition method can be implemented 
in accordance with two principles. The first principle is low intensity and stresses 
the use of time, often by avoiding decisive battle, to wear down the adversary. 
The second principle is high intensity and makes use of numerical or technologi-
cal superiority to destroy the adversary’s ability to continue combat.  
THE ATTRITION METHOD THEN AND NOW
During the Cold War, Norway and other western countries based their strategy largely 
on the threat of long-lasting operations in accordance with the attrition method. The 
rationale was that this threat would deter potential aggressors. Important elements 
of the strategy were the Total defence concept, defence forces based on extensive 
mobilisation and a relatively low degree of mechanisation and considerable depth. 
Simply equipped but numerically large conscript forces should ensure that an attack 
on Norway would be a long drawn out affair. Since the end of the Cold War, attrition 
has been used as the operational method several times. The war in Kosovo in 1999 is 
one example. In spring 1999 NATO carried out a bombing campaign over a period of 
more than two months which gradually wore down the adversary’s forces and their 
will to continue fighting. It can be seen as something of a paradox that most western 
countries at that time either had removed the attrition method from their military 
doctrines in favour of concepts of operations based on the manoeuvre method alone, 
or were in the process of doing so.      
0332. The low intensity principle harmonises with the principles the doctrine 
describes for combat against irregular forces. According to this principle, attrition 
is achieved by inflicting on the adversary a series of losses, often over a long 
period, so that he gradually comes to feel that the price of continuing combat 
will be too high. This principle has often been used by irregular forces and has 
then shown itself to be effective against coalition forces by causing opinion at 
home to move towards the view that the price of continuing combat will be too 
high when measured against what is at stake. Threats of this type of attrition 
warfare can also be used to deter a potential intervention or an aggressor.
0333. The second principle in the attrition method is that of high intensity. Here 
numerical and/or technological superiority is used to defeat an adversary. This 
numerical and/or technological superiority is used to overpower the adversary 
with a lesser degree of risk than there would be in the case of operations in 
accordance with the manoeuvre method. This is done by making use of techno-
logy to find the adversary and attack him with weapon systems against which 
he has little chance of defending himself, for example by using systems from 
outside the range of his capabilities. 
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The attrition method against irregular forces 
0334. In combat against irregular forces one will often be facing attrition warfare 
of low intensity, something which calls for great patience and determination. 
This means that combat against such forces requires flexibility and an effects-
based approach. Combat against irregular forces can be summarised in terms of 
five actions which will often take place in parallel. These are:
 
•	 Action which is taken directly against the irregular force. These are offensive 
actions to find and fix a force (limit its room for manoeuvre), cut its lines of 
communication and strike it. 
•	 Actions undertaken for the purpose of protecting the civil population physically 
against the irregular forces and thereby isolating the adversary from the civil 
population. 
•	 Actions which are directed against the irregular force’s external support. The 
twin purposes are to cut off the irregular force physically from such support 
and to influence external actors so that they themselves cut off their support. 
This can be done through a combination of military and civil means. 
•	 Actions to build trust among the local population, both in the lawful local 
authorities and in our forces, so that they switch their allegiance away from 
the irregular force (Hearts and Minds operations). This type of action is mainly 
about improving living conditions for the local inhabitants but can also take 
the form of pure information campaigns.
•	 Actions directed towards protecting our own operations or civil actors. The 
objective is to maintain freedom of movement in the area and to protect own 
personnel, bases and supply lines.
 
0335. It is important that all personnel who take part in operations against irre-
gular forces should understand that the methods which are used will be of deci-
sive importance from the point of view of winning acceptance among the local 
inhabitants. When making a choice of methods, therefore, it is necessary conti-
nually to weigh up what will be most effective in eliminating a threat against 
what will be accepted by the local inhabitants. 
The attrition method against regular forces 
0336. Emphasis will often be placed on the manoeuvre method in combat against 
regular forces. At the same time it is often necessary to achieve the comprehen-
sive defeat of the adversary’s forces in order to gain the desired effect. While the 
manoeuvre method implies a high degree of risk, use of the attrition method in 
high intensity conflicts will make use of a numerical and/or technological superi-
ority to overpower the adversary with a lower degree of risk.  
0337. When using the attrition method against regular forces, emphasis is placed 
on principles such as force build-up, preparatory elimination of the adversary’s 
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most important systems and subsequent combat with a high degree of coordi-
nation. Less weight is placed on risk and tempo. Instead the accent is on safety, 
force concentration and firepower.
0338. During operations in accordance with the attrition method, the Armed 
Forces will systematically attack the adversary’s systems so that the battle can 
be fought on one’s own terms. Superior technology is used to locate and defeat 
the adversary while own forces remain outside the range of his weapon systems. 
In a joint operations context that implies gaining and maintaining air and sea 
superiority as well as control of key terrain. The adversary’s systems and forces 
are defeated in order of priority based on the extent to which these pose a threat 
to own forces or to the success of the mission. Offensive operations are carried 
out with a high degree of safety and coordination. High tempo is not normally a 
priority and, when it is used, the purpose is to expose the enemy’s systems in 
order to strike them physically rather than psychologically. 
0339. Operations in accordance with the attrition method are demanding in terms 
of resources. Where Norway’s armed forces are concerned this means that this 
method of operations will be difficult to employ unaided. It is probably only in 
alliance with other countries that Norway can achieve the force superiority that 
is necessary to be able to use this method to any great extent at the strategic 
and/or operational level. 
The stabilizing method 
0340. The stabilizing method is used mainly in operations where the Armed Forces’ 
task is to lower the level of conflict between two or more parties. Operations in 
accordance with the stabilizing method can also be carried out in the end phase 
of operations based on the manoeuvre or attrition methods with the objective of 
stabilizing the situation so that the political aims can be achieved. Such operations 
can also be carried out to alleviate human suffering and to support humanitarian 
aid, either directly or indirectly, by limiting violence and criminality in the area. 
0341. Operations in accordance with the stabilizing method are characterised by 
being of long duration and by the volatility of the level of violence which can shift 
rapidly from open combat with heavy weapons to apparent calm. In addition, 
the stabilizing force is often forced to operate while dispersed over large geo-
graphical areas. Experience shows that there are three key conditions for success 
in stabilization operations. The forces must have credibility and perseverance, 
and the authority with which the operation is conducted must be created, sus-
tained and continuously developed. Authority stems from how the various actors 
perceive the legitimacy of the mandate on which the operation is being conducted 
and the degree to which the various actors in the area are cooperating with the 
forces carrying it out. 
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0342. In addition to these conditions, the stabilizing method embraces five prin-
ciples: impartiality, transparency, restraint in the use of force, built-in robustness 
and the ability to deter, as well as freedom of movement and area control.
0343. It is very important that the parties perceive the stabilizing force as impar-
tial. If it may appear that the stabilizing force has taken sides, the troops 
themselves become  part of the conflict. Impartiality entails treating the parties 
in a conflict on the basis of how they adhere to any agreements reached. It does 
not mean treating all parties in the same way. It is important to be clear that 
various parties in a conflict may see it as being in their interest to accuse the 
stabilizing force for not being impartial. Being impartial is a very demanding 
challenge at both organisational and individual levels.  
0344. Transparency means that the stabilization force’s mandate, and the rules 
which apply, are known to all parties. Knowledge of agreements reached, and 
how the stabilization force will act if the agreements are broken, will have a 
calming and preventive effect. At the same time, this makes considerable demands 
on the stabilization force where knowledge of their own mandate, the rules that 
apply and predictable behaviour are concerned. 
0345. Restraint in the use of force: A clear difference between the stabilizing method 
and the other two operational methods is that in the stabilizing method there 
must necessarily be much more restraint in the use of force. The use of weapons 
will, in the main, serve as a show of strength and have a deterrent effect. 
0346. A stabilizing force must have built-in robustness and the ability to deter, so 
that it is able to deal with any escalation. An inadequately equipped force can 
invite escalation. A stabilizing force must therefore have the ability to switch 
rapidly from the stabilizing method to the manoeuvre or attrition method. The 
requirement for robustness is also important because it could be necessary for 
certain force elements on tactical level to carry out operations using the mano-
euvre or attrition method.
0347. Freedom of movement and area control: One condition for carrying out 
operations in accordance with the stabilizing method is being able to move freely 
in the operational area while at the same time being able to control the move-
ment of other parties. Area control can be exercised by grouping the stabilizing 
force over the whole, or most, of the area concerned. This is demanding in terms 
of personnel but will often be necessary in the initial phase of an operation using 
the stabilizing method. Another way to exercise area control is to combine per-
manent surveillance exercised by smaller units, mobile surveillance and a mobile 
reserve which can be inserted as the need arises. A range of technical surveillance 
solutions can also play an important role.
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4.  The doctrine’s theoretical and conceptual 
framework
0401. This chapter provides an overview of theories, concepts and ideas which 
are central to the Armed Forces’ Operational Foundation and joint operational 
activities. As an introduction the chapter starts by describing the concepts of 
combat, combat capability, combat domains, combined actions and basic functions. 
Attention is directed towards theories and concepts which underlie the Oper-
ational Foundation’s  basic ideas: the manoeuvrist-, effects-based- and the network-
based approach.
Combat
0402. Combat is a clash between human beings where the objective is to impose 
one’s will on one or more of the combatant parties. Combat has several dimensions. 
Intellectually it involves developing creative and sustainable concepts and to use 
these wisely. It also involves sustaining will and cohesion and it has, in addition, 
a tangible side – the systems that the Armed Forces develop in order to put com-
bat into practice. 
COMBAT – A BATTLE OF WILLS AND IDEAS 
One hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the most skilful. Seizing the enemy 
without fighting is the most skilful.
Sun Tzu
The profoundest truth of war is that the issue of battle is usually decided in the minds 
of the opposing commanders, not in the bodies of their men. 
Sir Basil Liddell Hart
The aim, through a combination of positive and negative actions on different planes, 
is to influence an adversary to make our aims his aims.
John A. Warden III 
0403. The purpose of combat is to influence the adversary’s will to continue to 
fight by, among other means, affecting his cohesion or physical capability. The 
ambition in combat is to influence the adversary and other actors in all the dimen-
sions mentioned above. The combat capability model shows the relationship 
between the conceptual, moral and physical factors which affect combat, while 
the domain model allows for the combat’s four domains.
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Combat capability
0404. Combat capability is a military force’s fighting capability and its ability to 
succeed in its operations. It consists of conceptual, moral and physical factors. 
These factors are overlapping and have a mutually reinforcing effect on each 
other. Flexibility, which is central to the Armed Forces’ Operational Foundation 
has various implications for each of these factors.
Figure 4.1, COMBAT CAPABILITY MODEL
0405. The conceptual factors are about how the Armed Forces can best utilise 
their own recourses in order to achieve their objectives. They include experience 
and approaches to current and future operations, and are built on doctrines and 
concepts that underlie a common understanding of how combat is to be con-
ducted. Flexibility in this area entails developing concepts of operations and 
organisations that pave the way for conduct and problem solving adapted to 
match the situation. 
0406. The moral factors are to do with will and cohesion. Both aspects are vital 
to the ability to meet the challenges of combat. Combat morale and the will to 
win are built on team spirit, motivation, good leadership and a common ethical 
platform. It is on this plane that flexibility to develop personnel who are open to 
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new solutions and can act with determination without the safety of a set orga-
nisation, set routines or set procedures. The moral factors are closely linked with 
a common professional identity, as described in Chapter 6.
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF MORALE IN BATTLE
The moral is to the physical as three is to one.
Napoleon Bonaparte
Force effectiveness depends on people, ideas and hardware. In that order!
John Boyd
0407. The physical factors cover materiel systems, including the education and 
training needed to ensure that the systems can be used correctly and the reaction 
capability maintained. The physical factors also include the physical capability of 
the individuals and of the unit as a whole. In this area, flexibility entails the 
development of platforms and command and control systems which make it 
possible to combine different systems to meet the specific requirements of the 
situation.
Combat domains
0408. The domain model complements the combat capability model by showing 
in which domains combat is taking place and how the domains are connected. 
The concept of a domain is used here to describe abstract areas, in contrast to 
combat arenas (land, sea, air and space), which describe the concrete areas where 
the battle is being fought (the arenas all belong to the physical domain). 
0409. The domain model describes the cognitive domain, the information domain, 
the social domain and the physical domain and how these are connected. This 
model was initially developed with Network Centric Warfare and Information 
Operations in mind, but can also be used to show that military operations and 
combat are conducted on a number of different planes apart from the purely 
physical.   
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Figure 4.2, THE DOMAIN MODEL (See NBD below  and Information Operations in Chapter 5)
0410. The cognitive domain covers combat’s mental dimension, that is to say how 
the individual’s thoughts, values and will are influenced. The domain includes 
the individual’s perceptions, which in turn are governed by psychological factors, 
education, training and level of experience. Ultimately, the outcome of combat 
is decided in the cognitive domain. 
0411. The information domain covers the information which forms the basis of our 
situation awareness. The domain spans the whole spectrum from data to informa-
tion. (Data is regarded as consisting of the simplest of information-bearing units 
while information consists of data which has been assembled and processed to 
give it meaning). In the information domain information is created, processed and 
distributed. Combat in this domain is about limiting and distorting the adversary’s 
information while protecting one’s self against his actions in this domain.
0412. The social domain covers interaction between individuals and units. It is 
here that we find communication between individuals, team spirit, cohesion and 
leadership. The social domain is directly linked to the cognitive domain by virtue 
of the fact that communication at the individual level and cohesion within the 
Armed Forces is absolutely essential to the individual’s will, and the unit’s ability 
to continue combat. Combat in this domain is especially about breaking down 
the adversary’s cohesion while at the same time reinforcing one’s own. 
0413. The physical domain covers the traditional arenas for military operations: 
land, sea, air and space. The physical platforms and sensors operate in this domain 
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and the communications network that links the platforms together is to be found 
here. Combat in the physical domain is about making use of human and materiel 
resources for the purpose of influencing the adversary’s physical capability. 
 
Combined actions 
0414. Joint operations are founded on the theory that a combination of different 
means and actions brings the benefits of synergy and thereby the possibility of 
using limited resources in a more effective way. Force concentration and simul-
taneous action with multiple systems contribute to making the adversary feel 
inferior, which in turn influences his will to continue combat. Another argument 
is that different weapon systems can support one another and that the adversary’s 
attempts to protect himself against one system will often expose him to another. 
Combined actions also cover the use of both lethal and non-lethal means. The 
concept of combined actions is thus somewhat broader than that of Combined 
Arms which basically relates to the use of different weapon systems.  
0415. The ability to combine actions is absolutely central to the Armed Forces’ 
Operational Foundation and finds expression in the emphasis placed on joint 
operations based on the effects-based, network-based and manoeuvrist approaches 
and on the need for flexibility. The significance of combining different actions is 
also dealt with in Chapter 5 which, in addition to describing traditional compo-
nents, places relatively strong emphasis on special operations, information ope-
rations and civil-military cooperation.  
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COMBINED ARMS – A BRIEF HISTORY 
Jonathan M. House (a US Army officer and professor of history) postulates in his book 
Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century that the strengths of one weapon 
system can compensate for weaknesses in other systems. He further asserts that the 
ability to combine different actions gives the commander greater freedom of action – and 
the adversary a more complicated threat picture to deal with. If one has at least two 
ways of fighting the enemy, it means that he can never be quite sure how he will be 
attacked. 
Robert Leonhard (US Army officer and author) maintains that a theory about Combined 
Arms has three elements. First each individual weapon system will have its strengths 
and weaknesses. Armoured forces for example have the advantage vis-à-vis infantry in 
open terrain while the opposite is the case in more rugged terrain, but by combining 
the systems they will complement one another, thereby rendering the whole stronger 
than the sum of its parts. The infantry can protect the armour during combat in close 
terrain but the armoured forces can be used to achieve rapid breakthroughs in the 
enemy’s lines. Second, Combined Arms can create difficult dilemmas for the adversary; 
in order to defend himself against one system he will have to leave himself vulnerable 
to another. If an armoured unit, for example, has to defend itself against air attack, the 
natural defence would be to spread out and construct physical defences. But if the air 
attack is combined with a massive ground attack using armour, the armoured unit will 
face a dilemma between on the one hand spreading out in positions which make easy 
targets for a tank attack or, on the other hand, concentrating the unit in order to counter 
the armoured attack but, in so doing, becoming more vulnerable to air attack. A third 
element in Combined Arms is to force the adversary into the type of terrain in which 
he is most vulnerable. Instead of engaging the enemy’s tanks with ones own in open 
terrain, the intention is to lead them into terrain in which one’s own force have a com-
parative advantage. For example the enemy’s tanks could be led into rugged and con-
stricted terrain to make them easily accessible for attack by infantry. 
Combined actions are a well-known phenomenon in modern military history. Early 
examples of this approach can be seen in the way Gustav II Adolf (1594–1632) and 
Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821) organised their armies. They brought together infan-
try, cavalry and artillery in an entirely new way which increased the armies’ overall 
striking power. During the Second World War both Germany and the Soviet Union 
developed theories for how air forces could be integrated in land operations. The Uni-
ted States’ AirLand Battle doctrine (1982) was the result of increased emphasis on the 
combination of different weapon systems. Since the Cold War there has been a deeper 
integration of weapon systems at all levels in the military organisations. During the 
Iraq war in 2003 the United States forces integrated their weapon systems over the 
whole scale from operational to tactical levels. This they did by, for example, com-
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bining, land sea and air systems with systems for special and information operations. 
The third element in Leonhard’s theory is well-known from Norwegian defence thin-
king during the Cold War, where Soviet forces possibly attacking Norway were to be 
led into the narrow valleys of Troms in which Norwegian light infantry would have a 
considerable comparative advantage and would be able to delay the invasion until 
allied forces arrived to relieve them. 
The concept of Combined Arms is often used in United States and British doctrines. 
The concept originated in connection with ground operations where different weapon 
systems were combined at team and squad level to increase striking power. Today the 
concept is also used in a joint operations context and includes weapons from all 
service branches. Combined Arms should not be confused with Combined Operations 
which are operations in which two or more countries participate.
Basic functions 
0416. Military units are dependent on six basic functions: command and control for 
guidance and coordination, means of action in order to have an effect on the 
adversary, mobility in order to be able to move about, protection for the security of 
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Figure 4.3, THE BASIC FUNCTIONS 
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own forces, intelligence in order to create a picture of the situation, and logistics for 
enabling necessary resources. Command and control, intelligence and logistics are 
described in Chapter 5 while protection, mobility and means of action are described 
in Appendix A.
0417. The basic functions can be used for a discussion of how the Armed Forces 
should develop their capabilities within the different areas. The functions can 
also be assembled in a model which shows the connections between them. Figure 
4.3 is an illustration of the fact that there is mutual dependence and interaction 
between the various functions and that they should be viewed as a whole. Com-
mand and control is placed in the centre because this function ties the other five 
together. 
0418. The network-based approach in the Armed Forces’ Operational Foundation 
is about organising the basic functions as flexibly and rationally as possible. The 
basic functions model (figure 4.3) and the decision cycle (figure 4.4) are intended 
as aids as to how we should think beyond organisational units. Such an approxi-
mation enables us to focus on how the various functions can be coordinated to 
achieve a higher operational tempo and the benefits of synergy.
The manoeuvrist approach and manoeuvre theory 
It was to use mobility as a psychological weapon, not to kill but to move; to move not 
to kill but in order to terrify, to bewilder, to perplex, to cause consternation, doubt, 
and confusion in the rear of the enemy, which rumour would magnify until panic 
became monstrous. In short, its aim was to paralyse not only the enemy’s command 
but also his government, and paralysation would be in direct proportion to velocity. 
(About Guderian’s rapid advance to the English Channel during the campaign in France 
in 1940). 
J. F. C. Fuller 
0419. The manoeuvre theory emphasise the psychological dimension of combat 
and it regards combat as a battle between wills in which the aim is to break down 
the adversary’s cohesion and will to fight. As a consequence the manoeuvre 
theory allows for an operational environment characterised by uncertainty, fear, 
chaos, friction and unpredictability. The manoeuvre theory emphasises the 
importance of turning these factors to one’s own advantage by mastering them 
and, at the same time, exposing the adversary to them to the greatest extent 
possible.  
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THE NATURE OF ARMED CONFLICT
Even though the character of armed conflicts has changed through history, and in 
recent years, it is still human beings who fight, not machines and systems. The means 
and methods will change from conflict to conflict but, at the same time, it is possible 
to talk about the abiding nature of conflict, in which friction, uncertainty and chaos, 
danger and stress are factors that are always present.
Friction: Friction is what separates a plan on paper from the actual execution. There 
are three fundamental forms of friction: that which is present, or which arises, in one’s 
own organisation, that which is created in the encounter with an adversary, and that 
which is due to the environment, for example as a consequence of weather conditions. 
Friction can arise as a combination of these forms and can have several sources: phy-
sical (tiredness, obstacles), psychological (fear, confusion) and technological (unfami-
liar equipment, faults, shortages and accidents).
Uncertainty and chaos: Armed conflicts will always be characterised by uncertainty 
and chaos, often called the fog of war. This arises, for example because of incomplete, 
inaccurate and contradictory information, and contributes to limitation of situation 
awareness. The fog of war leads to confusion and degrades the ability to take the 
right decisions at the right time. Modern technology and forms of organisation can 
mitigate these challenges to a certain extent but they will never be able to eliminate 
the fog of war. Actors in a conflict will actively seek to conceal their intentions and to 
create as much uncertainty and chaos as possible for the adversary. A good knowledge 
of the adversary and of oneself will certainly help to reduce this uncertainty but 
chance will always make it difficult to predict the final outcome. 
Danger and stress: The use of military force involves the use, or threat of using, phy-
sical violence. This engenders a feeling of danger, and most people react to danger 
with fear. In addition there will often be the effect of physical exhaustion, loneliness 
and the lack of food and sleep. Taken together these conditions can put the combatants 
under a substantial degree of stress. And stress will as a rule lead to reduced combat 
capability. 
0420.The difference between the manoeuvre theory and manoeuvre warfare is 
not clear-cut, but manoeuvre warfare can be described as the practical embodi-
ment of the manoeuvre theory, where a set of techniques is given for how military 
forces should operate in order to break down the adversary’s cohesion and will 
to fight.  
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MANOEUVRE THEORY AND MANOEUVRE WARFARE  
The concept of manoeuvre theory came into being in the 1900s but its underlying 
philosophy, with its emphasis on the psychological aspects of the art of war, is not 
new: as long ago as 500 BC this had been expounded by Sun Tzu. The theory derives 
its name from manoeuvring – physical movement – on the battlefield to get into 
position to attack or threaten an adversary. The art of war thus emphasised physical 
movement as a means of gaining a psychological advantage. Today the concept of 
manoeuvre has been extended to include more than purely physical movements. 
The First World War, and particularly the static western front, was seen by many as an 
end point for the classical art of war. Warfare had apparently been reduced to gigantic 
material battles in which the nations’ economic, demographic and political capacity 
was seen as being far more important than the decisions of the generals. In the inter-
war years a desire to be able to again decide wars on the battlefield caused military 
theoreticians in many countries to seek new methods, other than a long war of attrition, 
of achieving victory. Theoreticians who wielded much influence included the Britons J. 
F. C. Fuller (1878–1966) and Sir Basil Liddell Hart (1895–1970), the German Heinz Guderian 
(1888–1954) and the Russians Vladimir Triandafillov (1894–1931) and Mikhail Tuk-
hachevsky (1893–1937). Subsequently, following the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, 
the manoeuvrist theory experienced a renaissance – first in the United States and then 
in the NATO area. The central thinkers in the development of modern western manoeuvre 
theory were the Americans John Boyd (1927–1997), William Lind and Robert Leonhard. 
Manoeuvre theory is today often used as an umbrella term for a number of different 
theories which have in common that they focus on the destruction of the adversary’s 
cohesion and ability to operate more than on gradual and systematic destruction 
through the use of firepower. Some theoreticians have drawn attention to the methods 
while others have concentrated on attempts to describe the underlying psychological 
factors. This has meant that manoeuvre theory today is a concept that witnesses 
various interpretations. Wise commanders over the years have often focused on influ-
encing the adversary’s cohesion and will and have used a variety of means to achieve 
this. Thus we may perhaps say that manoeuvre warfare came first and that the mano-
euvre theory was created in an attempt to harvest some wisdom from historical 
examples. The critics assert that the manoeuvre theoreticians make selective use of 
historical examples to underpin their theory and that there are many examples of 
the adversary’s will being broken only by the use of massive firepower and by a long 
period of attrition to wear down his war-fighting capability. 
0421. Both in manoeuvre theory and in manoeuvre warfare, emphasis is placed 
on the analysis of the various actors’ strengths and weaknesses. In the Armed 
Forces’ Operational Foundation this is embodied in the manoeuvrist approach 
and requires comprehensive knowledge of both our own and our adversary’s 
organisation (political and military structures, objectives, operating patterns, 
capabilities and characteristics as well as culture, norms and sets of values. The 
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concepts of centre of gravity and critical vulnerabilities describe the connections 
between the different actors’ strengths and weaknesses. Appendix C defines 
the concepts and describes how a structural analysis (a process for analysing 
the actors in a conflict) can be carried out. 
The techniques of manoeuvre warfare 
0422. Manoeuvre warfare has been described by many theoreticians (see text-
box above) who have different views as how to gain the psychological advantage. 
There is, therefore, no unified view of what the most important techniques in 
this form of warfare actually are. The Armed Forces have chosen to emphasise 
surprise, initiative, the indirect method, tempo and mission command. These 
techniques are in line with the factors emphasised in our allies’ doctrines. 
0423. Surprise is important in manoeuvre warfare primarily because of the psycho-
logical effect of surprise. Unexpected events create fear and uncertainty in the 
adversary. Surprise also contributes towards making it easier to attack the 
adversary physically. Surprise is achieved by using unexpected methods in 
unexpected places at unexpected times. Unexpected in time and place minor 
actions can have a major effect. 
0424. One of manoeuvre warfare’s most important techniques is to seize, and 
continue to hold, the initiative. The side which has the initiative forces the 
adversary to react, so that the adversary is exposed to attack and thus placed 
under psychological pressure. The ability to take the initiative starts at the indi-
vidual level and is a part of the Armed Forces’ culture and one of the fundamen-
tals of the military profession. Mission command, understanding of the 
commander’s intentions and the ability to take calculated risks are essential 
conditions for seizing and maintaining the initiative. 
0425. The indirect approach: Manoeuvre warfare places weight on avoiding the 
adversary’s main forces while at the same time taking advantage of his weak-
nesses. The indirect approach is a well-proven technique for gaining and maintai-
ning the psychological upper hand. By preventing the adversary from choosing 
the time and place of any confrontation, his progress is weakened and his wea-
pon systems and organisation are degraded. This leads to doubts and redeploy-
ments on the part of the adversary.
 
THE INDIRECT APPROACH
In strategy the longest way round is often the shortest way there – a direct approach to 
the object exhausts the attacker and hardens the resistance by compression, whereas an 
indirect approach loosens the defender’s hold by upsetting his balance. 
Sir Basil Liddell Hart
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0426. The indirect approach has both an abstract and a tangible dimension. The 
tangible dimension is about avoiding the adversary’s physical forces and at the 
same time attacking their weaknesses. The abstract dimension is about avoiding 
the adversary’s strong sides in the broadest sense while at the same time exploi-
ting his vulnerabilities – for example by influencing the local population’s support 
for a combatant group rather than by attacking the group itself, or by attacking 
their supply lines rather than their weapon systems. 
0427. Tempo can be defined as relative speed of action over time compared with 
that of an adversary. The purpose of conducting combat at a high tempo is to 
render the adversary vulnerable, gain a psychological advantage and make the 
basis of his decisionmaking irrelevant. The ability to act at high tempo confers 
an advantage in that one can oneself choose the tempo which at any given time 
will produce the desired effect. High tempo will not, however, always be desirable 
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Figure 4.4, THE DECISION CYCLE, THE BASIC FUNCTIONS AND TEMPO
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during an operation. In combat against irregular forces, in the context of the 
stabilizing method or the attrition method, patience will often be more important 
than high tempo.
0428. The decision cycle model describes how tempo can be achieved from the 
time at which an event occurs to the time at which action is initiated. The deci-
sion cycle consists of four elements which together form a continuous process: 
observation, orientation, decision and action. The decision cycle can also be under-
stood as three sections, where the first concerns information: observation and 
orientation – what situation are we facing? The second concerns decision: deci-
sion as to what must or should be done to come to terms with the situation. The 
third concerns the conduct of the action itself: how and with what means? The 
ability to complete this process more rapidly and with better quality than the 
adversary is of decisive importance to achieving success.
0429. The aim is “to get inside the adversary’s decision cycle”: By completing the 
decision cycle more rapidly than the adversary, he will continually be forced onto 
the back foot. This will put own forces into favourable positions while the adversary 
will lag behind. The ability to take correct decisions rapidly is an essential condi-
tion for achieving high tempo. At the same time the basic functions must be 
developed and integrated to support this capability. Basic functions organised in 
networks and a command and control system which makes possible the rapid 
exchange of information between units will enhance the capability for high tempo 
combat.
0430. The concept of timing is closely linked with tempo. Timing entails carrying 
out the actions when they will give the best results in the current situation. Cor-
rect timing can be initiating one’s actions when the adversary least expects it. In 
the context of the stabilizing method or the attrition method, correct timing can 
be initiating action against the irregular forces at the same time as initiating 
actions to win the hearts and minds of the local population. It should be stressed 
that these are simply two examples. What constitutes correct timing will vary 
depending of the specific situation. 
0431. Mission command is essentially a culture associated with manoeuvre war-
fare and an essential condition for the ability to master friction and chaos while 
at the same time maintaining the initiative and tempo. Mission command is 
exercised through a technique involving stating the intention, allocating resour-
ces and giving the greatest possible freedom of action to whoever is to carry out 
the mission. Mission command is described further in Chapter 6. 
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JOHN BOYD AND THE OODA LOOP
The decision cycle is a simplification of the OODA loop and can lead the reader into believing that 
the loop is a mechanical and sequential process which can be solved by technical means. John 
Boyd held quite a different view. According to Boyd the OODA loop is not one loop but a description 
of several possible loops. The most important part is orientation which covers perceptions and the 
ability to take intuitive decisions. Experienced decision-takers raise the tempo through their ability 
to take correct decisions rapidly. Boyd attached great weight on the psychological aspects of com-
bat, and the importance of understanding how the adversary thinks, in order to be able to influence 
his understanding of his surroundings and, in that way, to “get inside his decision cycle”. Boyd 
himself preferred to call his model the O-O-D-A Loop in order to bring out the differences between 
Observe, Orient, Decide and Act.
John Boyd (1927–1997) was a colonel in the United States Air Force and developed the OODA loop 
against the background of his experience as a fighter pilot during the Korean War (1950–1953). With 
the OODA loop as his point of departure he wanted to describe how the American F-86 fighter pilots 
won more than 90 % of their aerial combat engagements with Chinese and Korean MiG-15 aircraft. 
Despite their inferiority in a number of respects, the F-86 Sabre aircraft had two decisive advantages: 
the ability of their pilots, with a better field of vision, to visualise the situation far more rapidly than 
their opponents, and the F-86 Sabre’s more responsive flight control system which enabled the 
American pilots to switch between different types of manoeuvre much more rapidly than was pos-
sible for the MiG-15 pilots. The American pilots quickly learned to exploit this advantage, and used 
it to force their opponents into a series of manoeuvres in which, in their efforts to react, the MiG 
pilots either exposed themselves to attack or made fatal mistakes. Boyd stressed that these effects 
were not primarily technological in nature but that they were mainly psychological. The American 
pilots were sure that they would be successful and therefore took the initiative, while their oppo-
nents were unsure and therefore made fatal mistakes. Boyd continued his studies, focusing on 
successful campaigns from history, with a view to making his observations universally applicable.
Figur 4.5, The OODA Loop
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From “manoeuvre theory and manoeuvre warfare” to “manoeuvrist approach 
and manoeuvre method” 
0432. Manoeuvre theory has been NATO’s most important theoretical basis since 
the 1980s. The Alliance’s ambition has been to be capable of waging manoeuvre 
warfare against a mechanised adversary within the framework of a large-scale 
war. The theory has thus been associated with high-intensity warfare against a 
mechanised adversary. In recent years, however, the Armed Forces have been 
engaged mainly in operations during conflicts of lower intensity. Against this 
background it has been asserted that manoeuve warfare is of little relevance to 
the greater part of the Armed Forces’ operational activities, and that the mano-
euvre theory as such is no longer valid. The view of the Armed Forces is that the 
manoeuvre theory is still of relevance but that it needs to be nuanced for use 
today. 
0433. With the concepts of the manoeuvrist approach and the manoeuvre method, 
the Armed Forces are carrying forward the manoeuvre theory’s psychological 
point of departure and manoeuvre warfare’s techniques in a contemporary con-
text. The ambition is that the manoeuvrist approach should become part of the 
Armed Forces’ culture and thus form the basis for all types of operations, while 
it is still acknowledged that the manoeuvre method today often must be com-
bined with other methods in order to achieve the desired effect. The manoeuvrist 
approach advocates an approach at an individual level which stresses the psy-
chological dimension of combat, while the manoeuvre method is one of three 
operational methods in the Armed Forces’ Operational Foundation, designed to 
break down the adversary’s will and coherence based on the thechniques of 
manoeuvre warfare.
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The effects based-approach to operations  
0434. The effects based approach forms the basis of a number of concepts inclu-
ding Effects Based Operations and Effects Based Approach to Operations. As already 
mentioned, the Armed Forces do not wish to tie themselves too closely to parti-
cular concepts, technological solutions or procedures. The following sections 
therefore give attention rather to the fundamentals of the approach and to the 
central concepts.
0435. The effects based approach has been actualised in today’s complex conflicts 
involving several parties, which may often have unclear alliance and conflict rela-
tionships between themselves, together with a number of external actors having 
differing interests in the conflict. In such conflicts it is difficult to direct one action 
against one specific party. On the contrary, it may be necessary to initiate a spec-
trum of actions, including both civil and military means, directed against a num-
ber of actors in order to achieve results which are desirable in the longer term. 
EFFECTS BASED OPERATIONS CONCEPTS 
The concept of Effects Based Operations (EBO) originated in the US Air Force (USAF) in 
the 1990s. This approach arose as a reaction to the fact that, as the USAF saw it, more 
weight was given in military operations to the actions themselves, attacking the targets, 
than to the results. Developments in Effects Based Operations have thus been driven 
largely by the USAF and are slanted strongly towards the use of air power. In practice 
the emphasis has been on technology and what can be achieved by air power alone. 
The Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) is a further development of the 
original EBO concept. In NATO there is a general focus on EBAO and the United King-
dom has been the principal driver of further developments in this area. The European 
variant embodies a broader and more generally based approach than the original 
American model and places less weight on technology and what air power alone can 
achieve. The British have gradually gone over to the concept of Comprehensive Appro-
ach in which attention is focused more on the coordination of civil and military actions 
than on the relationship between military actions and their effects. 
The US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) has in recent years also moved towards an 
EBAO approach which is not unlike the NATO approach but which has a greater focus 
on effects based planning tools and actual implementation of these tools.
Effects-based approach cornerstones
0436. The effects based approach has three cornerstones. The first is to see all 
means as parts of a larger whole in which military and civil means are coordinated. 
The second cornerstone is to see the adversary and other actors as a system of 
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systems in which many different actors and factors interact with one another. That 
means that all actions carried out, and the particular means used, must be asses-
sed on the basis of what effects they may have on the various parties. The third 
and most important cornerstone is that all actions carried out must be justifiable 
on the basis of their contribution to the achievement of the desired effect.
Integrated use of means
0437. Military means represent one of a number of means that states have at 
their disposal, and military means must thus be seen as part of a larger whole. 
It is important to include other states and the various international organisations 
in this whole since such actors will often play a part in conflict management 
together with military forces. It is also necessary to understand the levels of 
command at which decisions are taken concerning the use of the various means, 
including the military, and how these levels together form a whole. 
System of systems
0438. The focus on system is the second cornerstone of the effects-based appro-
ach. System thinking is seeing all parties in a conflict, together with other actors 
who might conceivably influence the conflict, as a system of systems. The com-
ponents of a system are also known as nodes. State actors will have more fully 
developed systems than non-state actors but in most cases the systems will have 
the same basic functions. Such systems will also have several points of contact 
with other systems locally, regionally and globally. It is important to understand 
the whole of an actor’s system and how it functions, both in itself and in interac-
tion with other systems. 
Figure 4.6, THE ACTORS’ SYSTEMS
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FFOD Engelsk.indd   83 13-03-08   09:53:33
8
0439. In the effects-based approach to operations (EBAO), both state and non-
state actors are viewed as systems each with six subsystems, commonly denoted 
by the acronym PMESII:
•	 the political system covers the decision and command functions,
•	 the military system covers the means of physical force and the associated means 
of command and control,  
•	 the economic system covers the resource base and its financing,
•	 the social system consists of the people, including possible ethnic and religious 
dimensions,
•	 the infrastructure system consists of communications in the widest sense, 
including electricity, the transport network, water supplies and sanitation, 
•	 the information system consists of the information infrastructure, command 
systems and media.
SYSTEMS AND THE SYSTEM THINKING
A system is a collection of elements connected together in such a way that they create 
an organised whole. A system is built up of mutually dependent components and 
processes. The units in a system will share a common purpose and the collective results 
of the units in the system will be greater than the sum of the parts in isolation. This 
is known as synergy. The more units and processes that the system contains, the more 
difficult it is to analyse the system as such and the significance of the individual 
elements to the system as a whole. 
All systems which include humans are complex, since the human factor makes it very 
difficult to predict with certainty the results that can be achieved by affecting the 
system. Dynamic systems are systems in a constant state of change and interaction 
with other systems. Open systems are systems which interact with other systems. 
Adaptive systems are systems with an ability to develop and alter to meet changing 
requirements in their environment and thus improving their effectiveness. Adaptive 
systems have redundancy, which means that elements in the system are capable of 
taking over from other elements that have failed or been destroyed. 
System thinking is interdisciplinary. It is employed, for example, in meteorology, geo-
logy, sociology and political science. System thinking is an approach used to understand 
how complex phenomena affect each other. System thinking entails looking for con-
nections between different phenomena and can be viewed as an alternative to cause 
and effect thinking. System thinking is seeing the whole by understanding the qua-
lities of, and the connections between, the various parts. 
0440. Analysis, including analysis in a military context, has usually focused on 
breaking a system down into its components and then studying each component 
individually. An analysis based on system thinking not only evaluates the indivi-
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dual parts but also places emphasis on how the individual parts work together 
within the system and with other systems, and how the systems working together 
function as a whole.
0441. The point of the effects-based approach is to coordinate and integrate all 
the means of influencing the systems. Diplomatic, information-based, economic 
and military measures are directed against each of the subsystems with the aim 
of achieving effects in the system as a whole or in parts of it. In this perspective, 
system thinking is necessary to understand where and how the actions can best 
be implemented in order to achieve the desired effects while avoiding those that 
are undesirable. 
Desired effect
0442. The third and most important cornerstone of the effects-based approach 
is to concentrate on the overall result, the effect, that is desired, and not on the 
individual means in themselves. The point of departure of the effects-based 
approach is to focus on which forms of behaviour change are desired and to 
combine the actions and individual means which are necessary to achieve this. 
0443. The aim in an armed conflict is to force the adversary to change his behaviour 
so that one’s own objectives prevail. In a stabilization operation or in combat against 
irregular forces, it is often a question of causing a number of parties to change their 
behaviour in order to put an end to the violence and the conflict. Different actions 
may be necessary to achieve this. The use of force is often necessary against war-
ring parties, while measures of a protective and socially developmental nature will 
be important in relation to the local population. For the groups in conflict, the 
desired behavioural change is that they should give up and stop the violence and 
the fighting. Where the local population is concerned, the behavioural change desi-
red is that they should stop their support for the warring parties.
The effects based approach and humanitarian aid
0444. Acute humanitarian aid in order to reduce human suffering will often be 
necessary and this can be rendered by both international organisations and mili-
tary forces. It is often difficult to identify the boundary 
between humanitarian aid and actions designed to pro-
mote social development in the longer term. The effects- 
based approach, with its emphasis on the integration 
of civil and military means, can lead to humanitarian 
aid being interpreted as a way of coercing a party to do 
one thing or another. This is not the case. Humanitarian 
aid is never an instrument of coercion. However actions 
which support humanitarian aid can be a positive influ-
ence and help to achieve the effect desired. 
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Action, result and effect
Figure 4.7, ACTION, RESULT AND EFFECT
0445. In a given situation the desired effect is defined as stopping the adversary’s 
advance and protecting a flank. In Figure 4.7 the action will consist of the col-
lective means deployed against the bridge, for example aerial bombing. The action 
has the immediate result that the bridge is destroyed. This result is objective and 
absolute and will appear the same regardless of standpoint. However, the effect 
of the bridge being destroyed is relative. The direct effects are the immediate 
effects which the destruction of the bridge has on the adversary, own forces or 
on other parties. The indirect effects may be either desired or undesired and they 
must all, or at least those one can reasonably know about, be considered during 
the planning of the operation. In this example, for instance, the destruction of 
the bridge might have the indirect effect of weakening the local populations 
support for our mission and swaying them towards the adversary. 
0446. In the example of the bridge above, the desired effect could be achieved 
by actions other than aerial bombing. An alternative action could be to mine the 
bridge and defend it. This requires resources but would at the same time make 
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it possible to use the bridge later. Another alternative might be to attack the 
adversary in another sector, so forcing him to regroup and delaying his advance. 
The effects based approach is about selecting those methods and means which 
achieve the desired effects to the greatest extent and with as few undesired 
effects as possible. 
DEVELOPMENT OF EBAO CONCEPTS IN NATO
NATO continuously develops methods for the preparation and execution of operations 
in accordance with the principles of the effects based approach. The development 
process covers both theoretical concept development and practical experiments. The 
four concepts which in 2007 underlie NATO’s effects based approach to operations 
are Knowledge Based Development (KBD), Effects Based Planning (EBP), Effects Based 
Execution (EBE) and Effects Based Assessment (EBA).
Knowledge Based Development is about developing tools to aid system understanding. 
Two important aids in this process are Operational Net Assessment and Collaborative 
Information Environment which are respectively a computer based analysis tool and 
a web based information tool. 
Effects Based Planning (EBP) has as its point of departure procedures which are laid 
down in the Alliance’s existing planning tools, Guidelines for Operational Planning 
(GOP) and AJP 5. The planning sequence in effects based planning covers effects, nodes, 
actions and resources (ENAR), and its purpose is to define the desired effect; analyse 
which nodes must be influenced in order to achieve this; analyse which actions against 
these nodes will give the desired outcome and avoid undesired outcomes; and analyse 
which resources are required to execute the operation. In the execution of the ope-
ration itself the elements occur in the reverse order: resources, actions, nodes and 
effects (RANE). 
Effects Based Execution (EBE) focuses on acts and actions which are intended to achieve 
the desired and planned effects. Central concepts here are synergy effects and syn-
chronised effects. The ability to measure and assess effects, and the ability to adapt 
rapidly to changes, will be central to the execution of operations. 
Effects Based Assessment (EBA) is to observe the results of all relevant events and to 
assess these against the desired and undesired effects. Traditional Battle Damage 
Assessment (BDA) has often directed attention to the direct results of the action rather 
than to effects.
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Effects-based campaigns
Figure 4.8, TRADITIONAL CAMPAIGNS AND THE EFFECTS BASED APPROACH 
0447. The figure to the left above gives a schematic overview of a traditional cam-
paign. The desired end state is achieved by influencing the adversary’s centre of 
gravity (CoG). The centre of gravity is influenced through the achievement of a 
number of decisive points (DP). The decisive points are formulated as objectives in 
the operational plan and the military campaign is divided into phases in which 
these decisive points are to be achieved. The campaign is designed to bring about 
the military part of the end state. Civil actions are separated from the military 
campaign and follows particular lines relating to the political objectives. This dis-
tinction between military and civil actions was originally made with high intensity 
conflicts in mind and has been shown by experience to work well when the aim 
has been to defeat a military adversary. It is important to note that the figure on 
the left is an extreme simplification and that developments today are oriented 
towards the increased integration of civil and military actions. Note also that the 
military forces are not necessarily divided into single-service elements but rather 
into integrated components in which each particular operational line is linked to 
an overall objective. 
0448. The figure to the right gives a schematic overview of the intentions for an 
effects-based campaign. The basic idea is to integrate the civil and the military 
means. The desired end state is still to be achieved by influencing the adversary’s 
centre of gravity. The actual centre(s) of gravity are to a greater extent identified 
by means of system thinking. The centre of gravity is influenced by the achievement 
of a number of decisive effects (DE). The decisive effects will largely concern pro-
ducing the desired behaviour on the part of the adversary and other actors involved. 
The campaign is not sequential to the same extent as in the traditional campaign 
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but it is conducted along a number of lines in parallel in order to achieve the deci-
sive effects. The desired end state is formulated so that political and military objec-
tives are integrated. 
0449. The effects-based approach to operations is relatively simple in theory. The 
practical execution, however, is complicated. One of the major challenges arises 
from the fact that today there is relatively little experience of the integration of 
civil and military means and the procedures that this involves. Such an integration 
will necessarily extend across a number of different command levels and involve 
different sectors and agencies. There is an obvious risk of lack of clarity regarding 
authority and responsibility as well as less than ideal resource concentration. There 
may at the same time be great advantages to be gained through successful inte-
gration, and a substantial degree of integration may well be achieved naturally. 
The Effects-based approach and Network based Defence 
0450. The purpose of Network Based Defence (NBD) is to obtain and share infor-
mation while the purpose of the effects-based approach to operations (EBTO) is to 
make use of the information. For both the planning and execution of operations, 
EBTO will benefit greatly from the information sharing that is being planned for 
NBD. EBTO requires large amounts of information for the analysis of effects, the 
establishment of knowledge bases and the coordination of civil and military 
means. 
0451. The effects-based approach at the level outlined in the doctrine will benefit 
from increased network-basing but is not dependent on the advent of full NBD. 
The effects-based approach is primarily about developing a culture in the Armed 
Forces, with individuals who understand and use this way of thinking.
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The network-based approach and Network Based 
Defence
0452. Forces organised in networks are already in use today, to a greater or lesser 
degree, when the Norwegian Armed Forces carry out day-to-day operations or 
are involved in the handling of episodes. The Armed Forces will continue to develop 
in the direction of network-basing. The network-based approach is about creating 
a culture in which there is a shared responsibility to contribute towards this 
continuing development. The doctrine describes the most important parts of the 
concept and provides an overview of the conceptual framework as well as various 
degrees of maturity on the way towards network-basing. 
THE NETWORK CONCEPTS
Many concepts have been developed for the purpose of linking military resources in 
networks with the use of modern information technology.
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) was developed in the United States. This concept was 
inspired by the global integrated production, distribution and sales systems of inter-
national conglomerates. It involves highly ambitious levels of technology and orga-
nisational development.
Network Enabling Capacities (NEC) is the term used for the United Kingdom’s develop-
ment work in this field. In relation to Network Centric Warfare it focuses to a greater 
extent on improving existing technology and organisation, and developing these in 
the direction of network organisation. In general, the level of ambition in NEC is not 
as high as in NCW.
NATO Network Enabling Capacities (NNEC) applies to NATO’s development work in the 
area of network organisation. The level of ambition and the basic ideas are very similar 
to that involved in the United Kingdom’s NEC work. The development work must 
however have due regard to all member countries in line with the principle of con-
sensus. A large part of the work on NNEC is devoted to arriving at a common basis 
for further development. 
The Norwegian work on Network Based Defence (NBD) is directed towards achieving 
increased network organisation. The level of ambition and the basic ideas are largely 
coincident with those of NATO’s NNEC and the United Kingdom’s NEC. One important 
reason why the Norwegian defence community itself is engaged in development 
work in this area is that the Norwegian Armed Forces want to influence the develop-
ment of NNEC.  
What is Network based Defence? 
0453. NBD is a concept for working together in a network for the purpose of using 
the Armed Forces’ resources in ways which make use of the possibilities which 
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the information age offers, and for the purpose of achieving increased flexibility 
and effectiveness. NBD is a concept envisaged for use in all types of conflict and 
at all levels of conflict both at home and abroad. NBD is about seeing technology, 
competence, organisation and current processes in a common context, and it 
covers human, organisational and technical dimensions as well as conceptual, 
moral and physical factors as described in the combat capability model. 
0454. NBD implies a shift of focus from what each individual platform (for exam-
ple aircraft or naval vessels) can do on its own, to what a network of platforms can 
do. Such a shift of focus will make it possible to link different military functions 
in a flexible way and so increase the collective combat capability. The key to this 
lies in the use of modern technology and the flexible use of human resources. 
Figure 4.9, ADVANTAGES OF NBD 
0455. Decision makers, sensors and action systems are linked together in a network 
of networks in a robust information structure in which information is continuously 
being gathered and made available or distributed. Increased information aware-
ness makes it simpler for commanders at all levels to take correct decisions rapidly. 
This also contributes to improving cooperation and coordination between dif-
ferent units and systems. The information infrastructure in a network also makes 
it easier for the commander to impart his intention. 
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0456. Network organisation makes forces less dependent on physical proximity 
to each other and on geographical position in general. Such organisation also 
increases robustness in that information can be stored in different places and 
distributed by a variety of channels. 
Network-basing and the domain model
0457. Network-basing is about linking together processes which take place within 
the different domains. Such an interlinking will increase speed, precision and robust-
ness. At the same time, the meaning of NBD will vary between the domains:
•	 In the cognitive domain, network-basing is about creating a precise basis for 
decision making.
•	 In the information domain, network-basing is about making information avai-
lable to the right user at the right time and making information from the 
whole network accessible to the decision takers when they require it. It is also 
about developing robustness and protecting information by means of decen-
tralised storage and a set of alternative distribution channels for informa-
tion.  
•	 In the social domain, network-basing is about improving the ability of infor-
mation to create a shared overall picture of the situation, awareness of what 
the mission is and what the desired effects are.
•	 In the physical domain, network-basing is about the gathering of information, 
assembling combat units and linking different weapons systems with speed 
and precision in order to achieve effect.
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NEW INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS
New information technology has revolutionised many areas of both business and 
military activities, hence the advent of such concepts as Revolution in Business Affairs 
and Revolution in Military Affairs. 
The concept of a revolution applied to the military use of the new information tech-
nology originated in the Soviet Union. In the 1970s and ’80s studies were carried out 
of a number of wars, for example those in Vietnam, the Middle East and the Falklands. 
A general trend was identified in which information technology had opened up new 
possibilities. This applied particularly to new combat systems which were able, with 
great precision and almost in real time, to identify and engage targets at very great 
distances. It was assumed that technology would in future make it possible to achieve 
information superiority on the battlefield. 
The United States has come far in this field and now has an overarching vision of how 
the country’s armed forces should be developed and utilised. Joint Vision 2010, dating 
from 1996, later developed into Joint Vision 2020, stresses that the United States’ 
technological superiority must be used to change the whole of the Armed Forces and 
the way in which war is waged. The ambition is to deal with a broad spectrum of 
peacetime operations, the deterrence and prevention of conflicts and large scale war-
fighting. The traditional basic military functions have been developed to so-called 
operational concepts such as Dominant Manoeuvre, Precision Engagement and Focu-
sed Logistics. 
Information superiority is, according to the Americans, the key to realisation of the 
new operational concepts. It means a superior ability to gather, process and distribute 
information in an uninterrupted stream. At the same time the adversary’s ability to 
do the same must be destroyed or turned to one’s own advantage. Decision superiority, 
the ability to convert information into action, is given strong emphasis. In Joint Vision, 
great importance is attached to the continuous development of organisation, doctri-
nes and concepts and on relevant training and experience. 
From platform to system 
0458. A military organisation in the NBD can be described as a set of components 
(nodes) with connections between them. The components can be divided into 
three main categories:
•	 Sensor components have the gathering of data as their main function. Sensors 
include all components which contribute to situational awareness and may 
be anything from space-based sensors to people.
•	 Decision components have the taking of decisions as their main function. During 
an operation these will be able to take decisions about organisational changes 
and the allocation of resources, allotting tasks and the engagement of tar-
gets.    
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•	 Action components are to achieve results and effects. Action components 
include both lethal and non-lethal means. In NATO Network Enabling Capabi-
lities these are called effect components. The Norwegian term used, equivalent 
to ‘action components’ was chosen to keep in line with the concept of action-
result-effect (Figure 4.7).
0459. In addition to the main categories of components, there are decision sup-
port components (staff functions) and coordination 
components. The purpose of the latter is to contribute 
to the coordination of the various components and 
systems. One example of a coordination component 
is a Forward Air Controller (FAC) who conducts coordi-
nation between aircraft and other combat forces. The 
coordination components have a particularly impor-
tant role in a network based defence which is as yet 
at an initial stage. 
0460. The information infrastructure (INI) includes all information systems respon-
sible for communication between the components in the system. It consists of 
technical equipment for the processing, storage, distribution and presentation 
of information. This means, for example, computers and their software, satellite 
communications, radio and telephone systems. The information infrastructure 
also includes the people who operate and support the systems as well as the 
associated standards and procedures.
0461. Separating sensors and weapons does not mean that all weapon platforms 
are without sensors but receive information only from sensors that are physically 
positioned elsewhere. A weapon system must be capable of being used as an 
autonomous system, as a sensor and as an action component. Platforms which 
are so dimensioned can be decision components provided that the responsibility 
and authority conditions have been defined. Amongst other things this means 
that sensors which are co-located with the weapons (as they will be in an aircraft 
or a warship) must be able to transmit information to other action components 
or to the decision components. 
 
0462. Army units, frigates, fighter aircraft and special forces are examples of ele-
ments which can be both sensor and action components in all types of networks. 
Frigates are an example of platforms which have sufficient information infra-
structure to function as decision components in large networks while the others 
can do so in smaller networks. Within the network, the various units can carry 
out tasks or missions individually. At the same time, the constant transfer of 
target information and own position can contribute to facilitating the coordina-
tion of these individual actions if required. 
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SITUATION AWARENESS
Situation awareness is an essential precondition for the ability to synchronise actions 
without there necessarily being a detailed plan. Situation awareness occupies a cen-
tral position in NBD thinking. The concept itself has three elements differing mutually 
in quality:
•  Situation consciousness is the lowest degree of situation awareness and entails 
being conscious that something is happening.
•  Situation comprehension is the next level and means being aware of the significance 
of what is happening.    
•  Situation prediction is the highest degree of situation awareness and entails the 
ability to recognise previous patterns and, on that basis, to predict how the situation 
is likely to develop.
Figure 4.10, SENSOR, WEAPON AND DECISION PLATFORMS
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NbD as a continuous process 
Figure 4.11, NETWORK BASED DEFENCE – DIFFERING DEGREES OF MATURITY
0463.The left hand side of Figure 4.11 shows an initial form of the Network Based 
Defence. The single-service components have a dominant role. The information 
and component structure is based on existing equipment and materiel and is 
being developed within the separate service branches. The single-service com-
ponents are built up round the traditional platforms. There has at the same time 
been a marked increase in the ability to share information between these com-
ponents and to use the platforms in different roles. The command and control 
structure is common. There is active use of coordination components for coordi-
nation between the service branches and in relation to other actors.
0464. The right hand side of the figure shows a NBD with a high degree of maturity. 
To a great extent the individual service branches have been replaced by a fully 
integrated network of nodes with different properties which can be customised to 
meet the needs of each specific operation, and in which all information is acces-
sible to the whole network. Decisions can be taken at different levels in the orga-
nisation and the human competence will be fully oriented towards working in a 
network environment. The coordination components are not equally essential but 
have a role where the interface with other actors is concerned.  
0465. Both right and left sides of Figure 4.11 describe the Network Based Defence 
and that NBD should be seen as a process rather than an end state. It is by no 
means a certainty that the picture of the ideal NBD that we have today will be 
realised, and the picture we have of NBD may alter at a later stage. The Network 
Based Defence is a journey rather than a destination.
Initial NBD
AIR SEA
LAND
Mature NBD
Sensor component
Action component
Decision component
Decision support component
Coordination component
Information infrastructure, (INI)
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NBD AND ITS VARIOUS DEGREES OF MATURITY
The course of development towards network based defence will be a continuous process 
which must be managed and in which all members of the Armed Forces must participate. 
In order to achieve this it must be possible to assess whether development is proceeding 
in the desired direction. This can be done by defining a series of state descriptions for 
network based defence, or so-called degrees of maturity: initial, integrating and com-
prehensive. The degrees are not exact states to be aimed at with specific measures and 
deadlines, but are intended to give a picture of the phases that a network based defence 
has to go through.
Initial NBD will be within reach during the course of the next few years. A defence at 
this stage of maturity will have an organisation with a good knowledge and understan-
ding of NBD, and NBD will form an integral part of the Armed Forces’ education and 
training. A common network for selected components will be established and all those 
with connections to this network will have access to common information for shared 
situation awareness. Interoperability will be given priority to components involved in 
the same operation. The personnel in the organisation will be a combination of gene-
ralists and specialists. At the same time there will be a dividing line between the day-
to-day running of the Armed Forces on the one side and operations, education, training 
and exercising on the other. NBD will be at its clearest in the latter area. The organisation 
will be relatively static with a large proportion of sequential processes. The technical 
infrastructure will consist mainly of today’s equipment but with certain improvements 
and local system variants where appropriate. Emphasis will be placed on vertical mana-
gement and control based on rules and procedures but the organisation will assume 
an increasing degree of horizontal coordination. The use of information and communi-
cation technology (ICT) is mainly motivated by aspects of rationalisation rather by con-
siderations of what is possible. 
Integrating NBD will be characterised by strong network consciousness. Day-to-day 
running, concepts and doctrines will to a large extent be network based. The organisa-
tion will have a flatter structure compared to the initial NBD. There will be an increased 
degree of horizontal coordination as compared with rules and procedures. There will 
be highly dynamic forms of organisation and processes in given situations. Both old 
and new equipment will be capable of use in networks. A common communications 
network will exist together with a developed information management in which all 
information in the network can be made accessible to everyone who has a need for it. 
Internally there will be a generally high degree of interoperability and the Armed Forces 
will also have begun to develop their interoperability capabilities vis-à-vis non-military 
actors and agencies. Personnel will consist more of specialists than generalists. The use 
of ICT will have shifted from being primarily a rationalisation tool towards being a source 
of innovation. The organisation will still be static with the focus on military 
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interoperability. Integrating NBD will be characterised by greater uncertainty than 
earlier stages since major investment in technology will be replacing the current 
legacy, and the innovative use of ICT allied to experimentation in many areas may 
result in setbacks or lower cost-effectiveness.
Comprehensive NBD will be network-based in all its activities. There will be little dis-
tinction between day-to-day running, education, training exercising and the develop-
ment of concepts and doctrines. The organisation will be dynamic, adaptable to the 
situation and capable of engaging in parallel processes. Emphasis will be placed on 
horizontal coordination. There will be an integrated information infrastructure which 
will be accessible to all. Comprehensive information management will mean that 
information in the network is accessible, intelligible and usable by all who have a 
need for it. Interoperability will be universal in all relevant areas internally techno-
logically, organisationally and procedurally. A capability for interoperability vis-à-vis 
relevant and prioritised external actors and agencies will also have been developed. 
The people in the organisation will be specialised and possess a high degree of self-
reliance and will be skilled in working as a team. The decision as to who will carry out 
a specific task will be taken on the basis of who is most competent. ICT will be used 
both for rationalisation and for enabling new capabilities. Comprehensive NBD will 
improve on integrating NBD in terms of cost-effectiveness. 
Information management in NbD
0466. A network based defence does not consist of one common network which 
covers all levels and which has the same properties at all levels. On the contrary, 
it is about different networks which to a greater or lesser degree can be linked 
together.
0467. The different levels have different requirements for information and infor-
mation must be processed at each individual level. Information management is 
the process to ensure that the best quality information reaches and is finally used 
for decision making by the right users. Information management covers the rout-
ines, processes and systems for the production, storage and management of 
information which support the activity and which ensure that the organisation 
is able to make use of it. 
0468. Information management can take place according to the push or the pull 
principles. The push principle means that the information is transferred from the 
source to the user, for example from superior to subordinate during a mission. 
The pull principle means that the user fetches the information that is considered 
to be needed, for example by searching a database. Both principles have advan-
tages and disadvantages when precision and time consumption are concerned. 
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0469. Efficient information management is a key to realising the potential increase 
in efficiency that network basing offers. There are, however, many unanswered 
questions surrounding this area and further research and development is needed. 
Nevertheless the doctrine highlights the following fundamental requirements 
for efficient information management:
•	 the combination of human and machine processing of information,
•	 the possibility of using both push and pull principles at all levels,  
•	 the possibility of protecting and selecting information with the aid of crypto 
systems,
•	 the possibility of connecting to civil systems, for example the Internet or the 
Search and Rescue co-ordination centres.
•	 interoperability with NATO.
The challenges of network basing
0470. There are many challenges associated with the development of NBD. Infor-
mation management has been mentioned above. Bandwidth and transmission 
speed; power supply; team spirit; and then people and procedures which can alter-
nate between centralised and decentralised command, are other examples of pro-
blem areas which will need further action. Discussion of NBD and its further 
development requires insight and understanding of all these aspects.
0471. Bandwidth and transmission speed: Network basing is dependent on large 
amounts of information being transferred rapidly. Military units use different 
media for the transfer of information. Fibre optics offers large bandwidth and 
high transmission speed (measured in gigabits per second) but requires that all 
elements of the network are interconnected with physical cables. Such a method 
of transfer can thus be used within staffs or by units which are permanently 
grouped together. Satellite channels and radio links offer medium bandwidth 
and transmission speed (measured in megabits per second). Satellite and radio 
links can be used by mobile units but require a free line of sight between trans-
mitter and receiver. This means that such equipment cannot be used in all types 
of terrain or under all conditions. Broadcast radio and mobile telephone offer 
relatively low bandwidth and low transmission speed (measured in kilobits per 
second). These media, however, do not require a free line of sight between trans-
mitter and receiver. For the Army’s mobile units, which use mainly broadcast radio 
in the HF and VHF bands, transfer rate is often limited.
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SHANNON’S LAW 
The American mathematician Claude Shannon (1916-2001) was a pioneer in the field 
of information technology. In 1948 he formulated a mathematical law to aid the under-
standing of telecommunication including radio and data communication (A Mathe-
matical Theory of Communication). Put briefly, the essence of Shannon’s Law is that 
the higher the frequency used by the transfer medium, the greater the transmission 
speed will be. The problem for an army unit using broadcast radio is that the higher 
the frequency, the shorter the effective range will be.     
0472. Power supply presents another technical challenge for NBD. The challenge 
is a serious one for mobile units. During the Iraq war in 2003 the availability of 
batteries was a limiting factor where night operations were concerned. And then 
most of the batteries were used for night vision equipment and not for mobile 
terminals for network based warfare. Research in the field of power supplies for 
NBD is now a high priority internationally.
0473. Team spirit: NBD places emphasis on the need for a flat organisation with 
flexible units that can be tailored to the needs of different missions. Today’s orga-
nisation has a personnel structure that fosters a sense of belonging, with com-
manders and subordinates in a relationship which promotes togetherness and 
a team spirit. To maintain this sense of belonging and team spirit, so essential in 
combat, in a network based organisation is a major challenge.  
0474. People and procedures which can alternate between centralised and decen-
tralised command: A fundamental part of the thinking associated with NBD is 
that it must be possible to make decisions either centrally or at local level depend-
ing on the given situation. Developing procedures that make it possible for 
 authority to be moved rapidly around the organisation poses a formidable 
 challenge. A challenge at least as formidable is also posed by development of 
individuals capable of switching between taking the initiative and leading in one 
situation, and yet able to subordinate themselves rapidly to received orders in 
another. These human and organisational challenges can be met if the Armed 
Forces place the emphasis on mission command and decentralised decision 
making in our everyday activities and shape the training and exercising of per-
sonnel with this in view. At the same time, we must be able to exercise centralised 
command when it is necessary.
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5.  Joint operations – components and  
functions
0501. This chapter deals with joint operations and those components and key 
functions that play a part in such operations. The chapter first explains the con-
cepts operation, joint operation and operational art. This is followed by a descrip-
tion of the components land forces, sea forces, air forces and special forces and 
how these can contribute in a joint operation. The chapter concludes with a 
description of the functions command and control, information operations, civil-
military cooperation (CIMIC), intelligence and logistics.
Military operations 
0502. An operation is a series of combat activities, movements and other actions 
which are intended to achieve an overall aim. An operation can be carried out 
both with and without armed action. A simple operation can be carried out to 
achieve a strategic objective or it can form part of a series of operations. Such a 
series is called a campaign.  
0503. A military operation is characterised by four properties. Firstly an operation 
is carried out to achieve a defined objective, either by itself or as part of a series 
to achieve political objectives. Secondly it has a mandate for the use of military 
force and is carried out in circumstances in which other agencies are not able to 
act effectively. Thirdly a military operation has a clearly defined framework of 
command and responsibility. Finally, the authority assigning the task and the 
person responsible for carrying it out should be in agreement as to the resources 
that can be made available. 
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0504. An operation can be categorised as military strategic, operational or tactical 
depending on its objectives. In other words it is not primarily the size of the forces 
involved that determine how the operation can be described. Operations with spe-
cial forces and air forces are examples of operations which are often carried out 
with small units which can be deployed directly against military strategic targets. 
Operations can also be characterised on the basis of which forces are involved, such 
as “joint operations”; or according to the type of operation, such as “search and 
rescue operations” and “anti-terror operations”; or depending on the arena in which 
the operation will be conducted, such as “land, air and sea operations”. 
0505. A joint operation is an operation in which contributions from several service 
branches are integrated and coordinated 
to realise the benefits of synergy at mili-
tary strategic, operational or tactical levels, 
often within a multinational framework 
and often in close cooperation with civilian 
resources and agencies. The aspiration 
behind a joint operation thus extends bey-
ond the coordination of separate tactical 
single service operations under joint com-
mand, and is about making use of the 
attributes of the various components and 
support functions in order to achieve the 
benefits of synergy. 
0506. A conceptual framework for joint operations can encompass three forms of 
operations: Deep operations are about attacking the adversary’s will, cohesion and 
capability for continued combat, including attacks on his headquarters, other infra-
structure, logistics and reserve forces. Close operations imply direct attack on the 
adversary’s military forces. Rear operations are carried out to protect our own vital 
functions, including morale, command and control, lines of communication and 
reserve forces.
0507. Such a framework can constitute a tool for linking the specific function of 
individual operations, that is to say the effects that they are intended to achieve, 
to place, or where that effect is to be achieved, and to the time at which a given 
effect should ideally be achieved. The commander’s intent – what is desired to be 
achieved through the joint operation as a whole – is the essential point, and even 
if the three forms of operations mentioned above can take place in parallel, the 
emphasis placed on each of them will vary according to the desired effects.
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0508. Most often a joint operation or campaign will, in its entirety, consist of eight 
phases:
•	 completion of a Joint Estimate and development of a joint operational plan,
•	 preparation of the force itself by force build-up and training,
•	 building up logistic support, host nation support and multinational support,
•	 deployment to the operational area, possibly reinforcing forces already deployed 
there,
•	 carrying out the operation(s) itself/themselves,
•	 securing the post-operation phase through conflict resolution and military 
post-conflict activities,
•	 redeployment of the forces, 
•	 post-operative reporting, including the identification of lessons learned. 
0509. Operations today are increasingly complex and unpredictable. There is there-
fore little point in defining normative principles for how the Armed Forces’ joint 
operations should be conducted. In every individual operation it is the joint opera-
tional commander’s responsibility to combine the components and support func-
tions in such a way that the desired effects are achieved and the political objectives 
fulfilled. The Armed Forces’ Operational Foundation does, however, provide a com-
mon general basis for the preparation and execution of operations.  
Operational art  
0510. Operational art is a military commander’s use of the means at his disposal to 
achieve the desired effects and fulfil the overall objectives. The operational art is 
referred to as an “art” because it entails linking together and realising, often abstract, 
strategic aims by means of physical activities. The term “art” is used because it is 
about managing combat in a range of different temporal and spatial dimensions 
in the physical, social, information and cognitive domains where there are few quanti-
fiable values or set answers. Operational art is also the art of the possible, that is to 
say making use of the resources that one actually has in order to achieve the best 
possible result. 
0511. Good operational art requires creativity and imagination. Talent is therefore 
an important factor in determining who is best qualified to command military joint 
operations. However, talent alone is not sufficient. Good operational art is also to a 
great extent about experience and training. Furthermore, a factor absolutely essen-
tial to good operational art is the ability to see a particular activity in the wider 
context of security policy, in which particular actions, or the absence of them, can 
have far-reaching political and economic consequences. This insight is of major sig-
nificance both in national operations and in international operations abroad. 
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Command and organisation of a joint operational force 
0512. A joint operational force can be organised on the basis of independent 
components with their own Component Commanders. These would then be sub-
ordinate to the Joint Operational Force Commander. A component is traditionally 
contributed from a single service branch but can also consist of elements and 
units from more than one service branch brought together to form a functional 
element. The special forces component is an example of such an element. All 
components, whether single-service or functional, are combined in such a way 
that their combat effectiveness in their respective arenas (land, sea and air) is 
maximised. A joint operational force can also be organised with directly subor-
dinate units in which the different elements and units are directly subordinate 
to the Joint Operational Force Commander. With this form of organisation there 
is thus no need for individual Component Commanders at the level below the 
Joint Operational Force Commander.
0513. In a NATO context it is usual for a joint operational force to be organised 
with a combination of components and directly subordinate units. Where the 
emphasis between these two principles is placed depends on the competence 
and capacity of the headquarters, the total number of subordinate units and the 
magnitude and complexity of the operation concerned. The component solution 
will normally be preferred if the joint operational commander and his staff have 
limited resources, there are a large number of subordinate units and the operation 
is extensive and complex. A form of organisation with directly subordinate units 
is often preferred in operations with a small number of subordinate units or in 
other situations where the joint operational headquarters is in the best position 
to coordinate the actions.  
0514. The preparation and execution of joint operations is dependent on a range 
of supporting functions which are orga-
nised by the joint operational headquar-
ters. Examples of such functions include 
civil-military cooperation, information 
operations, intelligence, operational secu-
rity, logistics, targeting, political and legal 
advice, financing, press and information 
services and personnel administration. 
Individual functions will normally be 
associated with a particular staff ele-
ment or be taken care of by a particular 
process within the joint operational 
headquarters.
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ORGANISATION OF JOINT OPERATIONAL HEADQUARTERS 
A joint operational headquarters is organised with a view to achieving the desired syner-
gies between components and supporting functions. Traditionally headquarters have 
been organised on the basis of either a so-called “J-structure” (joint structure) or a so-called 
“commander structure”.
J-structure stands for joint structure and means that the headquarters’ activities are grou-
ped functionally, across single-service boundaries. NATO operates with 9 functions: J1 = 
administration and personnel, J2 = intelligence, J3 = operations, J4 = logistics, J5 = plans and 
policy, J6 = communication and command systems, J7 = doctrine and training, J8 = budget 
and finance, and J9 = CIMIC (civil-military cooperation). The nine functions are normally 
located in branches which together constitute the basis of the joint operational 
commander’s decision-making and serve to execute the commander’s decisions.  
Commander structure is also a joint structure but one in which the headquarters organi-
sation is based more on single-service lines than the J-structure. The commander structure 
normally means that there will be an overall joint operational commander with three 
subordinate single-service commanders. This in turn means that the particular specialised 
capabilities of the individual service branches are represented directly to the joint opera-
tional commander when decisions are to be made since the overall commander must be 
in close liaison with the commanders of the land, sea and air forces. 
In 1971 Norway introduced commander structure in its joint operational headquarters in 
North and South Norway. This was a structure which differed from corresponding struc-
tures in other NATO countries in that there was very close integration between the indi-
vidual service branches. With the introduction of the commander structure – the Norwe-
gian model – a substantial degree of authority and responsibility was transferred from 
the single-service commanders to the overall commander (the Joint Operational Com-
mander). This is illustrated by the fact that the single-service operational commanders, 
referred to as “Commanders” in Norwegian, were known as “Chiefs” in other NATO coun-
tries – with the implications for authority and responsibility that this title suggests. In 
Norway the term “Chief” was reserved for the Chief of Defence, the officer in overall 
operational command. Following the end of the Cold War, there was a stronger emphasis 
on integration due to increased recognition of the importance of joint situation awareness, 
joint planning and the joint coordination of operations across single-service boundaries. 
In 2006 the Norwegian Armed Forces abandoned the commander structure and intro-
duced the J-structure throughout. 
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The land component and land operations    
0515. The land component consists primarily of land forces but can also be regar-
ded as a functional element in which land forces, amphibious forces, special for-
ces, CIMIC elements, air forces and supporting sea forces also feature. 
The characteristics of land combat
0516. The world’s inhabitants live on land and on land, too, is the infrastructure 
and production capacity that supports this population. It is on land that society 
develops and has its most important interaction. Conflicts unfold and are most 
often decided on land. And so the greater part of classical military theory relates 
to land combat. 
0517. Land operations are conducted in complex environments. The combat is 
characterised by the terrain and often by a multiplicity of actors. The large num-
ber of actors increases the likelihood of friction and the risk of misunderstandings. 
The terrain with its natural obstacles and infrastructure will also contribute sig-
nificantly to friction, for example due to difficulty in making headway and often 
restricted visibility. 
0518. The core tasks of the land forces are to find, fix and strike the adversary and 
to exploit the gains that are achieved. These are the core tasks in all types of 
operation, even though the execution will vary depending on whether it is a 
stabilization operation or combat against regular or irregular forces. Find, fix, strike 
and exploit are not static or sequential tasks but will take place in parallel and 
continuously throughout an operation. 
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0519. The aim with the task find is in the broadest sense to obtain an overall view 
of the situation in the operational area. Human information collection through 
presence and interaction with all the actors in the operational area is one of the 
land component’s most important contributions in joint operations. Important 
elements of this are determining where the adversary and other actors are loca-
ted, what capabilities they have at their disposal and what their intentions are. 
0520. The aim with the task fix implies reducing the adversary’s freedom of action 
while at the same time increasing one’s own. The methods of fixing vary and 
range from information operations, military presence and patrolling to combat 
operations. Combat operations with the intention of fixing can be conducted 
both as offensive and defensive operations. 
The Norwegian Armed Forces’ Doctrine for Land Operations (FDLO) was issued in 2004. 
The doctrine includes a comprehensive review of the Norwegian Army and relevant 
aspects of land operations. FDLO is not identical with NATO’s doctrine for land ope-
rations, AJP 3.2 Land Operations, but harmonises with it.
0521. The aim with the task strike implies initiating various actions on the adversary 
to create an effect. In the widest sense this covers a broad spectrum of actions 
which are determined by the category of the operation. Methods of striking 
include all actions which are directed against the adversary, thus covering both 
lethal and non-lethal means. 
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0522. Exploitation (exploit) of progress made in a land operation should be viewed 
in the light of the manoeuvre method and is about continuing to maintain ini-
tiative and to exert pressure on the adversary by exploiting successes achieved. 
In a joint operation land forces can be committed to exploit the situation arising 
as a result of action by another component, for example by taking control of an 
area which has been under attack by sea or air forces.
The command and organisation of land forces
0523. Task organisation and the principle of combined actions is central to the 
organisation of land forces. Task organisation is about seeking to optimise the 
composition of a grouping on the basis of the task that is to be carried out in the 
given situation. A battlegroup is a unit which is organised on the basis of the 
tasks to be carried out in a given situation. A fundamental precondition for effec-
tive land combat is the ability to combine different weapon systems (combined 
arms) at the lowest combat level.
ORGANISATION OF MILITARY LAND FORCES
During the 18th century a system of land force organisation was developed which, 
around 1800, was adopted by Napoleon Bonaparte to administer and organise the 
mass armies he mobilised. The system was based on dividing the land forces into a 
clear hierarchical structure consisting of corps, brigade, battalion, company, platoon 
and section. The brigade represented the lowest level at which all the army’s different 
arms (infantry, cavalry and so on) were represented. 
0524. The brigade is composed of different arms and services, which in turn will 
include different weapon systems. Traditionally the brigade has been divided into 
manoeuvre units (infantry and armour), tactical support units (artillery, air defence 
and combat engineer), logistic units (medical and supply) and command and control 
units (communications, military police and reconnaissance units). Another way of 
subdividing the brigade, which may have advantages from the point of view of a 
network-based approach and flexibility, is to view the brigade as a command super-
structure for different functions. The brigade then encompasses combat, tactical 
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support, other support and command. The brigade can operate independently as a 
separate entity, in a role subordinate to a higher level (division), or as part of a 
component structure. Which types of units the brigade consists of – and the size 
of the brigade itself – may vary, and in Norway the size has consistently been 
somewhat less than the international average of about 5,000 soldiers. 
0525. Staffs and command posts at brigade level and above will, during operations, 
be configured and equipped to command and control actions involving different 
systems across single-service boundaries. At battalion and below, however, com-
mand support components or coordination components can be added to coordinate 
the different systems in combat. Developments in the direction of network based 
defence opens the way for such coordination to be employed to an increasing extent 
at lower levels. 
The land component’s contribution to joint operations 
0526. The purpose of land operations is to hold and control areas of land, or to seize 
and defend these with the aim of combating an adversary, stabilising the situation 
between conflicting parties or protecting the civilian popula-
tion, infrastructure and own forces. Control of territory is also 
a precondition for humanitarian aid and other measures 
which over time can improve conditions in the conflict area. 
0527. The land component’s contribution in a joint operation 
is territorial control over time and close interaction with the 
actors in the conflict area. It can contribute information about 
the parties in a conflict and other factors that affect the ope-
ration. To have soldiers in the operational area itself is important for access to first 
hand information. The component also has an effect, direct or indirect, on the 
adversary. The component’s lethal and non-lethal means contribute towards redu-
cing the adversary’s freedom of action and affecting his will and capability. 
0528. The land component also contributes through securing own forces, bases for 
sea and air forces, general infrastructure and supply lines on land. In addition to 
regular guard and security duties, the land forces can contribute to air defence, 
electronic warfare, CBRN (protection against chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear weapons) as well as combat engineering tasks. 
0529. The land component looks after logistics on land for all the joint resources in 
the operational area. Land forces are often resource-intensive in terms of both 
personnel and equipment and will themselves require substantial logistic support 
and secure supply lines. At the same time, both maritime and air forces are often 
dependent on bases and support points on land to enable them to operate in their 
own elements. 
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The sea component and maritime operations   
0530. The sea component consists primarily of maritime forces but can also be 
seen as a functional element consisting of maritime forces, amphibious forces, 
air forces and supporting land forces (for example base elements).
The characteristics of naval combat
0531. Two thirds of the world’s surface is covered by sea and two thirds of the 
world’s population lives less than 20 km from the coast. The sea thus provides 
strategic access to many of the world’s most important political, economic and 
most densely populated centres. The oceans are themselves rich in resources (for 
example petroleum and fish), and they represent one of the main arteries of 
international trade. The sea is an arena for the projection of military power, somet-
hing that can be used in connection with deterrence, diplomacy and other forms 
of political influence in peacetime. It is also an arena for the use of military force 
in times of crisis or armed conflict, and in many instances gives direct access to 
the theatre of war on land. 
0532. Maritime forces have a number of important characteristics such as avai-
lability, mobility, versatility, autonomy and endurance, and they provide support 
for operating range, lifting capacity, a forward presence, balance of power and 
influence. Maritime forces can, with their capacity for flexible and strategic deploy-
ment, be easily inserted or withdrawn. 
0533. The operating area for maritime forces can be divided into the open sea 
and coastal waters or littoral areas. The concept of a littoral area has assumed 
FFOD Engelsk.indd   112 13-03-08   09:56:17
11
greater importance in recent years and can be defined in a military context as a 
sea area which extends from the open sea in to the coast and which must be 
controlled in order to support operations on land. It also covers the land area 
immediately inland from the coast which can be supported and defended directly 
from seaward. The extent of the area will depend on various factors including 
the nature of the operation concerned and the capabilities being employed.
The Norwegian Armed Forces’ Doctrine for Maritime Operations (FDMO) is the Norwe-
gian maritime doctrine which gives an overall perspective of Norway’s maritime capa-
bilities and the areas in which these capabilities can be used. FDMO is not identical 
with NATO’s doctrine for maritime operations, AJP 3.1 Allied Joint Maritime Operations, 
but harmonises with it.
0534. Maritime forces have a range of tasks which can be divided into three main 
groups. 
•	 Military: Maritime forces are used as a means of armed combat or as a threat.
•	 Law and order: Maritime forces are used nationally and internationally in order to 
uphold sovereignty and the rule of law.
•	 Aid: Maritime forces can also contribute specialised resources to many peace ope-
rations in which the use of force is not appropriate.
These tasks can be further categorised into anti-air warfare, anti-surface warfare, 
anti-submarine warfare, mine operations and amphibious operations. 
0535. Anti-air warfare has as its purpose the removal of the threat of air or missile 
attack, or to reduce it to an acceptable level. The need for anti-air warfare capa-
bilities varies according to the nature of the task, the threat assessment and 
where the operation is taking place. Vessels may be equipped with air defence 
systems for self-defence and the defence of own assets and other units in a force 
group. In littoral areas, land-based aircraft will strengthen and extend the defence 
of the operational area. The availability of such support will often be an essential 
precondition for a successful operation.
0536. Anti-surface warfare can be either offensive or defensive. It can embrace 
means of combat in all dimensions, that is to say below, above or on the sea 
surface, as well as from land. Important capabilities which are available from 
different platforms include anti-surface missiles, torpedoes and gunfire directed 
against sea or land targets. Land-based combat aircraft or other aerial platforms 
equipped with stand-off air-to-surface missiles will be able to strengthen the 
concentration of firepower and increase the operational commander’s room for 
manoeuvre. The warships’ weapon systems can also be used against targets on 
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land in order to contribute to the flexible use of limited capabilities in operations 
carried out in littoral areas. 
0537. Anti-submarine warfare embraces all means of detecting, classifying, loca-
ting, scaring off, avoiding or destroying an adversary’s underwater vessels. Com-
bating such vessels is a challenging task because 
of the characteristics of the underwater envi-
ronment and because the underwater topo-
graphy can afford protection against discovery. 
It is thus important to be able to use a variety 
of means such as active and passive listening 
systems, light and heavy weapons which can be 
delivered by surface vessels, helicopters, mari-
time aircraft and submarines.
0538. Mine operations cover both measures against mines and maritime mining 
operations in which mines can be laid from all types of vessels, including subma-
rines, and from aircraft. Developments in sea mine technology, including smart 
mines and self-propelled automated mines, make mines an effective weapon 
against both surface ships and submarines. A thorough reconnaissance of the 
local waters in advance of an operation is essential for effective mining opera-
tions.
0539. Amphibious operations are joint operations in which land forces are landed, 
or threaten to land, with support from seaward. Amphibious operations can be 
conducted across the whole spectrum from unopposed landing to land in the 
face of armed resistance. As a consequence, the requirements for force compo-
sition and capabilities will vary. An amphibious operation will involve different 
types of vessels, landing forces, weapons and aircraft.
Command and organisation of maritime forces
0540. The joint operational commander or maritime component commander 
organises the sea component on the basis of the functions or tasks that it is to 
fulfil (task organisation). There are normally four levels in such an organisation: 
Task Forces (TF), Task Groups (TG), Task Units (TU) and Task Elements (TE). Task Groups 
are normally the lowest level of self-sufficient combat force in a task organisation. 
Forces, groups, units and elements are all led by their own commanders. 
The sea component’s contribution to joint operations
0541. The sea component is able to move on the open sea and in littoral areas 
and to carry out operations right across the conflict spectrum. It is able to act as 
a door-opener in a joint operation in which the sea axis is used as a line of com-
munication or advance. This can be of particular importance when the emphasis 
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is on the use of smaller, high firepower expeditionary forces and special forces in 
connection with crisis management. Lift capacity leased from the merchant fleet 
will often be of decisive importance in bringing in forces and materiel during 
major operations, so increasing endurance. 
0542. The sea component can be used against targets on land by making use of 
the sea as a central axis of advance. In some cases, land forces will only be in a 
position to advance if inserted by landing craft in an amphibious operation. Land 
forces can be prevented from achieving their objectives if maritime forces fail to 
secure the sea front or supply from seaward. The sea component will also be able 
to contribute to control of the airspace. In addition the sea component contribu-
tes to joint operations by establishing and maintaining sea control, sea denial and 
maritime power projection, supported by a maritime capability for command and 
control and sea-based logistics. It is important that these contributions are seen 
in context and not as being mutually exclusive; all can feature in one and the 
same operation.
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SEA CONTROL, SEA DENIAL AND MARITIME POWER PROJECTION
Sea Control denotes a level of ambition which involves securing a sea area for own 
operations or own activities but which is limited in time and space. It implies control 
of the sea surface, the underwater environment and the airspace over the operational 
area. The latter dictates that the air component must be seen as a contributor in 
achieving sea control and there needs to be dynamic interaction between the two 
components. The minimum requirement for control of the airspace is that it should 
bring about and maintain a favourable air situation. Air superiority (a higher level of 
ambition) will be a requirement where a robust degree of sea control is necessary and 
the adversary is very likely to be capable of mounting a challenge via airspace. 
The achievement of sea control and its affirmation at various levels are often impor-
tant in joint operations. The extent of sea control must strike a balance between 
regard for own freedom of action on the one side and what constitutes an acceptable 
risk on the other. The level of ambition can vary between establishing absolute sea 
control and accepting limited local contention. If one party is unable to exercise sea 
control, it does not necessarily mean that the other party can do so. 
Sea Denial denotes a level of ambition which involves preventing the adversary from 
using a sea area for his operations. Sea denial has something in common with sea 
control in that denying the adversary freedom of action can also be one aspect of sea 
control. Sea denial is, however, a usable method when for various reasons it may not 
be possible or desirable to achieve sea control. A zone in which sea denial is exercised 
can form part of the outer operational area, that is to say an area which is of less 
significance than the inner (where sea control can be exercised). 
Maritime Power Projection is the strategic use of, or threat of use of, maritime forces 
in order to influence events on land. Sea control is often a precondition for maritime 
power projection, especially in order to gain access to the coastal zone, so furthering 
the ability to project power on land. The projection can take the form of an amphibious 
attack by making use of aircraft and helicopters, by using weapons against targets 
on land or by using special forces. Power projection can be used throughout the whole 
of the conflict spectrum, from peace, via crisis to armed conflict. It can be used with 
a view to gaining access to areas which land forces cannot reach, to open up new 
directions for operations or to secure forward bases. In general the presence of mari-
time forces is politically acceptable. This can be used to demonstrate political will and 
cohesion in an alliance. It represents a form of military presence which is possible 
without having to enter another state’s territorial waters or airspace.
FFOD Engelsk.indd   116 13-03-08   09:56:43
117
The air component and air operations   
0543. The air component consists primarily of air forces, but can also be seen as a 
functional element consisting of all those forces which support the air forces or 
which make primary use of the airspace to affect the land-, sea- and air arenas.  
The characteristics of air combat
0544. Air forces operate in and make use of the third dimension – the air. This 
extends from ground level and upwards into the atmosphere, covering 100 % of 
the earth’s surface with no natural boundaries or obstacles. This makes it pos-
sible for platforms to cover large distances in a short time and the air’s transpa-
rency enables objects to be detected at long ranges, either visually or with the 
aid of a spectrum of different sensors.  
The Norwegian Armed Forces’ Doctrine for Air Operations (FDLO) was issued in 2002. 
The doctrine includes a comprehensive review of the Norwegian Air Force and relevant 
aspects of air operations. The Norwegian Armed Forces’ doctrine for air operations is 
not identical with NATO’s doctrine for air operations, AJP 3.3 Joint Air and Space Ope-
rations, but harmonises with it.
0545. The fundamental properties of air forces are height, speed and reach. Height, 
combined with advanced sensor systems provides a unique overview. Speed and 
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reach gives the capability to move over large distances to almost any location in 
the course of just minutes or hours. Air forces can create results at long distances 
in a short time, or can swiftly provide a presence to observe a particular area. 
0546. Air forces’ flexibility and versatility mean that they can be rapidly adapted 
to changing conditions and requirements. They can rapidly switch from defensive 
to offensive operations, from tactical to strategic operations, from one task to 
another, from one target to another, from concentrated to distributed force, from 
high to low tempo, from humanitarian aid to precision fire against a particular 
target, and from being a sensor component to being an action component.
AIR POWER
The concept of air power arose from the development of the aircraft, and subsequently 
missiles and space systems, as means of combat. The concept of air power is defined 
somewhat differently from one country to another. NATO uses the following definition: 
Air power is the military use of systems which operate in or pass through the airspace. 
This includes surface-to-air weapons, manned and unmanned aircraft, satellites and space 
platforms which provide support for military operations. 
The Norwegian Air Force operates with seven air power functions: counter-air operations, 
anti-surface operations, surveillance and reconnaissance, air transport, electronic warfare, 
search and rescue and air-to-air refuelling. In order to be able to carry out operations, air 
power is dependent on command and control and ground-based support 
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The command and organisation of air forces
0547. Air forces should generally be placed under centralised command in order 
to ensure concentration of force, economy and the benefits of synergy with other 
components. At the same time, decentralised execution is necessary in order to 
achieve effective control, reaction capability and tactical flexibility. Centralised 
command and decentralised execution is dependent on a shared situation awa-
reness and understanding of the commander’s intent as to which effects are to 
be achieved. 
0548. The air component prepares and carries out joint air operations as well as 
coordinating air forces which are included in the land and sea components. Opti-
mal utilisation of air forces in joint operations is dependent on all components 
being familiar with the air command and control process and how own compo-
nents’ requirements for air power can best be served in this process.
0549. The air command and control process must ensure that the air forces are 
prioritised, coordinated and synchronised for execution of the joint operational 
tasks. The planning cycle must allow for a high degree of flexibility and the dyna-
mic use of the air forces so that it is possible to manage a continuously developing 
situation. It is true that the distribution of resources between predefined tasks 
and flexible tasking will vary from operation to operation, but it is very important 
that other forces identifies and puts forward any requirements for air power 
contributions as early as possible 
The air component’s contribution to joint operations
0550. The air component’s contribution to joint operations can be divided into 
air control, information gathering, precision targeting and air mobility.
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0551. Air control: Joint operations are very often dependent on air control, and this 
is the air component’s most important contribution. Air control is an essential 
precondition for ensuring freedom of action for own land, 
sea and air forces. Air control is achieved through sur-
veillance and interception. Surveillance is about building 
up the necessary picture of the situation so that any irre-
gular or undesired activity can be detected. Surveillance 
of the airspace is carried out using ground, sea and air-
based sensors which are connected together in a network 
for the production and distribution of a common air pic-
ture. Interception is a reaction to undesired activity in the 
airspace. It can range from identification to physical 
destruction depending on the circumstances. Interception 
is effected through offensive or defensive counter-air operations. Air control is a 
relative condition which can be divided into the various levels: favourable air 
situation, air superiority or air supremacy. A favourable air situation exists when 
the adversary’s action and his use of the means of air combat will not affect the 
outcome of our land, sea and air operations to any significant extent. Air superi-
ority is a degree of dominance of the airspace, at a given time and place, which 
makes our land, sea and air operations possible without prohibitive disruption 
by the adversary. Air supremacy further strengthens the condition provided by 
air superiority, giving a situation in which the adversary’s air combat forces are 
unable to achieve effective interference of our forces’ operations. 
0552. Information gathering: Aerial platforms equipped with advanced sensors 
and command and control systems have an important function in getting the 
right information to the right decision-maker at the right time. A combination 
of manned and unmanned aerial platforms with a varied range of sensors (active 
and passive) will be able to collect and deliver relevant information about the 
activity in the air, on the surface and under water, and on land, to a common 
network. It is important to understand that air forces are both important provi-
ders and major consumers of information. A capability for air control and preci-
sion engagement from aerial platforms is very demanding in terms of intelligence, 
an accurate and up-to-date situation picture and the ability to make immediate 
use of information so that the shortest possible reaction time between detection 
and action is achieved. 
0553. Precision targeting: Precision weapons delivered from aerial platforms are 
able in principle to reach all targets of tactical, operational and strategic signifi-
cance and results can be achieved against land, sea and air targets. Precision 
weapons also enable force concentration to be achieved with fewer aerial plat-
forms than in the past. Precision weapons delivered from aerial platforms make 
it possible to achieve direct effects while at the same time reducing the risk of 
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undesired indirect effects in the form of collateral damage, the sending of nega-
tive signals and the risk to own forces. The demonstration of capability and the 
will to engage with precision weapons, through rapidly making their presence 
felt, can in itself have a significant effect on an adversary. 
0554. Air mobility: Aerial platforms have inherent high mobility and are able to 
create effects over large distances in a short time. The capacity for strategic and 
operational transport can be of decisive importance in the deployment of rapid 
reaction forces. Tactical air transport is often necessary to ensure the reaction 
capability, operating range and effectiveness of other forces. High air mobility is 
important to being able to deliver humanitarian support internationally or to 
carry out search and rescue missions. High air mobility can, moreover, create 
positive political effects through timely surveillance and the rapid establishment 
of a presence to demonstrate the will and capability to use force.
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The special forces component and special operations 
0555. In recent years the Norwegian Armed Forces have placed increased emp-
hasis on the further development of the Norwegian special forces while special 
operations at the same time have assumed greater importance in the execution 
of joint operations both nationally and abroad. Special forces can contribute to 
the creation of major effects using resources that are relatively limited in time 
and space. Special operations can be either overt or covert and can be carried out 
either independently or within a joint operational framework. 
0556. In NATO it is usual to define special operations as military activities con-
ducted by specially designated, organised, trained and equipped forces using 
operational techniques and methods not standard to conventional forces. These 
operations are carried out in peacetime, in times of crisis and in armed conflict 
independently of, or coordinated with, conventional forces. Political or military 
considerations may dictate the use of undercover, covert or discreet methods and 
may require acceptance of a degree of military or political risk that is not usual 
in conventional operations. 
0557. Special operations are carried out by specially selected personnel who are 
provided with special equipment and thorough training in advanced tactics and 
techniques. Special forces have a short reaction time and can be inserted over 
large distances on land, by air or by surface craft or submarines.
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THE USE OF SPECIAL FORCES – A BRIEF HISTORY
Historically, special forces have played a variety of roles in warfare. They have often 
been used to infiltrate the enemy and obtain valuable information which is difficult 
to acquire and not obtainable through the use of other sensors. At the same time 
special forces have been used to carry out other missions, especially to attack opera-
tional/strategic targets. The advantage of special forces is that they have the capacity 
to operate covertly in small independent units which are thus difficult to detect. 
The Second World War saw the emergence of special units trained and equipped for 
operations behind enemy lines. Shortly after the outbreak of war the British established 
the Special Air Service (SAS), the purpose of which was to operate with undercover groups 
of agents in an occupied Europe. In Norway, following the outbreak of war, Kompani Linge 
was established with the aim of operating on Norwegian territory. The Vemork action is 
a classic example of a British/Norwegian special operation which, using specially tailored 
means and methods, achieved results that had a strategic effect. The special forces ope-
rated independently and outside the conventional chains of command. Short, unambi-
guous chains of command with the fewest possible links are also a characteristic of today’s 
special forces. The reason for this lies in the sensitive nature of the missions where the 
need for direct political or military strategic direction is often great. 
After the Second World War, unconventional military operational methods were given 
lower priority or were viewed with scepticism by many military leaders. Many of the 
special units in Western Europe and the United States were disbanded. This was also the 
case with the Norwegian groups which for five years had operated on occupied soil.
However, subsequent crises and wars have on a number of occasions resulted in the 
acceptance and establishment of military units with unconventional capabilities. In the 
United Kingdom the need once more arose for special forces capabilities since these 
units showed themselves to be effective force multipliers in the wars which followed 
the granting of independence to former colonies. The same happened in the United 
States where the aim was to prepare for unconventional operations behind the Iron 
Curtain in the event of the Cold War escalating into open war. Today’s Norwegian spe-
cial forces were established in the 1950s and 1960s with a similar intention and with 
special regard to operations behind enemy lines in the event of an attack on Norway. 
The terrorist action in Munich in 1972 contributed to the establishment of new special 
units in Europe since there were scarcely any existing units capable of rescuing hos-
tages and combating terrorists. Since then special forces have been used in actions 
of this type on a number of occasions, for example the rescuing of hostages at Entebbe 
airport in Uganda by Israeli special forces in 1976. The SAS was used in a similar way 
in rescuing hostages held in the Iranian embassy in London in 1980. In 1982 the Nor-
wegian Armed Forces established the Special Forces Command (FSK) as a military 
capability in support of the police, primarily with a view to defending the offshore 
installations in the North Sea.
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The first Gulf War (1990-91) revitalised interest in special forces both in the United States 
and in the United Kingdom. During the conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s and in the 
wars in Afghanistan (from 2001) and Iraq (from 2003) such forces have proved to be 
extremely useful. In particular they have engaged in liaison, surveillance and the gathering 
of information relating to the warring parties, the training of guerrilla forces as well as 
offensive operations against war criminals and terrorists. The traditional tasks remain but 
new ones include, for example, operations to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and support for computer network operations (CNO). Another trend is towards 
more integrated operations between conventional units and special forces. 
Tasks for special forces
0558. Special forces can be used effectively across the whole conflict spectrum from 
peace to armed conflict. In addition to traditional military tasks this includes sup-
port for the civil community and tasks associated with stabilization operations. The 
special forces are able to carry out operations which have to be tailor-made due to 
special requirements or strategic objectives. Norwegian special forces undertake 
five main types of operation: special reconnaissance and surveillance, offensive ope-
rations, military assistance, special air operations and counter-terror operations. 
0559. Special reconnaissance and surveillance has the aim of gathering information 
of strategic or operational significance. Special reconnaissance can be used where 
other methods of information gathering are made difficult due to weather, geo-
graphy, an adversary’s countermeasures or other limitations, and should be initia-
ted early enough to allow the information to be used in the decision process.  
0560. Special reconnaissance and surveillance can include area reconnaissance 
and surveillance in support of decision processes; reconnaissance and area assess-
ment prior to operations carried out by conventional forces or in preparation for 
own offensive missions; target acquisition, including the adversary’s command 
and control systems and particularly important targets or personnel; surveillance 
in order to gain insight into the adversary’s operational plans and intentions; and 
assessment of results and effects achieved by lethal and non-lethal means. 
0561. Offensive operations can include raids, live fire attack, hostage rescue or 
independent sabotage actions. Such operations 
can also take the form of fire-control and target-
illumination for stand-off weapons delivered from 
land, sea or aerial platforms. Offensive operations 
with special forces will most often have limited 
objectives and duration, and will usually include 
a planned withdrawal from the operational area. 
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The operations can be carried out either independently or in support of conven-
tional operations. Offensive operations will often be adapted to achieve effects 
of strategic or operational significance. This can involve the attack, destruction, 
neutralisation and possible interdiction of critical targets (materiel or personnel 
targets) including the localisation and capture of key persons or materiel, rescue 
missions and the rescuing of hostages. 
0562. Special operations can include military assistance to allies or other friendly 
forces in time of peace, crisis or armed conflict. This includes the exercising, setting 
up, supporting and possible leading of resistance or guerrilla forces; the exercising, 
setting up and possible supporting of networks to hide persons and help them to 
escape (Evasion and Escape); contributing to stabilization operations, including 
helping to ensure the security and liaison function of own forces, or providing 
other assistance to support communication between the parties involved.  
0563. Special air operations are operations with air units which are equipped, 
organised and trained to operate independently or together with special forces/
conventional forces. 
0564. Counter-terror operations are offensive measures to reduce the vulnerability 
of national or allied interests, their forces, personnel and property to terrorist 
attacks. This covers measures and operations, including hostage rescue involving 
agencies other than the Armed Forces. 
Command and organisation of special forces 
0565. The special forces component is commanded and organised on lines similar 
to those with other Armed Forces components. The special forces component 
commander organises the component according to the tasks that they are to 
fulfil – task organisation. This organisation can be multinational and functionally 
subdivided with special units from land, sea and air forces. 
0566. Special operations require clear and unambiguous command arrangements. 
Allied special operations are normally commanded and controlled from a special 
forces component headquarters in the operational area (Combined Joint Force 
Special Operations Component Command – CJFSOCC). The special forces comman-
der is responsible for providing the operational commander with recommenda-
tions for the use of special forces in the operational area and for the coordination 
and preparation of the operations. In Norway the special forces are commanded 
from a Joint Operational Headquarters through the Special Operations Centre.
Principles for the use of special forces 
0567. Selective use: Special operations should be used to achieve aims of high or 
critical importance at a strategic or operational level. This can entail high risk but 
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also great effect if the operation is successful; something that often necessitates 
political approval for the use of special forces. Such forces are limited in number 
and cannot easily be replaced, and they should therefore not be used as a sub-
stitute for regular forces. This does not exclude, however, the possibility of special 
forces being used at a tactical level for a limited period. 
0568. Early use: The use of special forces must be assessed at the initial phase of 
operational planning. Special forces can operate independently without estab-
lished infrastructure and can be used early in a planning phase for purposes 
including the obtaining of information which will strengthen the planning 
basis. 
0569: Own and inter-acting planning: Special operations require a comprehensive 
planning basis and close dialogue concerning the task between the tasking aut-
hority and the unit carrying out the task. Against the background of a given task, 
the force works out an operational concept. This must contain information about 
insertion, infiltration, target phases, exfiltration and extraction, logistics, com-
mand and control. The operational concept is submitted to the tasking authority 
for approval and the order to execute.
0570. Integration with other components: At the joint operational level the special 
forces’ operational concept and support 
requirements (resources from other com-
ponents for insertion, extraction and 
logistic support) must be coordinated 
with the overall joint operational plan 
and other operational plans in order to 
ensure mutual support and the full uti-
lisation of resources. Integration with 
other components and collaborating 
agencies is ensured by the placing of liai-
son and coordination components from 
the special forces in relevant positions. 
0571. Operational security: Special operations must be covered by a high degree 
of operational security because of their often strategic importance and political 
sensitivity, and the need to protect own personnel. 
0572. Intelligence: Special operations require comprehensive information about 
the adversary, the geography and the weather conditions. The special forces will 
often need the most thorough and detailed intelligence that it is possible to 
obtain. Such intelligence can be of decisive importance in choosing the way in 
which a particular task should be carried out. The forces may themselves gather 
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this information, coordinated with or supported by national or allied intelligence 
resources, either as preparation for, or as a part of, the operation itself. 
0573. Logistics: Re-supply and other support for special forces is planned and 
coordinated at the operational level. Special forces themselves plan their own 
re-supply in the field on the basis of their specific needs and implement this using 
their own resources, supported if necessary by conventional logistic elements. 
Special forces will always seek to be self-supplied for the duration of the mission. 
When deployed on operations abroad, special forces will be linked into conven-
tional logistic arrangements where it is natural to do so.
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Operational functions   
Command and control – C2
0574. Command and control is the military concept for controlling the conduct 
of operations and it forms the basis for all operational activity. C2 consists of the 
organisation, the processes, the systems and the leadership that ensure that 
military commanders are in a position to command and control their forces. The 
purpose of our command and control is to manage the planning and execution 
of all types of operations in a way that is both quicker and better in terms of 
quality than an adversary can achieve.  
COMMAND AND CONTROL – A KEY THEME OF THE DOCTRINE
Command and control is the foundation stone of all operational activity – and hence 
a theme which runs throughout this doctrine. This means that theory and concepts 
which are directly related to C2 are described in different places in the doctrine – inte-
grated with the chapters where they belong: Chapter 2 describes the levels of com-
mand and interaction with other actors. Chapters 3 and 4 describe the Armed Forces’ 
Operational Foundation and its theoretical and conceptual basis, which in turn has 
an important bearing on the Armed Forces’ view as to how C2 should be exercised. 
Chapter 6 describes the professional qualities and the command philosophy – mission 
command – which constitutes C2’s human dimension. Appendix B describes central 
concepts of command and control.
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0575. Command is the authority that a military commander has to lead, coordinate 
and control military forces. Control is the authority that a military commander 
exercises over parts of the activity of subordinate forces, or of other forces not 
normally under his or her command. This authority includes responsibility for 
implementing orders and directives. Control is not only an expression of authority 
as defined above and considered in more detail in Appendix B, but is also an 
expression of the process which the commander uses, or acts in accordance with, 
when he or she organises, leads and coordinates the activities of subordinate 
forces. In short, command is the process by which the commander expresses his 
or her intent, while control is the process by which he or she coordinates and 
controls the activities so that they coincide with the intent. 
PLANNING  
Planning is a part of command and control. Planning normally follows detailed pro-
cedures and is not described in this doctrine. For guideline for the planning of opera-
tions, reference should be made to AJP 05, GOP, Norwegian Armed Forces Staff Hand-
book, and the Norwegian Army’s FR 3-1, Staff Handbook for the Army, the planning and 
decision process.
0576. The fundamental basis of all command is the authority that a commander 
has vis-à-vis his subordinates. Authority has a formal side based on rank and 
position, and an informal side which is a function of leadership qualities and 
professional ability. Formal authority confers executive powers but the comman-
der is also dependent on a personal authority in order to exercise effective com-
mand and control. Responsibility for the achievement of results is a natural 
 consequence of authority. In the same way, commanders who are given respon-
sibility must also be given the necessary authority.  
COMMANDARE
Command is derived from the Latin commandare, which means “to assign tasks” and 
is primarily understood to mean a verbal order to be obeyed immediately. However, 
there is hardly an aspect of military activity that over the centuries has changed as 
much as the concept of command. From having been an attribute of the strongest 
and most charismatic warrior, command is now associated with a bureaucracy cha-
racterised by a formal hierarchy with clear regulations for the distribution of respon-
sibility and authority. One need look no further back than the Napoleonic wars to find 
examples of how the authority to command was assigned to individuals rather than 
to a systematic bureaucracy.  
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Command and control in relation to the Armed Forces’ Operational Foundation 
0577. Command and control in relation to the Armed Forces’ Operational Foun-
dation places emphasis on dynamic interaction, commander’s intent, delegation 
of authority, choice of command position and view of technology.     
0578. Dynamic interaction: The complexity and dynamic of military operations mean 
that effective command and control depends on an ability to adapt to rapidly chan-
ging situations. The traditional view of command and control is one in which superi-
ors exercise control of their subordinates. Mission command implies a more dynamic 
approach and represents an acknowledgement that attempts to establish full con-
trol will have an adverse effect on tempo and the initiatives expected of subordina-
tes. Command and control is less about “controlling” something, but more about 
bringing all elements together in support of a common aim. Command and control 
is an interactive process which involves all the parts of a system and acts in all 
directions. One of the most important sides of control is the continuous flow of 
information about the operation in progress that is fed back to commanders and 
enables them to adapt to changing conditions and to make use of new possibilities 
as they arise. Information can come from different sources and in different forms, 
for example intelligence as to how the adversary is reacting, information about the 
status of subordinate or other units, or as adjusted directives or orders from higher 
levels. This underlines the point that command and control should not be seen as 
“pure control” of subordinates by their superiors, but rather as keeping the operation 
“under control” based on information on how the situation is developing.
0579. The Commander’s Intent is his or her vision of how a mission is to be accom-
plished. The commander’s intent provides a basis enabling subordinates to take 
initiatives and to ensure continuity in the operation and effective adaptation of 
the plan even in the face of friction, chaos and uncertainty. The commander’s 
intent continues to apply to the operation even if the situation dictates that the 
tasks assigned to subordinate units are no longer applicable. The intent should 
be formulated in a few short sentences which say clearly: 
 
•	 why the operation is being carried out (the purpose),
•	 what is to be achieved (the objectives ), and
•	 what the desired end state is. 
0580. As a general rule of thumb, the mission and the commander’s intent must 
be understood two levels down in the organisation. The commander’s intent is 
formulated by the commander himself/herself and should reflect his/her perso-
nality and style of leadership, and it should serve to provide both motivation and 
guidance. A commander, therefore, should not be afraid to be inspiring and to speak 
from the heart and he/she must choose the way in which the intent is communi-
cated. Communication is often just as important as the actual formulation, and in 
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any form of communication the commander must express himself/herself simply. 
Only in this way will he/she be able to ensure that the intent will be followed. 
0581. Delegation of authority: The Armed Forces’ Operational Foundation is based 
on authority to plan and command operations being delegated to the greatest 
possible extent. Such an aim presupposes clear and unambiguous imparting of 
the commander’s intent, clear overall objectives and a well developed professio-
nal identity (Chapter 6) at all levels. Delegation implies that:
 
•	 commanders can delegate the whole or part of their authority, and decide how 
much authority their staff and subordinate commanders may exercise on their 
behalf,
•	 authority which is delegated can at any time be taken back or adjusted,
•	 the transferring of authority and the assignment of responsibility for functions 
or tasks within the force or unit will under no circumstances absolve com-
manders of their own superior responsibility. 
 
0582. The commander’s choice of command position: As a general rule, commanders 
at all levels should choose a command position on the basis of where they will exert 
the greatest influence on combat. Technically, at the combat level, this should always 
be “in the front line”. The joint operational commander will however have a number 
of factors to consider, for example it will be necessary to have a pre-
sence in different places in order to exert influence. Examples of this 
are contact with political leaders, the forces of other nations and civil 
actors. The choice of a command position will often entail striking a 
difficult balance between the need for an overview of the situation 
and access to good communications systems on the one hand, and 
the need to exercise leadership and to gain first-hand knowledge of 
the combat situation by being “at the front” on the other. The need 
for commanders at the operational level is to see and be seen.
0583. New technology in the field of command and control offers possibilities which 
only a few years ago were unthinkable. But it would be wrong to conclude that the 
technology can solve all command and control problems. The technology associa-
ted with command and control itself poses some challenges, for example:
 
•	 The increased possibility of detailed surveillance in real time can lead to com-
manders becoming involved in so-called “micro-management”. 
•	 Unsystematic gathering and storage of large amounts of information – and 
the undisciplined imparting of such information – can have a seriously inhibi-
ting effect on the ability to take decisions.
•	 Increased dependence on technology and information also increases vulnera-
bility, especially where the command and control function is concerned.  
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0584. Today’s challenges associated with command and control can be met by 
the Armed Forces further developing mission command to produce a culture in 
which commanders only assume detailed control when absolutely necessary. 
Also required are well-developed systems and procedures as well as robust com-
mand and control systems with a high degree of redundancy. An intent that is 
clearly imparted makes it easier to carry out the tasks, even with limited means 
of communication. Such an intent is also of outmost importance in making it 
possible to live with overwhelming amounts of information: Only when we know 
what we want to do, can we define what we need to know.  
WAR IS THE PROVINCE OF UNCERTAINTY
War is the province of uncertainty. Three-fourths of those things on which action in 
war is based lie hidden more or less in the fog of uncertainty. A keen and penetrating 
mind, and the most skilful judgment, is necessary to search out the true situation.
Carl von Clausewitz
The command and control system in the Armed Forces’ Operational Foundation
0585. The command and control system (C2S) consists of the structures and proces-
ses established to transform intent into action. The command and control system 
is an integrated system comprising doctrine, including leadership philosophy, infor-
mation, personnel (staffs) and a support structure. A command and control system 
in the Armed Forces’ conceptual framework for operations must have a range of 
properties, but it is particularly important that the men and women who form part 
of this system share a common doctrinal understanding and that the system 
in itself supports situation awareness and possesses the characteristics of inter-
operability, robustness and flexibility.
0586. Common doctrinal understanding: The point of departure for effective com-
mand and control is a shared understanding of the Armed Forces’ Operational 
Foundation. This creates a common foundation for the way in which we relate to 
the command and control process and different military problems. The doctrine 
also contributes to the creation of a common language which makes it easier to 
conduct discussions about, and to develop further, our ability to prepare and carry 
out operations, including the command and control process. 
0587. Support situation awareness: Supporting the situation awareness of the user 
is a key property of a command and control system. Situation awareness is affected 
by, for example, the amount of information, the quality of the information and the 
management of information in the system. The value of information is closely 
linked to time because the significance of specific information often declines rapidly. 
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Effective command and control is all about the relevant information being availa-
ble at the right time and in a usable form.
0588. It is people who constitute the core of the command and control system, and 
the other parts of the system are there to allow people to function in the best pos-
sible way. Even though the human brain has a capacity to understand and assess 
which far exceeds that of any other system, a command and 
control system has to take account of human limitations while 
at the same time still being able to make use of humans’ 
unique capabilities. Today traditional information transfer by 
radio, telephone and writing is supplemented by technical 
systems which make it possible to access real time informa-
tion and to transfer information in graphical form. The tech-
nology continues to develop but it is important to underline 
the fact that the face to face meeting will continue to play a 
fundamental part in creating situation awareness. 
0589. The capacity for interoperability depends to a large degree on the will and 
capacity for information exchange within the system, something which in turn is 
linked with the choice of technology standard. Interoperability, however, also has 
its organisational and procedural aspects and the capacity for interoperability is 
dependent on how the command and control activity is organised and how com-
mand is exercised. The joint command structure is one of the pillars of NATO’s 
military cooperation and the command and control system used by the Norwegian 
Armed Forces must be capable of being made compatible with NATO’s choices in 
this area. 
0590. The command and control system must have substantial robustness, including 
adequate endurance and redundancy. It must be capable of maintaining its func-
tionality over long periods and under conditions of stress, including direct attack 
by an adversary. The system must be made secure against a broad spectrum of 
weapons, including electronic attack. It must be able to retain the whole, or parts, 
of its capacity even if subjected to stress for long periods and even if parts of the 
system are knocked out. The command and control system must be protected 
against all unauthorised forms of use or misuse.
0591. The command and control system must have great flexibility. The Armed 
Forces often operate under conditions of great uncertainty, both nationally and 
abroad. It is difficult to predict where the next operation will take place, what types 
of missions will be involved and what command arrangements will be required. 
Experience in recent years has shown that the Armed Forces must be able to exer-
cise command and control in widely differing operational areas, often far from the 
central headquarters and staffs in Norway.
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Information operations 
0592. Ambitions to influence the adversary’s situation awareness and will have 
existed for as long as armed conflict itself. The battle for the information domain 
is today more important than ever because of the huge information consumption 
of society and military forces, the breakthrough of the Internet and the increase in 
media coverage. Information operations are an important part of all military ope-
rations.  Their purpose is to protect own forces and influence the adversary or other 
actors in the area of operations. 
0593. Information operations are coordinated activities which are implemented to 
achieve desired effects on the understanding, will and capability of adversaries, 
potential adversaries and other target groups. Information operations support the 
strategic objectives by influencing other parties’ information, information-based 
processes and systems, while at the same time making use of and protecting own 
information, information-based processes and systems. 
Principles of information operations are described in AJP 3.10 NATO Information Ope-
rations Doctrine.
0594. Information operations differ from other military operations in that they 
are not directed first and foremost against the physical domain. Instead the ambi-
IN OUT
The information domain
The cognitive domain
The social domain
The physical domain
Action
Intention
Info Ops
Info Ops
Will
Perception
Figure 5.1, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DOMAINS AND INFORMATION  OPERATIONS 
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tion is to achieve a more direct effect in the cognitive domain, including the 
thought processes underlying the adversary’s situation awareness and decision-
making, by influencing information. By combining information operations with 
actions in the physical domain, both can be mutually reinforcing.
 
Figure 5.1 describes how the reality, as it appears in the physical domain, can be distor-
ted in the social domain and the information domain (IN) before, through human 
perception, it forms the basis of decision-making. When these decisions are to be 
translated into actions in the physical domain, the information will again be distorted 
(OUT). The point of information operations is to influence the adversary’s will, cohesion 
and information transfer processes, as well as protecting ourselves in these areas. 
In the physical domain there are tangible things and events, what we call reality, which 
can be measured and weighed with the aid of sensors. Information about conditions 
in the physical domain can be imparted to a decision-maker mainly in three ways: 
a) by the decision-maker experiencing them at first hand, b) by passing information 
by means of technical sensors, or c) by other people reporting through the information 
domain. 
Here it is important to be clear that the picture of reality will already be incomplete 
or distorted in the information domain because not everything that happens in the 
physical domain can be recorded by sensors, and because it is impossible to transmit 
all information. In addition, all events will be coloured by human perception and when 
these are communicated between people in the social domain they will be coloured 
still further. 
In the cognitive domain information is processed which will form the basis of decision-
making. The information is filtered through the individuals’ perceptions which are 
influenced by factors including experience, knowledge, skills and cultural conditions. 
Reality will thus be further distorted before it is used as a basis for decisions. 
When decisions are then formulated as an intention, which in turn is to be translated 
into action, they are in reality being imparted from the cognitive domain, via the 
information domain to the social domain, that is to say to those who will in the final 
instance carry out the actions. The intention may already be exposed to distortion in 
the cognitive domain. This will happen when thoughts and ideas are to be formulated 
as words and pictures. In the information domain there may be further distortion due 
to limitations in the possibilities for information transfer. In the social domain distor-
tion will occur when information is communicated and interpreted between the indi-
viduals concerned. 
Information operations are directed against the cognitive domain in order to influence 
perceptions and will, against the social domain in order to influence the cohesion 
between individuals, and against the information domain in order to influence infor-
mation and information transfer. 
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Target groups and objectives for information operations 
0595. Information operations are directed against an adversary or a third party. The 
concept of a “third party” is a broad one and covers the civil population and other 
actors in the area of operations. The different actors require different types of infor-
mation operations. The objectives of information operations are to: 
•	 influence the adversary at command level; that is to say influence the leaders’ 
perceptions, plans, actions and will to continue combat,
•	 influence the adversary’s decision processes, that is to say destroy, degrade, 
interrupt, deny, mislead and exploit weaknesses in the adversary’s decision 
processes, information and information systems,
•	 develop and maintain a correct awareness of the situation, protect own and 
allied decision processes, information and information systems,
•	 influence any third parties and others so that they support our operations,
•	 keep non-combatants and neutral organisations informed so that they can 
cooperate more easily. 
Figure 5.2, INFORMATION OPERATIONS, CATEGORIES, TARGET GROUPS AND OBJECTIVES
Decision makers and
others to be inuenced
Capability
Will
Situation
awareness
Operational
security
Counter-
command
Inuence
DeceptionPSYOPS EW CNO Info security
Physical
destruction
NATO, possibly national
information strategy
Guidelines and
political direction
Info Ops
activities
Info Ops
core activities
Info Ops core activities
Info Ops
elements
Contri-
bution
FFOD Engelsk.indd   136 13-03-08   09:59:03
17
Central elements in information operations
0596. The core activities in information operations can be divided into those which 
are intended to influence the will and capability (for example the command func-
tion) of the adversary and those intended to protect own information. Central 
elements in such operations are information security, psychological operations 
(PSYOPS), deception, electronic warfare (EW), data network operations (DNO) and 
physical destruction of the information infrastructure.
0597. Information security is an important part of operational security (OPSEC). 
Operational security is intended to prevent an adversary from obtaining infor-
mation about our operations, objects, capabilities and intentions. Information 
security covers specific measures such as Information Communication Technology 
(ICT), security, personnel security and object security. It is intended to ensure 
confidentiality, integrity and availability and it includes measures for the protec-
tion of own information and information systems against manipulation, com-
promisation and loss. This includes, for example, computer network defence (CND), 
communications security (COMSEC), monitoring of own systems and searching 
for listening devices or other equipment for the tapping of information. 
0598. Psychological operations (PSYOPS) has the objective of influencing percep-
tions, attitudes and conduct and in this way achieving desired political and mili-
tary effects. Influence can be actively exerted both clandestinely and openly – in 
times of peace, crisis and armed conflict. In NATO the political leadership (North 
Atlantic Council – NAC) lays down guidelines for psychological operations and 
approves which target groups such operations are to be directed against. In order 
to carry out an effective psychological operation it is necessary to have a thorough 
knowledge and understanding of the target groups. It is often necessary to pos-
sess competence in such fields as psychology, sociology, anthropology, linguistics, 
graphic design, printing and publishing, and to have the capability for broadcas-
ting or mass distribution in some other way. PSYOPS messages can be dissemi-
nated using all forms of printed matter, radio, TV, loudspeakers directed at the 
adversary, direct conversations, the Internet, fax and mobile phones.  
0599. Deception has the objective of misleading an adversary through the mani-
pulation, distortion or falsification of information. Deception involves influencing 
the adversary’s decisionmakers in order to give them a false understanding of 
the actual situation, or a false understanding of the kind of intentions one has. 
For example a deception operation can mislead the adversary into taking mea-
sures against what he believes (wrongly) is coming. By taking such measures the 
adversary will in the first place either disperse or gather his resources on an incor-
rect basis. Next the adversary will have to acknowledge his mistake, and this can 
contribute to the negative effect on his morale and will to fight on. Deception is 
a complex instrument. It requires considerable effort and resources as well as a 
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high degree of secrecy. It also requires an insight into how an adversary thinks. 
Deception is coordinated by the operational commander but the use of deception 
may also be governed by mandate and by other political guidelines.
05100. Electronic Warfare (EW) is an umbrella term covering a variety of different 
methods for utilising the electromagnetic spectrum for military purposes. This 
requires comprehensive planning and coordination through a Joint Electronic 
Warfare Co-ordination Cell (JEWCC). It is usual to distinguish between three forms 
of EW: Electronic Attack (EA), which is a disruptive transmission ( jamming) or the 
transmission of false signatures; Electronic Protection (EP), which includes, among 
other things, the physical securing of own equipment to prevent unintended or 
excessive transmissions (so called compromising emanations or tempest), signals 
discipline and frequency-hopping radio equipment and Electronic Support (ES), 
which covers passive signal interception in its various forms. 
05101. Computer Network Operations are measures to influence the adversary’s 
computer network and to protect own networks. In the NATO context, the terms 
used are attack, exploit and defence. Such operations can be used both as strate-
gic and as operational tools, and in recent years have gained increased significance 
as a contribution to joint operations. Computer Network Attack (CNA) involves 
attacking the adversary’s computer system for the purpose of disruption or mani-
pulation. The attack may include infiltration of the adversary’s computer system 
with incorrect or infectious code, so-called “viruses” and “Trojan horses”. The 
impact of this type of operation has increased due to the widespread use of civil 
standards and civil software for military purposes. Computer Network Exploitation 
consists of measures to gain access to the adversary’s computer system, tap it 
for information and then make use of the information without the adversary 
being aware of it. Computer Network Defence (CND), consists of measures for the 
active protection of information by monitoring, analysing and implementing 
countermeasures to defeat attacks on own information systems. Increased use 
of information infrastructure brings increased complexity and thereby a greater 
risk that foreign CNA will disrupt the Armed Forces’ operations and so prevent 
achievement of the desired effects. It is essential that one should have one’s own 
CND in order to counter foreign CNA.
05102. Physical destruction of information infrastructure is considered to be a 
part of information operations and has two purposes: Physical destruction of the 
adversary’s command and control systems will have a direct effect on the 
adversary’s situation awareness and thus his ability to take decisions and exercise 
control. Physical destruction also sends a very strong signal and will play an impor-
tant role purely psychologically. Cohesion and the will to fight on will also be 
strongly affected if the adversary sees his information infrastructure put out of 
action and that he is losing control of his forces.
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Activities related to information operations 
05103. Personnel in the Press and Information service (P&I) and those involved in 
civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) should be informed of any ongoing information 
operations. Responsibility for this rests with the operational staff, possibly in 
consultation with a higher level. These two activities are, however, not to be 
defined as information operations, or as a part of such operations, because it is 
very important to safeguard the integrity and credibility of P&I and CIMIC. Inform-
ation seen as propaganda could very well prove counterproductive and questions 
could be raised regarding the legitimacy of the military activities and the credi-
bility of P&I.
Principles for the execution of information operations 
05104. NATO has seven principles for the conduct of information operations: the 
personal involvement of the operational commander, close coordination, good intel-
ligence, effects-based targeting process, centralised planning and decentralised 
execution, early and correctly phased implementation, and the monitoring and 
assessment of effects.
05105. Operational commander’s personal involvement: The operational comman-
der should use information operations as a central element of his campaign if 
such operations really can be effective. The use of information operations should 
be described in the commander’s intent and the commander should personally 
follow up the associated activities. 
05106. Close coordination is of decisive importance in information operations. The 
complexity, number of actors and possible consequences of such operations mean 
that they should be controlled and coordinated from the operational (often stra-
tegic) level and downwards. Above all the information operations should be coor-
dinated with the overarching information strategy which in NATO will normally 
have been approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC).
05107. Good intelligence is important in order to be able to carry out effective 
information operations. The information operation section of the staff works 
closely with the intelligence branch (J2) to define requirements and receive and 
share information. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) should, from 
an information operation perspective, include information on such areas as cul-
ture, religion and language as well as decision processes, information infrastruc-
ture and vulnerability of the networks. 
05108. Effects-based targeting: In order for the information operations to be effec-
tive, they should be coordinated with other actions. Such coordination will include 
the targeting process. The information operation section will suggest activities 
which will support the overall plan and these activities must be included as tar-
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gets in the joint target list. The actual effects of the actions must be continuously 
analysed.   
05109. Centralised planning and decentralised execution: Information operations 
should be planned centrally, at the operational or strategic level, in order to ensure 
synchronisation and coordination with other operations. As in other operations, 
decentralised execution should be the aim unless conditions are such that cen-
tralised execution is necessary.
05110. Early and correctly phased implementation: The planning and implemen-
tation of information operations should start early in an operation or campaign 
because of the complexity associated with these operations, and it can be a long 
time before effects are achieved. It is also important to undertake a thorough 
analysis of when it will be most favourable to launch an information operation. 
Both psychological operations and destruction of the information infrastructure 
if implemented at the wrong time, can be counterproductive. 
05111. Information operations should be monitored especially closely and conti-
nuously during the whole of the implementation phase, so that the effects pro-
duced underway can be assessed and the course adjusted as necessary. It is impor-
tant that the significance of close and continuous follow-up in such operations 
is not underestimated at the operational level. 
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Civil-Military Cooperation – CIMIC
05112. CIMIC is the coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, bet-
ween the military forces and civil actors, including national populations, local 
authorities, national and international organisations and agencies. The trend 
within NATO when carrying out operations is that increasing importance is 
attached to CIMIC and that CIMIC is conducted with a view to closer integration 
between military and civil activities and the adoption of common long-term aims. 
The significance of civil-military cooperation has also grown due to the increas-
ing number of civil actors in the operational areas. CIMIC is today regarded as a 
highly important function in all operations. 
The organisation of the CIMIC work
05113. The CIMIC work is run by the CIMIC Section in the operational headquarters. 
The size of this section will vary according to the need for civil military coopera-
tion in the particular operational area. The CIMIC section includes liaison officers 
who can be located with the relevant civil actors. A number of CIMIC teams will 
be attached to the operational force. Such CIMIC teams, or parts of them, may be 
attached to units at a tactical level. In NATO operations, CIMIC teams can be 
national or multinational and they can include personnel with special competence 
in logistics and infrastructure building, or from other relevant specialist areas. 
05114. CIMIC centres will be set up, if possible, outside the military bases. Such 
centres are intended to contribute to ensuring favourable conditions for the civil-
military cooperation. They must, as far as possible, be neutral in acting as arenas 
and forums for the exchange of information and contacts. 
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NATO’s principles for CIMIC are described in AJP 9 Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) 
Doctrine.
05115. The CIMIC section and CIMIC teams will seek to promote:
•	 liaison with civil actors at different levels,
•	 participation in joint planning with civil actors at operational and strategic 
levels, both before and during an operation,
•	 continuous assessment of the civil situation in the operational area,
•	 instruction of, and support for, all military units involved in the civil-military 
cooperation,
•	 a gradual transfer of responsibility to relevant civil actors in the operational 
area,
•	 cooperation and coordination in relation to other relevant parts of the opera-
tional staff.
Principles for CIMIC
05116. In carrying out CIMIC activities, both command arrangements and mutual 
relations are important. The command of CIMIC is based on three principles: Put-
ting the mission first, the commander’s personal involvement and the coordination 
of CIMIC actions, and the prioritisation of resources. In addition, six principles apply 
to the civil-military relations themselves: cultural understanding, a common aim, 
shared responsibility, consensus, transparency and communication.
Military command of CIMIC
05117. The principle of mission first is based on the primacy of the military mission. 
This is especially important in the light of the desire for increased integration 
between military and civil means. The aim of creating good relations with the 
various civil actors must not be allowed to endanger the mission through resour-
ces being spread too widely and excessive time being taken. Weighing the short-
term and long-term needs forms an important part of an operational commander’s 
assessments.
05118. Effective CIMIC depends on the operational commander being personally 
involved and coordinating CIMIC actions with other actions. CIMIC should be 
made an integral part of the planning and should be followed up continuously. 
The desired effects are achieved by coordinating the CIMIC actions with other 
actions, both upwards and downwards in the organisation. 
05119. The principle of the prioritisation of resources means that all use of military 
resources for civil purposes must be carefully assessed. It is important that the 
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military resources which would be tied up for civil purposes should be weighed 
against possible future requirements. Experience shows that the removal of mili-
tary support for the civil population without anyone else taking over this obliga-
tion can have a very damaging effect on relations between the military force and 
the civil population. The resources devoted to CIMIC are often of best use when 
they are concentrated in a few high priority areas. Such concentration indicates 
decisiveness and has a clear effect. Rapid changes for the better can have both 
physical and psychological results and can accelerate the process of enabling the 
affected areas to begin to function without help. CIMIC is demanding in terms 
of personnel, something which means that the work should be concentrated on 
actors who are regarded as being especially important. It is also necessary to be 
clear that some actors will need close follow-up for a very considerable time. 
Civil-military relations
05120. The principle of cultural understanding is all about insight into, and respect 
for, the history, traditions and way of life of the civil population. The same applies 
to an understanding and an appreciation of other civil actors in the operational 
area. The CIMIC section and the CIMIC teams must help to educate other units 
in relevant aspects of local conditions. 
05121. The principle of a common aim is about the need for political and military 
authorities to share a common aim with the local civil population. It is true that 
the short-term aims may vary but it is nevertheless important to assess on a 
continuing basis whether the short-term objectives can be made to coincide. 
Such a continuous assessment of objectives requires a close dialogue. 
05122. The principle of shared responsibility means that responsibility must be 
shared between the military force and the civil organisations. Sharing of respon-
sibility can be linked with the regular assessment of the objectives. The CIMIC 
staff is responsible for the preparations that have to be made for the progressive 
transfer of responsibility to civil actors as the operation proceeds. 
05123. The principle of consensus is about confidence and mutual respect between 
the military force and other parties. The military force will often have the capacity 
and means to force their will through, while other actors possess such means to 
a degree which is far less. It is important to be clear that pressure and the use of 
force in such situations will seldom serve the interests of the operation in the 
longer term. Instead it is essential to take steps to create and maintain good 
relations with other actors.
05124. The principle of transparency means that the dialogue and relations bet-
ween the civil and the military actors must be as open as possible. This can pose 
a challenge for military organisations which traditionally have a closed culture 
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and which, because of operational security, cannot share all information with 
others. CIMIC personnel represent a valuable resource for the gathering of infor-
mation. Information which comes via these personnel must, however, be regarded 
as a by-product of the CIMIC work. CIMIC personnel, perceived as intelligence 
personnel by the civil actors, will rapidly lose the built up trust that  is essential 
for effective civil-military cooperation. 
05125. The seventh and last principle for civil-military relations is communication. 
Cultural differences, especially where history, language and organisation are con-
cerned, can hinder effective communication. Experience shows that it can be a 
good investment to devote resources to overcoming obstacles of this kind. On 
the military side, the CIMIC Staff has responsibility for making suitable arrange-
ments in this area.
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Intelligence
05126. The objective with intelligence is to contribute to the best possible know-
ledge of the parties in the operational area, and of the area itself. The concept of 
intelligence is broad and covers product, process and activity. It is used to refer to 
the product which is the result of the processing of information and data about 
other nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or other actors as well as about 
areas for actual or potential operations. The concept is also used to refer to the 
actual processing of the information as well as to the activity involved and the 
organisations that engage in it.  
Strategic intelligence
05127. Strategic intelligence is information which has consequences for the over-
all military situation of the country or alliance concerned, or which could bring 
about a significant change in the conditions for an ongoing military operation. In 
peacetime the main object of strategic intelligence is to carry out area studies of 
Norway’s neighbouring areas and other areas which can significantly affect 
Norwegian security policy. Such strategic area studies can also make a significant 
contribution to intelligence work at the operational level. In times of crisis or armed 
conflict the significance of surveillance and the gathering of information will 
increase and a strategic warning capability will be of particular importance. 
The principles of intelligence within NATO are described in AJP 2.0 Allied Joint Intel-
ligence, Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine, as well as in the underlying publi-
cations AJP 2.1-2.6. 
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Operational intelligence 
05128. Operational intelligence is primarily linked to ongoing military operations, 
and will often be focused on information which has consequences for military 
operations within a defined operational area. On this level intelligence will have 
the important task of identifying the various possibilities, so that the operational 
commander can react and deploy his resources in the best way possible. Another 
important intelligence task at the operational level is to supply the tactical level 
and its units with intelligence so that they too have the opportunity to react and 
make their dispositions in good time. 
05129. During stabilization operations one of the most important products from 
the intelligence service at the operational level are threat assessments. In addition, 
the operational level in the theatre will also draw on the intelligence services of 
the various nations concerned. These will contribute jointly to the build-up of an 
intelligence picture of adversaries and other actors as well as assessing the extent 
to which these have the capability and the will to strike at forces involved in the 
operation. Primarily, the threat assessments will describe the threat posed by the 
adversary’s most dangerous and most likely course of action. This will give the 
operational commander the opportunity to set in motion measures to meet or 
defeat a particular threat or, if the risk (the consequence of meeting the threat) 
is considered to be high, to avoid the threat (remove the likelihood of meeting 
the threat), or, in an extreme case, to cancel an operation.
05130. The operational level must have access to a broad spectrum of capabilities 
for the gathering and processing of information. Even if parts of this information 
are based on strategic and tactical intelligence, the operational level will need to 
have access to particular capabilities to supplement and create robustness in the 
intelligence arrangements. The Norwegian Intelligence Service (Etterretningstje-
nesten) supports Norwegian forces operating abroad. The Intelligence Service 
can organise this support in various ways ranging from a simple liaison arrange-
ment to the deployment of a complete “all source” intelligence team NIST – Nati-
onal Intelligence Support Team).
Tactical intelligence 
05131. Tactical intelligence provides a basis for how the tactical commander uses 
and deploys his units in order to accomplish the mission. The tactical level is 
normally responsible for intelligence within a defined area and will have its own 
organs for gathering information to supplement the intelligence picture provided 
by a higher level and to pass on information from a lower level. 
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INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD (IPB)
Within NATO the intelligence process is often referred to as Intelligence Preparation of the 
Battlefield, or the IPB process. This is a systematic and continuous process for analysing the 
threat and the environment in a specific geographical area. The IPB process complements, 
and forms an integral part of, the operational planning and decision process. The purpose 
of the IPB process is to gain an understanding of adversaries and other parties and to 
analyse factors as weather, ground conditions, light levels, terrain and the like. The process 
provides the basis on which to develop particular operational plans. It should also form a 
point of departure for how particular reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition 
resources (ISTAR) should be used. 
The intelligence cycle 
05132. Intelligence activity can be described as a process consisting of four elements: 
direction, collection, processing and dissemination. The ability to perform this process 
more rapidly and with greater precision than the adversary is of decisive importance 
in being able to maintain a higher operational tempo. Both the NBD and ISTAR 
concepts aim to link together different sensors in order to be able to disseminate 
information more efficiently. In an intelligence organisation or operation, several 
parts of the cycle, or several cycles, will be in progress simultaneously.  
Figur 5.3, THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE
05133. Direction covers both to prioritise the intelligence information required in 
order to support own operational planning, and the planning of how to use the 
various intelligence collection resources. Collection covers the gathering of infor-
Direction
Processing
Dissemination Collection
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mation with a combination of technical sensors and human sources (Human 
Intelligence – HUMINT). Processing takes place mainly at the strategic or opera-
tional level. By means of analysis, information from new sources is collated with 
information already known. This analysis forms the basis on which effects that 
have been achieved are assessed, targets are selected and forecasts made regar-
ding possible developments. Finally the analysis provides a basis for the develop-
ment of own plans. Dissemination is about providing the right user with the right 
information at the right time. 
ISTAR
Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance – ISTAR is a NATO 
concept which covers the integration and synchronised use of sensors and informa-
tion/intelligence. ISTAR activities are conducted in many military units and at various 
levels.
Intelligence means mainly operational and tactical intelligence. Surveillance is the 
systematic observation of land areas including places, objects and persons, airspace 
and sea areas both surface and underwater. Target Acquisition covers detection, iden-
tification and localisation of a target with such precision and detail that weapons can 
be used effectively to engage the target. Reconnaissance is a limited mission which 
is initiated in order to obtain information about an adversary’s activities or resources. 
Reconnaissance also includes obtaining meteorological, hydrographical or geographical 
information for a particular area. 
ISTAR will contribute to the linking of intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and 
reconnaissance with the combat units so as to gain access to critical combat intel-
ligence or target information at the time it is required. ISTAR means in practice that 
sensors and systems, including those not normally used for intelligence purposes, are 
put to optimum use in order to create the best possible situation picture. 
ISTAR at operational level should be focused on the joint operational area. The special 
feature of the operational ISTAR activity is the breadth and accessibility of its collection 
capabilities. Operational ISTAR activities will normally have access to capabilities such 
as air-to-ground surveillance (AGS), satellite surveillance, long-range unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAV) and interaction with intelligence organs at the strategic level. The 
operational ISTAR activity will have a perspective that also covers areas outside the 
theatre of operations itself.
Intelligence principles
05134. Six important principles which should form the basis of the intelligence 
work are: integration, early initiation and processing, relevance, central coordination, 
source protection and tempo and flexibility.
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05135. The principle of integration with the overall operational plan means that 
the planning and conduct of intelligence should harmonise with the operations 
as they develop. The military commander should define what is needed by way 
of information about the adversary and the operational area in all phases of the 
operation. Further, the commander should prioritise and specify his information 
requirements as far as it is possible to do so. There should be a clear and unam-
biguous statement of the intelligence requirements for a given operation. 
05136. The initiation and processing of intelligence can be time-consuming. It is 
therefore important that the intelligence requirements should be defined as early 
as possible so that this work can be initiated at the right time. The requirement 
should then be passed to the intelligence collection organs.
05137. The principle of relevance is that the intelligence should contain relevant 
and accurate material which is made available at the right time. This calls for 
coordination capability and unified direction. 
05138. Central coordination means that the intelligence activities in the operational 
area should be coordinated by a central body. This is of decisive importance in 
ensuring that scarce intelligence resources are put to optimum use to match the 
intelligence needs of the commander and other decision makers. Duplication of 
tasks should be avoided while at the same time ensuring the coordination of all 
intelligence capabilities in order to develop a unified intelligence picture. The cen-
tral body should be in continuous close contact with other operational activity. 
05139. Source protection means that all sources, intelligence collection organs 
and methods used in the production of intelligence must be protected against 
possible compromise. This is essential in order to prevent the adversary from 
eliminating sources or mounting countermeasures before we have taken advan-
tage of the knowledge acquired. The compromising of sources and collection 
organs can also make it possible for the adversary to use these to put out mis-
leading information. 
05140. The sixth and final principle for the intelligence service is tempo and flexi-
bility. This is a precondition for achieving the best possible degree of situation 
awareness. The right information must reach the right user at the right time. A 
difficult challenge is posed in balancing the need for central direction (the big 
picture) against the need to disseminate intelligence at a tactical level (direct 
action). A network-based approach, in which sensors, analysis resources and units 
at different levels are linked together in contributing to the collection of infor-
mation, increases flexibility and thereby tempo. The ISTAR concept is an important 
tool in this respect
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Logistics
05141. Logistics is the activity which includes the planning and execution of the 
movement, support and maintenance of military forces. Logistics at the oper-
ational level is about supplies, services and other support which contributes to 
endurance in the execution of joint operations. It is an essential precondition for 
a successful operation that the logistics runs smoothly. Logistic planning must 
therefore be an integrated part of the operational planning. 
05142. Logistics covers the planning and development, acquisition, storage, dis-
tribution, maintenance and issue of materiel and supplies; the procurement, 
construction, maintenance and operation of buildings and installations; the pro-
curement or delivery of services; entering into contracts with suppliers; medical 
and veterinary services, including the evacuation and transport of personnel. 
05143. During the Cold War the central focus was on national defence. The main 
principle throughout the NATO region was to set up extensive national stockpiles. 
Today, however, logistic arrangements are quite different. This is due to three 
factors:
•	 More emphasis is placed on international tasks and operations in which large 
national stockpiles are less relevant.
•	 In the public sector, stockpiles and the like are no longer considered to make 
economic sense.
•	 Civil actors now play a larger part on the supply side than in the past, partly 
as one facet of the trend towards public private partnerships. 
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These conditions mean that the logistic resources must be acquired on a com-
mercial basis in competition with other users in the community. The Armed For-
ces therefore place greater emphasis on the need for logistics and supply arrange-
ments to function even when emergency measures legislation has not been 
brought into force. 
05144. Today logistics are more about linking together a network of suppliers and 
making sure that supplies are delivered to the users at the right time. As a part 
of this development, systems and other technical means are being developed to 
calculate consumption and load capacity, to track goods and to aid the develop-
ment of common standards. Even with the new logistics principles, the Armed 
Forces consider it essential to maintain a certain level of stockpiling, if only to 
underpin their reaction capability and potential endurance and to ensure access 
to critical materiel. 
05145. NATO’s Logistic Concept, (2003), is based on the premise that logistics are 
a national responsibility but, in order to avoid overlap and duplication of logistics 
capabilities in the operational area, NATO attaches greater importance to the 
coordination of logistics across national boundaries than was the case previously. 
Multinational logistics departments are being established for both operational 
and economic reasons. For the same reasons, division of responsibility between 
nations is taking place and there has been a trend towards a force commander 
being given authority to redistribute logistic resources between forces within 
given frameworks and guidelines. 
05146. The different branches of the Armed Forces share many characteristics 
where logistics are concerned, but at the same time their individual needs can 
vary somewhat. The differences will be especially marked on the distribution side. 
The land forces are often personnel intensive and ‘equipment heavy’. This means 
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a heavy demand for supplies irrespective of whether units are in combat or not. 
Naval forces, for their part, often have an inbuilt logistic safety buffer in some of 
their vessels. Resupply can take place when visiting a naval base or through the 
use of supply ships. Where air forces are concerned, the intention is that each air 
base should have its own independent logistic safety buffer. The supply or redis-
tribution of critical materiel, such as missiles, can be carried out using air transport. 
The supply of commodities involving large volumes, for example aviation fuel, 
necessitates the use of transport over land or by sea.  
Principles for logistics in joint operations 
05147. Even though the individual armed services have varying logistic require-
ments, it is nevertheless possible to identify six principles for logistics in a joint 
operational context: integrated planning and joint situation awareness, unified 
command, push and pull, correct timing, simplicity and resource economising.
NATO’s principles for logistics are described in MC 319/2 NATO Principles and Policies 
for Logistics and in AJP 4 Allied Joint Logistics Doctrine.
05148. The principle of integrated planning and joint situation awareness must 
form the basis of all logistics planning in order to ensure effective operational 
support. This can be done by making logistics planning an integral part of the 
operational planning and force generation processes and by keeping the logisti-
cians continuously updated with regard to the joint situation picture.
05149. Unified command means that it is the operational commander who deploys 
the logistic resources and ensures that they are used in line with his/her intentions 
and priorities. The commander’s ability to concentrate the effect of the resources 
at his/her disposal depends largely on he/she having the freedom of action, and 
the practical possibility, of redeploying logistic resources as required by the situ-
ation at the time. Tactical units will not normally have a full organisational logistics 
capability but can be provided with logistic support on an ad hoc basis in order 
to fulfil tasks allocated to them. 
05150. The principles of push and pull need to be seen in context. Push implies 
that supplies are brought forward to the combat 
units on the basis of previous experience. How 
much equipment of a given type does a unit require 
for a given type of task? The aim is to bring the 
supplies, as far as is possible, right forward to the 
user. The advantage of this method is that standard 
supplies are always sent out to the user. An obvious 
disadvantage is that the actual usage may differ 
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from estimates based on previous experience, something that can result in either 
unnecessary surpluses or serious shortages. Pull implies that the units themselves 
order the supplies they need. The advantage of this is that the user can order 
exactly what is needed based on the given situation. The disadvantage is the time 
it takes. In practice a combination of push and pull is used. The Armed Forces’ 
philosophy is that the logistic support should be so arranged as to allow the user 
to concentrate primarily on the main task in hand, and that the logistics organi-
sation will provide for the necessary supplies while at the same time keeping 
supplementary ordering as a possibility.  
05151. The principle of correct timing is about planning and the ability to look 
ahead. The right supplies at the right time help to ensure that a high tempo can 
be maintained. If the reverse is the case, and supplies are absent or inadequate, 
it will be difficult to maintain the tempo of the operations. This in turn may mean 
that own forces are obliged to fight on the adversary’s terms. 
05152. The simplicity principle is of key importance to the reliability of support for 
operations where the Armed Forces’ Operational Foundation emphasises the 
need for flexibility, with rapid organisational changes and frequent changes in 
the make-up of combat units and groups. The necessary logistic support should 
be planned and prepared at the lowest possible level, in line with the principle 
of unified command and decentralised control of logistic resources. The switching 
of supplies between units should be kept to a minimum and there should not be 
too many conditions attached to the logistic planning and execution. This will 
help to ensure that the logistic planning is as predictable as possible and as 
immune as possible to external effects and friction. 
05153. The principle of resource economising is based on the fact that logistic 
resources will often be scarce compared with the operational needs. The use of 
these resources therefore has to be kept to what is absolutely necessary, and to 
set priorities to match the central aspects of the operation in accordance with 
the commander’s intent. There is also a need to exercise foresight in the logistic 
planning in order to avoid the logistic arrangements collapsing as a result of 
constant changes during execution. 
Medical support
05154. Medical support covers all activities designed to maintain or restore the 
health of the forces so that combat capability can be sustained. In this doctrine, 
medical support is described as a part of logistics, but it is important to be clear 
that the tasks implicit in medical support are mainly operationally oriented and 
that the supply aspects represent a limited part of this support. Medical support 
consists of medical force protection, primary health services, secondary health 
services (specialists) and evacuation.
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NATO’s strategy for medical support in joint operations is described in MC 326/2, and 
NATO’s medical support doctrine is contained in AJP 4-10, ratified by Norway as STANAG 
2228. 
05155. Medical force protection has gained renewed topicality as a result of the 
Armed Forces’ increased involvement in remote regions. Sickness and non-com-
bat related conditions represent a considerable threat to the combat capability 
of military forces. Preventive health services, veterinary services, medical intel-
ligence and accessible primary health services are important preconditions for 
the maintenance of health and combat capability. During both the preparation 
and the execution of operations it is necessary to have a detailed policy for medi-
cal force protection.
05156. The Medical Service differs from other military support functions in that it 
is regulated by international and national legislation. The Geneva Conventions lay 
down clear guidelines for the protection of patients, the medical services and the 
personnel who provide these services. Medical personnel are described in the 
Conventions as non-combatants and cannot therefore be used in combat roles or 
in any way that may affect the conflict. The Medical Service is dependent on having 
a well-functioning organisation consisting of a command and control system 
(including medical intelligence), an integrated system for medical treatment, an 
integrated system for patient evacuation and a system for medical supplies.
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MEDICAL SERVICES – RAPID AND COMPETENT TREATMENT AT DIFFERENT 
LEVELS 
The time it takes from initial injury to first aid and medical treatment has a major effect 
on the injured person’s ability to survive or regain their health. Military medical resour-
ces should therefore be available in all units at all times. Immediate trauma treatment 
at the front give seriously injured patients an increased chance of survival in that they 
are receiving the right treatment at the right time. NATO aims to ensure that it will be 
possible for advanced trauma treatment to be given within one hour. Rapid evacuation 
to a location where there are good intensive care facilities, including surgery if needed, 
is often a key factor affecting survival and quality of life following treatment. 
Medical units are categorised as Role 1-4 based on their treatment capability (medical 
care capabilities). 
Role 1 medical support provides for routine primary health care, specialized first aid, 
triage, resuscitation and stabilization. Role 1 is integrated into all military units so that 
they are able to cover their own needs for primary care. 
Role 2 provides for patient reception, triage of casualties, resuscitation and acute treat-
ment to a higher technical level than Role 1. It can include specialist treatment in den-
tistry, psychiatry and veterinary services. Role 2 will routinely include damage control 
surgery to make patients better able to withstand subsequent transportation. Role 2 
includes the short-term care of patients who are expected either to be returned to duty 
or evacuated to the next role once their condition is stabilized. Role 2 is deployable.
Role 3 entails the ability to carry out secondary surgery and, to some extent, final 
treatment. It can thus provide support for an entire operational area. It includes spe-
cialists and its composition will depend on the needs of the operational area. In a 
national context, the Armed Forces will mainly use existing civilian hospitals to provide 
these services and will only have deployable Role 3 capabilities to a limited extent. 
Role 4 can provide all specialist services as well as final treatment such as recon-
structive surgery and rehabilitation. Nationally this capability will be met by civilian 
hospitals.
05157. It is a commander’s responsibility to ensure that medical services are avail-
able, so that health should not be a concern that diverts attention from the 
 military task. Planning of medical services must form an integral part of opera-
tional planning. Military commanders must always assess the effect that injuries 
and losses will have on the units’ ability to fulfil their tasks, and how the wounded 
are to be looked after. Detailed medical intelligence, medical plans and a high 
degree of readiness are essential if effective medical services should be available 
from the earliest phases of an operation. 
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6. The military profession 
0601. The personnel of the Armed Forces constitute the factor most vital to the 
success of our operations. A shared professional identity strengthens our cohesion 
and our ability to overcome the challenges we face, both as individuals and as 
an organisation. This chapter concludes the doctrine by describing the professio-
nal culture and the fundamental values that the Norwegian Armed Forces wants 
to develop in order to meet our challenges, achieve our missions and take care 
of our personnel in a proper and responsible way  
PROFESSION AND MILITARY PROFESSION
The military profession is comparable with other professions such as the legal or the 
medical professions. The members of a profession are entrusted with the responsibi-
lity for carrying out a specialised task for the good of society. The exercise of a profes-
sion is based on comprehensive theory and practical training. Those who follow that 
profession identify with that calling and with each other. One is, one does not simply 
work as a lawyer, doctor or an officer. In addition to this strong identification, members 
of a profession are linked by a common set of values. 
The concept of a profession can be expanded by reference to four attributes which 
together define the nature of a profession, that is to say what constitutes its soul – its 
ethos. Responsibility is about the obligation of that profession to society and to its 
own members. Identity is about the members’ identification with that profession and 
their exclusive status in society. Expertise is about the members’ special knowledge 
and skills which are used to perform the work of that profession. The fundamental 
values consist of the values and the codex which govern the exercise of that profes-
sion and the attitudes of its members. The fundamental values reflect the values and 
norms of society but will be developed specifically in relation to the requirements of 
that profession. 
Rationale and dimensions of the military profession
0602. The rationale of the military profession is to defend Norway and Norwegian 
interests. We therefore have a common responsibility towards society and each 
other to develop the Armed Forces in such a way that we are in the best possible 
position to fulfil this task. The level of responsibility increases with the degree of 
influence an individual has in the organisation. At the same time everyone, irrespec-
tive of their position, is under an obligation to learn and to train themselves to be 
able to perform their roles to the best of their ability. 
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0603. The core business of the military profession is the conduct of operations. This 
means that the values and attitudes required in the conduct of operations must 
also characterise our day-to-day activities. 
 
0604. The military profession has an intellectual, a physical and a moral dimension. 
The intellectual dimension is associated with the special knowledge and skills 
which are required to carry out our tasks and conduct our operations. At a stra-
tegic level this covers the ability to put own actions into a wider context, including 
the integration of military and other means to achieve desired effects and poli-
tical objectives. At operational and tactical levels the intellectual dimension requi-
res comprehensive knowledge in many different areas if success is to be achieved 
in complex operations both at home and abroad. The intellectual dimension has 
two cultural aspects: the first is internal and relates to respect for the values and 
requirements of the profession, while the second is outward-looking and relates 
to an understanding of how different cultures and views on life affect our oper-
ations. Theoretical studies, analytical ability and cultural understanding are all 
preconditions for the ability to adapt to changing operational environments. 
0605. The physical dimension is associated with the fact that combat is conducted 
mainly through physical actions and that the ability to perform these actions 
effectively is a precondition for success. The physical dimension concerns the 
combat skills that are needed for us to be able to achieve success in our tasks. It 
also covers physically demanding environments involving stress in the form of a 
lack of water, food and sleep. The physical dimension explains why we place such 
emphasis on skills training and why being in good physical shape is an essential 
part of our identity. 
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0606. The moral dimension is associated with the fact that combat is a battle of 
wills, a battle in which the side which best succeeds in maintaining its will and 
cohesion will prevail. The moral dimension covers the values and actions that 
reinforce this will to succeed and the ethical foundations which pave the way for 
acting correctly in demanding situations. This dimension is essential and it means 
that the will to succeed, strong cohesion and firm ethical foundations occupy an 
absolutely central place in our professional identity.
 
Professional identity and core values
0607. The military profession has a long tradition and our mission has consisted 
of being the nation’s ultimate instrument of power. Tradition forms an important 
part of our professional identity and we carry ourselves with a pride that reflects 
the achievements of the Armed Forces past and present, both under the personal 
stress of combat and in the demanding work of developing our defence forces. 
0608. All who wear the uniform are a part of our profession. They cover a wide 
range of roles, or combinations of roles, be they grenadiers, officers, engineers, 
technicians, seamen or pilots. Our common profession is none the weaker if indi-
viduals identify mainly with their primary role. The most important thing is that 
we share a common identity which unites us and strengthens the Armed Forces 
as a whole.
 
0609. The Armed Forces’ professional identity is founded on: 
•	 the common responsibility we have to society to prepare ourselves intellectu-
ally, physically and morally to defend Norway and Norwegian interests both 
nationally and abroad,
•	 confidence in each other’s judgement, skills and will to fulfil our allotted 
tasks,
•	 acknowledgement that the core business of the profession is the conduct of 
operations,
•	 the will to overcome obstacles and fulfil tasks in the best way possible,
•	 acknowledgement that our profession is collective and that attitudes and 
actions that serve to strengthen our cohesion are all important,
•	 acknowledgement that, in some situations, we are given the mandate to risk 
and to take life, and that this makes great demands on discipline and requires 
a highly developed sense of morality and ethics,
•	 the core values of respect, responsibility and courage, which unite us and 
characterise our actions.
 
0610. Society expects that those who have chosen the military profession will 
fulfil the Armed Forces’ tasks despite the personal cost that this can entail. Being 
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a part of our professional community means accepting all tasks assigned to the 
Armed Forces, both nationally and internationally. 
0611. National and allied confidence in Norwegian defence is essential to our 
ability to fulfil our tasks. Such confidence depends on our ability to perform these 
tasks and on the values and attitudes we stand for. Our attitude towards these 
tasks will be judged on the way in which every individual in uniform goes about 
his or her business, which means that we all must act, when all is said and done, 
as if we represent the whole of the Armed Forces. 
0612. In contrast to many other professions, we cannot fulfil our tasks in isolation 
– our efforts only make sense when we work together. This means that values 
and attitudes which strengthen our cohesion, such as comradeship, loyalty and 
self-sacrifice, are of vital importance, and that those values and attitudes that 
weaken our cohesion are unacceptable.
“... the military virtues – fortitude, endurance, loyalty, courage, and so on –  these are 
good qualities in any collection of men, and enrich the society in which they’re pro-
minent. But in the military society, they are functional necessities, which is something 
quite, quite different. I mean, a man can be false, fleeting, perjured, in every way cor-
rupt, and be a brilliant mathematician, or one of the world’s greatest painters. But 
there’s one thing he can’t be, and that is a good soldier, sailor, or airman.” 
General Sir John W. Hackett 
0613. It is central to our professional identity that we should use all justifiable 
means to fulfil the tasks assigned to the Armed Forces. The stress of combat can 
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be extreme. In our profession the will to succeed, and to strive to achieve results 
that exceed what might be expected, will make the difference between success 
and failure. 
0614. Of fundamental importance to our profession is the judgement of the indi-
vidual, and our trust both in our own and in each others’ judgement. Today’s com-
plex operations can never be fully covered by manuals and rules of engagement. 
Our ability to fulfil our tasks depends rather on individuals whose judgement is 
well developed and mature. The Armed Forces recruit individuals with good psy-
chological characteristics and their judgement capabilities are further developed 
through education, training and experience. It is the responsibility of a commander 
to develop these personal qualities and to ensure that tasks assigned are matched 
to the degree of maturity of the individual concerned. Trust in each others’ judge-
ment is also of fundamental importance to the philosophy of mission command.
0615. The military profession is alone in that its members can order others, and 
themselves be ordered, into harms way. This means that our profession makes 
extreme demands on discipline and requires a highly developed moral and ethi-
cal code. The ethical basis of the Armed Forces is set out in Core Values of the 
Norwegian Defence (Forsvarets verdigrunnlag), but to anchor it firmly in the psy-
che requires extensive education, training, experience and reflection. Developing 
the ethical basis of a unit is a commander’s responsibility, but how to act is the 
personal responsibility of each individual. 
0616. The Armed Forces is a value-driven organisation: We defend values and we 
are governed by values. Our shared values help us to withstand stress and strain 
and serve as a guide in complex situations.  The Armed Forces represent, and 
consist of, individuals from all walks of life in Norwegian society. That means that 
values that are central to our society, such as the equality of the individual and 
belief in democratic principles, are also central to the Armed Forces. 
0617. The Armed Forces’ core values, respect, responsibility and courage, are given 
deeper consideration in the Core Values of the Norwegian Defence and they also 
form the core of our ethical principles. Our core values mean that: 
•	 We must show respect for the society we represent, for each other, for the 
actors we meet in the course of operations and for the traditions and reputa-
tion of our profession.
•	 We must show responsibility for doing our best to develop the Armed Forces’ 
ability to fulfil the tasks entrusted to us by society, responsibility towards each 
other, and responsibility for our actions. 
•	 We must show courage when it comes to fulfilling our tasks, taking difficult 
decisions, and taking a stand when our conscience tells us that it is necessary. 
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Military leadership 
0618. All who wear uniform are covered by the requirement to identify himself 
or herself with the military profession and to act in accordance with the 
profession’s values and attitudes. This requirement, however, applies even more 
strongly to those who lead. It is the leaders who, through their values and actions, 
inspire everyone else to live up to the Armed Forces’ ideals. 
0619. Leadership involves influencing individuals and groups to work towards 
common goals. This is done by giving them purpose, resources, the necessary 
direction and motivation while at the same time developing the organisation. 
Credible leadership involves values, knowledge and skills, and is exercised through 
actions. What it takes to be a leader in the military profession can be summed 
up in the words to be – to know – to act. 
0620. Being an officer, whether commissioned or non-commissioned, in the Armed 
Forces means having the military profession engrained as part of one’s persona-
lity and exercising leadership in one’s actions based on the values described ear-
lier in this chapter. Example is everything: credible leadership can only be achie-
ved if the leader shows by his or her own conduct the values that he or she stands 
for.  
0621. Knowledge of interpersonal relations, social conditions, military theory, his-
tory, technology, tactics, procedures and regu-
lations are examples of what a military leader 
must possess in order to exercise effective lea-
dership today. In this context, knowledge does 
not mean that a leader has to be an expert in 
all these fields, but simply that good leadership 
is firmly built on theoretical foundations which 
themselves are the subject of continuous pro-
fessional development. 
0622. A military leader exercises leadership through action. Leaders in our profes-
sion have drive and initiative. Drive and initiative means seeing possibilities, taking 
responsibility and showing initiative. This quality is also exhibited by inspiring 
others, taking care of subordinate personnel and by an ability to work with others 
to find good solutions. 
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Mission command – our command philosophy
0623. The fundamental command philosophy of the Armed Forces is mission com-
mand. This means that commanders at different levels give direction by stating 
what is to be achieved and why it is to be achieved. Within this framework, subor-
dinates are basically then given freedom to fulfil the task as they think best. This 
philosophy is chosen for the reason that it allows room for initiative to be exercised 
at all levels. Because its effect is inclusive and stimulates participation at all levels 
in the organisation, it also provides the greatest robustness against the frictions of 
combat. Mission command is a philosophy which goes beyond the assignment of 
tasks and the allocation of resources. The philosophy is about having a culture of 
professionalism and mutual trust as described earlier in this chapter.
0624. The Armed Forces can develop a pervasive culture for mission command 
by: 
•	 decentralising authority as far as is possible and sensible,
•	 all commanders allocating to their subordinates those resources that they 
require to fulfil their tasks,
•	 allowing subordinates as far as possible to decide for themselves how best to 
carry out their tasks,
•	 attaching importance to ongoing training in taking responsibility and develo-
ping powers of judgement.
0625. The Armed Forces’ fundamental philosophy does not impair a military 
commander’s right to exercise direct command when this is considered to give 
the best results, for example when time is of the essence or because the com-
mander has the best situational awareness. The Armed Forces strive for a degree 
of flexibility that requires us to master both forms of command, even though 
decentralised command is the basis of our philosophy. 
Armed Forces’ responsibility for our personnel
0626. This concluding chapter has shown that the Armed Forces make great 
demands on our personnel. This means that the Armed Forces also have an abso-
lute responsibility to take care of our personnel, a responsibility incumbent on 
commanders at all levels. The Armed Forces have a particular responsibility to 
prepare the individual by giving him or her both the competence and the equip-
ment needed for any operations, to provide a career pattern which can be com-
bined with family life, to support the family as well as possible when a close 
family member is out on operational duty, and to take proper care of personnel 
in the aftermath of an operation. 
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APPENDIx A: CENTRAL CONCEPTS
Appendix A explains concepts which are often used in the Armed Forces and in 
the ongoing defence debate, as well as how they are used in this doctrine. The 
use of concepts in this doctrine accords as far as possible with the NATO defini-
tions in AAP-6. In some cases, however, the national – or international – interpre-
tation of the content of the concepts has developed since AAP-6 was written and 
in such cases the doctrine’s use of the concept will reflect this development. 
Action
That activity and those means, civil and military, lethal and non-lethal, which are 
used to bring about an effect on the adversary or other actors – see also result 
and effect. (0445). 
Air Power
Air Power is the military use of systems which operate in or pass through the 
airspace. This includes surface-to-air weapons, manned and unmanned aircraft, 
satellites and space platforms which provide support for military operations. (0546 
Text Box).
Armed Conflict 
A violent clash between states or between groups in society, associated with 
mutual differences in interests, ideas, feelings, resources or territories, for the 
purpose of disturbing the equilibrium between the parties. In terms of interna-
tional law, a distinction is not drawn between peace, crisis and war, but is drawn 
rather between peace and armed conflict. In the context of international law the 
concept of armed conflict applies when one party resorts to armed force against 
another – see also war. (0221 Text Box).
Asymmetry and asymmetric warfare 
A state of dissimilarity or imbalance between two or more actors. Asymmetry 
can entail differences in a number of areas including, for example, capabilities, 
technology, structure, organisation and methods. Asymmetric warfare can denote 
a form of warfare in which one party makes use of the weaknesses of an otherwise 
superior adversary, often through the use of untraditional methods or means. 
Attrition Method
One of three methods in the Armed Forces’ Operational Foundation (the manoeuvre, 
attrition and stabilization methods). The method is mainly directed against an 
adversary’s capability and describes two principles. The first principle is low intense 
and means inflicting successive losses on the adversary over a lengthy period so 
that he gradually realises that the cost of continuing the combat will be too high. 
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The second principle is high intense and means to make use of numerical or tech-
nological superiority to overcome the adversary. (0331 ff). 
basic Functions 
Basic Functions are functions which are necessary if a military system is to func-
tion, irrespective of the type of operation. The Basic Functions are command and 
control (for direction and coordination), means of action (to strike the adversary), 
mobility (to be able to move), protection (to ensure the safety of own forces), 
intelligence (to create a picture of what is happening) and logistics (for endurance 
and transport). (0416 ff, 0428).
Campaign
A campaign is a series of military operations designed to achieve strategic objec-
tives within a given time and in a given geographical area. (0502 ff). 
Centre of Gravity (CoG)
That which gives an actor the overall power and strength that is essential to his 
ability to achieve his own objectives or to prevent others from achieving theirs. 
The centre of gravity is normally formulated as a substantive. (Appendix C). 
Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)
CIMIC is the coordination and cooperation between the military forces and civil actors 
in support of the mission. The civil actors include local populations, local authorities, 
national and international organisations and agencies. The trend within NATO when 
carrying out operations is that increasing importance is attached to CIMIC and that 
CIMIC is conducted with a view to closer integration between military and civil acti-
vities and the adoption of common long-term aims. (05113 ff).
Cognitive 
Cognitive denotes intellectual functions such as perception, thinking and 
memory.
Combat Capability/Combat Capability Model
Combat capability depends on conceptual factors, moral factors and physical factors. 
Together these factors make up the combat capability model. The Armed Forces’ 
Operational Foundation has been developed with a view to developing, utilising 
and protecting one’s own capabilities in these three areas, but also with a view 
to influencing the capability of the adversary in these same areas. (0404 ff). 
Combined Actions 
The principle that a combination of different systems (lethal and non-lethal) and 
functions brings the benefits of synergy. Joint operations are built on this prin-
ciple. (0414 ff). 
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Command and Control
Command and control is one of the basic functions and is fundamental to the 
planning and execution of operations. It consists of the organisation, the proces-
ses, the procedures and the systems that ensure that military commanders are 
in a position to command and control their forces. (0574 ff).
Command and Control System
The integrated system comprising doctrine, procedures, organisation, personnel, 
equipment, installations and communications which give authorities at all levels 
sufficient data at the right time to allow them to plan, command and control 
their activities. (0585 ff).
Concept of Operations (CONOPS)
A brief and clear exposition of how a military commander has envisaged carrying 
out his mission.
Crisis
A national crisis is an unforeseen event which puts national resources to the test. 
Examples of such situations range from unpredictable events such as natural or 
environmental disasters, through mass movements of refugees, major accidents 
and pandemics to deliberate acts in the form of episodes in Norwegian sea areas, 
terrorist action against the population, industry or the infrastructure of society, 
up to and including armed attack at levels below that of open war. In a security 
policy context, a crisis is a conflict with tensions at a high level. This will be cha-
racterised by a surprise event, or a gradual escalation on the part of an actor, 
which is seen as being threatening to the extent that there appears to be a limi-
ted time in which to take decisions and react, and where there is a fear that an 
inadequate response, or a lack of action, could have catastrophic consequences. 
(0213 ff).
Culmination Point
An expression for a qualitative turning point at which an upward going curve 
(progress) suddenly begins to flatten out or turn downwards (regression). Usually 
used to denote the point in time at which an operation loses its momentum or 
forward thrust. 
Decision Cycle
The Decision Cycle consists of four elements which together form a continuous 
process: observation, orientation, decision and action. The ability to complete this 
process more rapidly than the adversary is in many cases of decisive importance 
in achieving success in a conflict. (0428 ff, Figure 4.4).
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Decisive Effects, DE
Decisive Effects are used in the planning of effects-based operations. The concept 
describes decisive effects, most often a change in the behaviour of the adversary, 
or that of other actors, which must be brought about in order to achieve the 
desired end state. (0448).
Decisive Points, DP
Used in the planning of operations. AAP-6 defines a Decisive Point as a point from 
which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist 
in all domains, i.e. the physical, social, information and the cognitive domains. Today 
the concept is used to describe the events in which we have to be successful on 
the way to eliminating, destroying or neutralising the adversary’s centre of gravity, 
something which can be compared to the milestones in a project plan. Decisive 
Points are identified by means of structural analysis and are determined mainly by 
considering the adversary’s critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities. It is 
important to be selective in the choice of Decisive Points. A Decisive Point must be 
of decisive significance for the adversary’s centre of gravity.  (Appendix C).
Delegation
The transfer of authority from a higher level of authority to a lower. (0581).
Deterrence
A political/military strategy which is intended to convince an adversary that the 
costs of taking aggressive action would outweigh the potential gains.
Direct Method/Direct Approach
Direct action against the adversary’s centre of gravity in order to affect his capa-
bility. This often means confronting the strength of an adversary’s forces and 
overpowering them to the point when they cannot continue to fight – see also 
the indirect method / indirect approach.
Domain Model
The Domain Model describes the different dimensions in which war can be waged 
and the interaction between them. The model has been developed primarily to 
describe the significance of information. The Norwegian Armed Forces’ Operatio-
nal Foundation has been developed with a view to combat in all the domains – 
physical, social, information and cognitive. (0408 ff, 0457, Figures 4.2 and 5.1). 
Effect
Result or change, often in the form of changed behaviour on the part of the 
adversary or other actors. A direct effect is the result in the short term – a direct 
result of the action taken. An indirect effect is the result in the longer term. A 
distinction is drawn between desired and undesired effects. (0442 ff).
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Effects based approach 
One of the three approaches which together form the Armed Forces’ Operational 
Foundation (effects based approach, network-based approach, manoeuvrist appro-
ach). The effects based approach is to see own operations in a wider context in 
which own actions have to harmonise with civil and other military actions, and 
in which focus is maintained on which effects must to be brought about in the 
adversary or other actors in order to achieve the political and strategic objectives. 
It is also about analysing oneself, the adversary and other actors as complex 
systems in which there are many mutually interacting factors and, through so 
doing, being able to coordinate and integrate all the means that can affect these 
systems, with a view to bringing about effects in the whole, or parts of, the system. 
Ultimately it is about concentrating on the effects that it is desired to achieve, 
and not about actions and results in themselves. (0306 ff, 0434 ff).
End State
A description of the political and or military situation that is desired when an 
operation has been completed. 
Escalation
Escalation means raising the level of a conflict. This can take place either hori-
zontally, for example through a geographical widening of the conflict, or vertically, 
for example through the increased use of force in terms of weapons and/or met-
hods.
Flexibility
Flexibility is the mental and physical ability of units/sections to switch between 
different approaches and operational methods in response to changing circumstan-
ces. The Armed Forces’ Operational Foundation is based on a general flexibility with 
regard to thinking and ideas and it further elaborates flexibility in relation to four 
areas: decision level, organisation, conduct and operational method. (0315 ff).
Force production 
Those processes and activities which contribute to the production of forces that 
are ready for action and which include education and exercising, personnel admi-
nistration, the development of tactics, the organisation of forces and the acqui-
sition of materiel. The force producer is responsible for recruiting, education, 
training and activity management.  
Force Projection
The presence of military forces, most often in a deterrent role.
FFOD Engelsk.indd   169 13-03-08   10:01:06
170
Friction
Friction corresponds to the factors that distinguish an operation as planned on 
paper from the operation as it turns out in reality. There are three fundamental 
forms of friction: that which exists or arises in one’s own organisation, that which 
is created in an encounter with an adversary, and that which arises due to cir-
cumstances. 
Indirect Method/Indirect Approach
An operation which seeks to avoid confrontation with the adversary’s main com-
bat forces. The indirect method has both an abstract and a concrete dimension. 
The concrete dimension is about avoiding the adversary’s physical forces and at 
the same time attacking his weaknesses. The abstract dimension is about avoid-
ing the adversary’s strong sides in the broadest sense while at the same time 
exploiting his weaker sides – see also direct method / direct approach. (0425). 
Information Operations 
Information Operations are coordinated activities intended to influence other 
parties’ decision-makers, or third parties, in support of own objectives. The ope-
rations are designed to influence other parties’ information, information-based 
processes and systems, while at the same time making use of and protecting 
own information, information-based processes and systems. (0592 ff).
Integrated Missions
This is a concept used by UN and the EU and it denotes operations in which both 
civil and military means must be coordinated. The UN lists the purposes of such 
operations as being the re-establishment of law and order, protection of the civil 
population and laying the foundations for positive development in the longer 
term. Such a unified view of conflict management falls within the scope of the 
effects based approach in the Armed Forces’ Operational Foundation. (0235 ff).
Intelligence 
One of the Basic Functions. Intelligence is intended to contribute to the best 
possible knowledge of the parties in the operational area and of the area itself. 
The concept of intelligence is a wide one which covers product, process and acti-
vity. The term is used to describe the product which is the result of the processing 
of information and data about other nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces 
or other actors, or about areas for actual or potential operations. The term is also 
used to denote the information processing itself and as a description of the whole 
activity itself and the organisations concerned in this activity. (05126 ff).
Intent
The intent expresses the commander’s overall vision of how a mission is to be 
accomplished and it includes why the operation is being carried out (the purpose), 
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what is to be achieved (the objectives) and what the desired end state is. This 
should be formulated as clearly as possible. (0579).
International Law
International law is the law which governs relations between states and other 
international legal entities. (0241 ff).
Interoperability
Interoperability is the ability to operate effectively together, for example between 
different service branches of the Armed Forces, with the military forces of other 
countries or with relevant parts of the civil sector. 
Irregular forces 
Irregular forces can cover a spectrum ranging from well-organised insurgencies, local 
warlords and their followers to criminal groups. A common feature of irregular forces 
is that they want power and influence in the conflict area. Irregular forces are seldom 
in uniform and are therefore difficult to distinguish from the local inhabitants. Their 
organisation is often based on a cell structure and a network with decentralised 
leadership. They like to use elements of the local infrastructure such as mobile 
phones and the Internet for communication. They often employ unconventional 
methods and can pose a serious threat to a stabilization force. (0228 ff, 0268 ff). 
ISTAR
Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) is a NATO 
concept which is intended to contribute to the linking of intelligence, surveillance, 
target acquisition and reconnaissance with the combat units so as to gain access 
to critical combat intelligence or target information at the time it is needed. 
(05133 Text Box).
Joint Force Commander, JFC
The commander who has the authority to exercise operational command or ope-
rational control of a joint force.
Joint operation area, JOA
That area of land, sea and air which is defined at a strategic level and in which a 
joint commander plans and executes military operations in order to carry out a 
clearly defined mission. 
Joint operations
Operations in which contributions from several service branches are integrated 
and coordinated in order to realise the benefits of synergy at strategic, operatio-
nal or tactical level, often within a multinational framework and usually in close 
cooperation with civil resources and agencies. (0505 ff).
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Land Power 
Military forces whose primary task is to engage in or support the land battle. This 
includes the Home Guard.
Lines of Operations 
A concept employed in the shaping of operations. Originally the term was used 
for movements in the physical domain: To operate on inner lines means mano-
euvring with one’s forces in the centre to keep the adversary split. To operate on 
outer lines means manoeuvring with ones forces round the adversary, who then 
occupies the central position, and attacking this adversary with coordinated 
actions. Today the term is primarily used to denote the abstract lines which form 
connections in time and space between decisive points with the centre of gravity 
of an operational plan. 
Logistics
Logistics is a Basic Function which spans the planning and execution of the move-
ment, support and maintenance of military forces. Logistics covers the acquisition 
and provision of services, materiel and supplies in support of military operations. 
(05141 ff).
Management
The process which is carried out in order to steer an activity towards given objec-
tives. This encompasses planning, execution and follow-up. Management of the 
day-to-day running of the Armed Forces is known as direction (ledelse) and the 
leading of military operations is known as command and control. In both cases it 
is of vital importance that the leader has the ability to inspire and control her or 
his colleagues and subordinates in pursuing the common objectives. This is called 
leadership. 
Manoeuvre Method 
One of three methods in the Armed Forces’ Operational Foundation (the manoeuvre 
method, attrition method and stabilization method). The manoeuvre method 
describes a set of techniques designed to influence the adversary’s cohesion and 
will to continue the combat: surprise, initiative, the indirect method, tempo and 
mission command. The ultimate purpose is to bring about the adversary’s physi-
cal and psychological collapse. (0327 ff, 0419 ff).
Manoeuvrist Approach 
One of three approaches which together forms the Armed Forces’ Operational 
Foundation (effects based approach, network-based approach, manoeuvrist appro-
ach). The manoeuvrist approach is to comprehend the psychological aspect of 
combat and acknowledge combat as a battle of wills characterised by uncertainty 
and chaos. By training and exercising to master these factors better than one’s 
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adversary, these challenges can actually be turned to our own advantage. The 
manoeuvrist approach is to strive to take the initiative and, through analysis, to 
see where the means of action should be brought to bear in order to achieve the 
greatest possible effect on the adversary – with the least possible use of own 
resources. The manoeuvrist approach can be used at all levels and entails confi-
dence that, through the application of the right means at the right time and with 
the initiative retained and constant pressure on the adversary maintained, it is 
possible for a smaller force to overcome a larger one (0312 ff, 0418 ff).  
Means of Action
One of the basic functions. The term describes all the actions using lethal and 
non-lethal means by which an effect on the adversary is achieved. This basic 
function was formerly termed firepower. The concept of means of action serves 
to emphasise the fact that the Norwegian Armed Forces develops and makes use 
of means other than pure firepower in order to achieve desired effects. The Armed 
Forces’ most important means remains firepower, which can be used both directly 
in combat or as means for deterrence. 
Lethal means include conventional weapon systems such as small arms, artillery, 
missiles and mines. Also among the lethal means are such non-conventional 
weapons as nuclear, chemical, biological and radiation weapons with lethal effects. 
Non-conventional weapons are not developed or used by the Norwegian Armed 
Forces although importance is attached to the development of a protection capa-
bility against such weapons. 
Non-lethal means include all means that in themselves are not lethal. These range 
from baton rounds and non-lethal ammunition used in riot control, for example, 
through weapons based on directed sound or non-lethal radiation, to means of 
conducting information operations including psychological operations (PSYOPS) 
and electronic warfare. 
Mission Command 
The fundamental command philosophy of the Armed Forces in which comman-
ders at the various levels give direction by stating what is to be achieved and why 
it is to be achieved. Within this framework, subordinates are basically then given 
freedom to fulfil the task as they think best. Mission command is dependent on 
a culture which is characterised by a well-developed professionalism in which 
there is mutual trust between commander and subordinate and where all mas-
ter their respective tasks and there is a willingness to take responsibility at all 
levels. (0623 ff). 
FFOD Engelsk.indd   173 13-03-08   10:01:11
17
Mobility
One of the Basic Functions. The capability of military forces or platforms that 
enables them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfil their 
primary mission. Mobility is a quality or capability possessed by a military 
force. 
Strategic mobility is the ability to move between different operational areas, often 
over long distances, sometimes even between continents. A platform with good 
strategic mobility has a large operating range. For a unit, good strategic mobility 
means essentially that it can be loaded on board an aircraft or ship. For a state, 
or an organisation such as NATO, strategic mobility means possessing this total 
capability in the relevant forces and transport resources. 
Operational mobility is the ability to move within an operational area by means 
of one’s own platforms or other transport resources. Good operational mobility 
for a platform or unit depends on its ability to move itself rapidly within an ope-
rational area. Combat aircraft, warships and airborne units are examples of units 
with good operational mobility. 
Tactical mobility is the ability to move within a tactical operational area. Good 
tactical mobility means that a platform or unit can itself move within its opera-
tional environment, given the nature of the terrain and the relevant need for 
protection. 
The requirement for good mobility differs, and may often be contradictory, bet-
ween the various levels. In force generation and the composition of units, the 
priority to be given to the different forms of mobility can involve difficult decis-
ions. 
Network-based Approach 
One of three approaches which together forms the Armed Forces’ Operational 
Foundation (effects based approach, network-based approach, manoeuvrist appro-
ach). The network-based approach means organising one’s resources as effectively 
as possible in order to achieve the highest degree of system integration, situation 
awareness and understanding of the commander’s intent, and it covers the 
development of personnel, organisation and technology. (0309 ff).
Non-lethal Weapons
Weapons which can put personnel or systems out of action for shorter or longer 
periods of time without killing. It is important to be clear, however, that many 
weapons which are non-lethal in themselves can have lethal effects if used incor-
rectly. (See Means of Action). 
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Operation 
A military operation is a series of combat activities, movements and other actions 
which are intended to achieve an overall aim. An operation can be carried out 
both with and without armed action. An operation can be carried out to achieve 
a strategic objective or it can form part of a series of operations. Such a series is 
called a campaign. (0502 ff).
Operational Activity
Operational activity covers planning and management of military operations in 
times of peace, crisis and armed conflict. This includes the supervision of prepa-
rations for mobilisation and the planning and management of exercises in 
cooperation with those who are responsible for force production.
Operational Art 
Operational art is a military commander’s use of the means at his disposal to 
achieve the desired effects and achieve the overall objectives. The operational art 
is referred to as an “art” because it entails linking together and realising, often 
abstract, strategic aims, by means of physical activities. The term “art” is used 
because it is about managing combat in a range of different temporal and spatial 
dimensions in the physical, social, information and cognitive domains where there 
are few quantifiable values or set answers. Operational art is also the art of the 
possible, that is to say making use of the resources that one actually has in order 
to achieve the best possible result. (0510 ff).
Peace Support Operations 
Peace support operations relate to the management of crises and armed conflict 
situations in accordance with Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. The UN and 
NATO use the following categorisation of peace support operations: Preventive 
diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace building, peacemaking and peace enforcement. 
(0225 Text box).
Protection
One of the Basic Functions. This encompasses the measures that are intended to 
safeguard and protect the combat capability of own forces and units so that 
these can be used when and where necessary. The ability to protect is dependent 
on moral, conceptual and physical factors (see combat capability). On a moral 
plane there is the importance of leadership which creates cohesion and motiva-
tion so that the units develop robustness in the face of action by the adversary. 
On a conceptual plane, a common understanding of operational methods, a high 
standard of training and common procedures will all contribute to increased 
robustness. On a physical plane, protection can be divided into preventive and 
consequence-reducing measures. Preventive measures cover actions to reduce 
the chance of detection and resultant action. If own forces are nevertheless detec-
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ted and attacked, consequence-reducing measures are implemented to reduce 
the consequential effects. 
Result
The objective result of an action, part of the conceptual chain: action, result and 
effect. (0445).
Sea Power
Sea power is the ability to control the sea and its resources, the ability to pursue 
and defend one’s interests at sea and the ability to influence events on land from 
seaward. 
Security Policy Means
The means by which a state can safeguard its national interests include, for exam-
ple, quiet diplomacy, military and economic assistance, information, international 
law and international organisations, trade policy, economic sanctions and military 
power. The acronym DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic) is 
used internationally.
Situation Awareness
The term situation awareness describes the condition in which a person is both 
aware of and understands a situation. Situation awareness includes the ability 
and the possibility of appreciating the situation, understanding it, making use 
of it and possibly predicting its future development. (0462 Text Box). 
Sovereignty
The right of self-rule within given borders. This includes the right to govern inter-
nally and freedom of action in dealing with other states. It also covers sovereign 
rights, sanctioned under international law, in areas outside the boundaries of a 
nation’s territory, airspace and territorial waters. 
Special Operations 
Military activities conducted by specially designated, organised, trained and equip-
ped forces using operational techniques and modes of employment not standard 
to conventional forces. These operations can be carried out in peacetime, in times 
of crisis and in armed conflict independently of, or coordinated with, conventio-
nal forces in order to achieve military, political, economic or psychological objec-
tives. (0555 ff).
Stabilization Operation 
A stabilization operation is intended to lower the level of conflict between two 
or more parties in order to preserve or re-establish peace. Such an operation is 
often concerned with ensuring that existing agreements are observed and with 
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the creation of a secure environment for non-military activities. This can involve 
surveillance and policing tasks as described in the section on the stabilizing met-
hod. (0226 ff).
Stabilizing Method
One of three methods in the Armed Forces’ Operational Foundation (the mano-
euvre, attrition and stabilization methods). The method is used, for example, where 
the Armed Forces’ task is to lower the level of conflict between two or more 
parties, and it embraces the principles of impartiality, transparency, restraint in 
the use of force, built-in robustness and the ability to deter, as well as freedom of 
movement and area control. (0340 ff).
Strategy
The word strategy comes from the Greek stratos (army) and agein (to lead). Stra-
tegos remains today the Greek word for general. The concept is thus military in 
origin although it is now used more generally. At the national strategic level it 
refers to the use of all the state’s means, civil as well as military, in order to achieve 
political objectives. Strategy can be summarised as the determination of what 
the aims are to be, with which means they can  be achieved, and how these means 
can be used to achieve them. A strategy must be dynamic and must allow for the 
existence of other relevant actors. 
Structural Analysis
A tool in the planning and decision-making process with which to identify 
strengths, weaknesses and critical vulnerabilities in all relevant actors, including 
one’s own. Within NATO a structural analysis tool developed by Dr Joseph Strange, 
(US Marine Corps), is often used. This method is a tool for the analysis of what 
the various actors’ centres of gravity are, and for deconstructing these centres of 
gravity so that their critical vulnerabilities can be identified. (Appendix C). 
War
The organised use of armed force, first and foremost between states but also 
between groups of people within a state or a territory. The concept can have dif-
ferent meanings depending on the context and who is using it – see also armed 
conflict which is the concept of war as defined under international law. (0221 Text 
Box). 
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APPENDIx B: COMMAND AND CONTROL 
CONCEPTS 
B1. Command and Control concepts describe the authority that a commander has 
over the forces that he or she has at his or her disposal for the accomplishment 
of the mission concerned. Definitions of command concepts often differ from 
one nation to another and from organisation to organisation. In addition, the 
command and control concepts will often be constrained by national reservations 
or restrictions, so-called caveats. It is necessary, therefore, that commanders and 
staffs should be familiar with what different organisations and cooperating nati-
ons subscribe to the different concepts, both in general terms and for each ope-
ration in particular. This Appendix contains explanations of some of the central 
Command and Control concepts used in NATO. The Norwegian Armed Forces’ 
approach to the same concepts is also described.
COMMAND
Full Command
B2. Full command is the military authority and responsibility of a commander to 
issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and 
administration and exists only within national services. When members of the 
Alliance assign forces to NATO, nations will delegate only operational command 
or operational control. As a consequence of this, no NATO commander will exer-
cise full command over assigned forces. 
B3. National use of full command entails authority for a commander to direct 
military activities within that commander’s area of authority, including adminis-
tration and logistics, unless otherwise stated. The concept is used in connection 
with command of an organisational unit, for example a brigade, an air squadron 
or a group of warships. Every commander in principle exercises full command 
over subordinate commanders in the same unit/formation, including their sub-
ordinate personnel, provided that operational command has not been excepted 
or delegated.
Operational Command (OPCOM)
B4. Operational command is the authority delegated to a commander to assign 
missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, 
and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed 
necessary. Operational command does not automatically include responsibility 
for administration. Nationally, operational command entails authority to delegate 
operational control, tactical command and/or tactical control. 
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Tactical Command (TACOM)
B5. Tactical command is the authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks 
to forces under his or her command in order to accomplish missions assigned to 
him or her by higher authority. National tactical command means that a com-
mander who has this authority can divide up the force subject to approval by 
higher authority. Tactical command does not include authority for administration 
or logistics unless this is specifically stated. A commander who has tactical com-
mand may delegate tactical control subject to approval by higher authority. 
CONTROL
Operational Control (OPCON)
B6. Operational control is the authority delegated to a commander to direct assig-
ned forces so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks 
which are usually limited by function, time, or location. This means authority to 
deploy units and to retain or delegate control of those units. Operational control 
does not entail authority to divide up assigned units, nor does it, of itself, include 
administrative or logistic control. Nationally, operational control entails authority 
to delegate operational control, tactical command and/or tactical control. A com-
mander with this authority can give both missions and tasks to assigned forces 
within his or her own mission and area of responsibility. 
B7. Operational control entails a limited access to the use of assigned forces. As 
a part of the transfer of command for the force in question, it must be made clear 
which limitations apply. The commander who has operational control may dele-
gate tactical control. The limitations imposed when delegating operational con-
trol to the operational level must follow the force if this level chooses to delegate 
the authority further. 
Tactical Control (TACON)
B8. Tactical control is the detailed and usually local direction and control which 
is necessary in carrying out assigned missions or tasks. Nationally, tactical control 
entails a temporary and limited authority in connection with the accomplishment 
of a definite task.
Administrative Control
B9. Administrative control entails exercising authority over subordinate or other 
organisations (or other activities) in areas such as personnel administration, 
finance, logistics and other areas not included in the operational missions of 
subordinate or other relevant units. 
Coordinating Authority 
B10. Coordinating authority is the authority granted to a commander or individual 
assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or tasks involving for-
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ces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more services or two or 
more forces of the same service. This means the authority to require consultation 
between the agencies involved, or their representatives, but does not automati-
cally mean the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between 
the agencies involved, attempts should be made to obtain essential agreement 
by discussion. In the event that essential agreement is not to be obtained this 
should be refered to to the appropriate authority.
OTHER COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATED CONCEPTS
Chain of command
B11. The chain of command is the chain (succession) of commanders from superior 
to subordinate through which command is exercised. There are three principal 
types of chain of command which can be defined depending on the area of respon-
sibility concerned:
•	 Chain of Command in which full command is exercised. Full command covers 
all operational and administrative military activity. 
•	 Operational Chain of Command is a chain of command established for a par-
ticular operation or series of successive operations. The degree of authority is 
graded in more detail as operational command, operational control, tactical 
command and tactical control. These concepts define the authority that a com-
mander has in relation to subordinate links rather than the extent of the 
commander’s responsibility to his or her superior.
•	 Administrative Chain of Command. This covers the management and execution 
of all military matters not included in tactics and strategy, primarily in the 
fields of logistics and personnel management. 
Superior – Subordinate
B12. Normally a person holding a higher rank than another person is that person’s 
superior. 
Superior
B13. A person who is entitled to issue an order which is to be obeyed by another 
person (the subordinate) is that person’s superior. In this context there is a com-
mand relationship between superior and subordinate.
Subordinate
B14. Denotes that a unit or person is placed under the relatively permanent com-
mand of another, and/or where a unit or person has been given their primary 
organisational attachment. 
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Attached
B15. Denotes that a unit or person is placed under the temporary command of 
another, and/or where a unit or person has been given a secondary organisatio-
nal attachment. Subject to the limitations contained in the attachment order, 
the receiving commander will exercise the same command authority over an 
attached formation as over a subordinate formation. However, the responsibility 
for the assigning and promoting of personnel will normally remain with the 
parent organisation. 
best Suited Commander 
B16. The commander who, by virtue of qualifications, equipment, location, situa-
tion awareness or other possible considerations, is best suited to prepare and 
execute an operation. This may be at either tactical or operational level. 
Support
B17. The action of a force, or part thereof, which aids, protects, or complements 
other forces.
Supported Commander 
B18. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task or 
mission assigned by a higher authority and who receives forces or other support 
from one or more supporting commanders. He or she is responsible for overall 
planning, including the objectives/effects for the support and the incorporation 
of the support from others into the plan. The superior commander is responsible 
for limiting the support in terms of extent, time, location, duration and the prio-
rity of that support mission in relation to the supporting commander’s other 
missions. 
Supporting Commander 
B19. The commander who provides a supported commander with forces or other 
support. He or she develops a supporting plan as necessary within the framework 
of the guidelines or mission received from his or her superior, and of the overall 
plan developed by the supported commander. The supporting commander must 
ensure that the supported commander is at all times kept updated as to which 
capabilities are available. 
B20. The concepts of “supported” and “supporting” commanders are linked to a 
NATO concept for Supported-Supporting Interrelationship (SSI). SSI is not a com-
mand relationship in itself but applies to preparations for mutual reinforcement, 
flexible coordination and force concentration in the different phases of an ope-
ration or campaign. The concept is normally used between, and possibly within, 
regional command links irrespective of level. The SSI concept prepares the way 
for prioritisation between units between which there is no command or control 
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authority. The supported and supporting commanders are appointed by their 
respective superiors in order to describe the interrelationship between these 
commanders. These commanders will often be at the same level in the chain of 
command. There can be several supporting commanders but only one supported 
commander. 
B21. It will also be possible to use the concept during national operations, for 
example in collaboration between Home Guard district commanders and the 
commander of an army formation. It should be possible to resolve the question 
of supported/supporting commanders using the principle of the best suited com-
mander. 
Transfer of Authority (TOA)
B22. This is a measure by which a nation transfers operational command or ope-
rational control to a NATO Command, or the corresponding transfer from one 
NATO Command to another. Such a process is also employed when Norway assigns 
forces to coalition operations or to the UN. Nationally, the concept of Transfer of 
Command is used. This includes the transfer of both command and control.
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APPENDIx C: STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred 
battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also 
suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every 
battle.
Sun Tzu
C1. Structural analysis forms part of the planning and decision process as a tool 
for the identification of strengths, weaknesses and critical vulnerabilities in all 
relevant actors including ourselves.
C2. Within NATO use is often made of a method of structural analysis developed 
by Dr Joseph Strange (US Marine Corps). The method takes as its point of depar-
ture the actors’ objectives and what capabilities and characteristics they possess 
that may eventually enable them to achieve their objectives. The method is a tool 
for analysing what constitutes the various actors’ centres of gravity and for decon-
structing these centres of gravity so that their strengths and weaknesses can be 
identified. Structural analysis has a significant role to play in the shaping of ope-
rations because it contributes to the process of defining the decisive points (DP) 
on which the concept of the operation itself will be built up. 
The sequence of events in a structural analysis 
C3. A structural analysis is performed in the following sequence:
•	 identification of the actors’ objectives and desired end state, 
•	 identification of the actors’ critical capabilities, i.e. those capabilities and cha-
racteristics that are essential to the achievement of their objectives,
•	  identification of centres of gravity, i.e. who or what is in possession of these 
capabilities and characteristics,  
•	 identification of critical requirements, i.e. what each individual critical capabi-
lity and characteristic is dependent on in order to be able to function, 
•	 identification of critical vulnerabilities, i.e. what deficiencies or weaknesses 
would lead to a decisive loss of critical capabilities and characteristics.
 
Centre of Gravity (CoG)
C4. The centre of gravity is defined in NATO as those capabilities, characteristics, 
or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping 
derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. This definition is 
somewhat imprecise and difficult to use in practice since it states that a centre 
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of gravity can be either a capability, a characteristic or a locality. Experience in 
recent years, moreover, has shown that certain individuals (for example Saddam 
Hussein) and certain military formations (for example the Republican Guard in 
Iraq) can be centres of gravity in that they possess precisely those capabilities 
and characteristics which are of decisive importance to the achievement of the 
aim. 
C5. Joseph Strange and others have elaborated on the concept of a centre of 
gravity by pointing out that it can be understood as the principal source of the 
ability to achieve one’s own objectives. Such an understanding contributes to 
making the centre of gravity more usable in that it is situation dependent and 
associated with the achievement of objectives. This leads to the following defi-
nition:
C6. The centre of gravity is that which gives an actor the overall power and 
strength that is essential to his ability to achieve his own objectives or to prevent 
others from achieving theirs. The centre of gravity is normally formulated as a 
substantive. 
The dynamic character of the centre of gravity
C7. The fact that the actors in a conflict have different objectives normally means 
that they will also have different centres of gravity, each of which will require a 
specific effect. The traditional understanding, which is essentially that the centre 
of gravity must be neutralised or destroyed, may therefore be applicable to some 
actors while, with regard to other actors, it may be necessary to take the opposite 
approach, namely to protect or support the centre of gravity. 
C8. In operations with many actors, there may be little point in identifying one 
centre of gravity per actor since that can result in a basis for analysis that is 
complex and difficult to handle. Keeping the need for a clear overview and a 
manageable number of centres of gravity in mind, it may be necessary to group 
the actors prior to analysis in order to arrive at what constitutes a common source 
of strength. In other words, to see whether there is a common denominator which 
is of decisive importance to the ability of the actors to achieve their objectives 
or to prevent others from achieving theirs. 
C9. The hunt for a common source of strength can, however, often lead to the 
identification of centres of gravity that are more abstract than is desirable. It is 
then of the utmost importance to thorough analyse the critical capabilities in 
order to be able to identify critical requirements with their associated critical 
vulnerabilities which are then more manageable in the sense that they can be 
made the subject of influence or utilisation. 
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C10. The transition from one phase to another in a campaign, for example from 
offensive operations to stabilization or reconstruction, may entail the introduction 
of new or other actors with new capabilities. Such cases could result in the estab-
lishment of new centres of gravity with their associated critical requirements 
and vulnerabilities. 
C11. Protecting, or inducing effects on centres of gravity, always calls for careful 
planning with regard to the achievement of effect and the use of resources. Such 
planning is therefore an important part of the shaping of an operation. The dyna-
mic of today’s complex conflicts, and the centre of gravity’s own dynamic, makes 
structural analysis a continuous process. The purpose of the process is to ensure 
that own actions are constantly adapted in such a way that they contribute to 
the achievement of the desired effect.  
Critical capabilities 
C12. Critical capabilities are those aspects of the centre of gravity that are of 
decisive importance to the significance of that centre of gravity. Critical capabili-
ties is thus an expression often used for the action dimension of a centre of 
gravity. If, for example, a military force is defined as a centre of gravity, the primary 
capabilities of the force could be the exercise of command and control, intelligence, 
logistics, protection, mobility and means of action (cf. the basic functions). Criti-
cal capabilities will thus normally be formulated as a verb (e.g. to command and 
control, to supply, to protect).
Critical requirements
C13. Critical requirements are those conditions, resources or means which are 
essential to the realisation of critical capabilities. The military force mentioned 
in the preceding paragraph will, for example, be dependent on communications 
systems in order to exercise command and control, access to supplies in order to 
take care of logistics, as well as infrastructure for mobility, such as airfields, har-
bours and road systems. A critical requirement will normally be formulated as a 
substantive (a communications system, fuel, a bridge).
Critical vulnerabilities
C14. Critical vulnerabilities are those critical requirements, or components of these, 
that are deficient or have weaknesses in a way that means that they are vulne-
rable to effects that can be achieved using modest resources, which can thus 
have a major effect. If the military force is defined as the centre of gravity, the 
capability for command and control as one of the critical capabilities, and the 
communications system as one of the critical requirements, the communications 
system or components of it (for example transmitters and receivers) can be a 
critical vulnerability. If such a critical vulnerability is neutralised, the centre of 
gravity will be weakened or will cease to function. 
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C15. A central element of the operational art is utilising ones own strengths 
against the critical vulnerabilities of other actors while at the same time protec-
ting one’s own vulnerabilities. Critical vulnerabilities, together with critical requi-
rements, constitute some of the decisive points (DP) and will provide a basis for 
targeting. 
Use of the centre of gravity concept and structural analysis 
C16. The centre of gravity has often been regarded as something in the nature of 
a metaphysical phenomenon. The ambition to describe how own resources should 
be used in the most effective way possible with the aim of breaking the adversary’s 
will to continue combat has led to a multiplicity of abstract definitions of a cen-
tre of gravity. 
C17. FFOD 07 gives the following guidance for the use of the centre of gravity 
concept and structural analysis with the intention that it should provide a practi-
cal tool during the planning and execution of operations:
•	 Analysis of the centres of gravity for the various actors in a conflict is a part of 
the structural analysis. The analysis process itself is more important than arri-
ving at an optimally formulated centre of gravity. 
•	 The adversary’s military centre of gravity is often his most powerful forces and 
weapon systems. A structural analysis finds the weaknesses and vulnerabilities 
of the forces and the systems and says something about how effects on these 
can be achieved. 
•	 Centre of gravity analysis must be linked with our own and the adversary’s 
objectives: What is the source of the adversary’s strength and ability to achieve 
his own objectives or to prevent others achieving theirs? This question can be 
used at all levels – strategic, operational and tactical. 
•	 The adversary can have one or more centres of gravity. It is important to reduce 
the number of centres of gravity to a few as possible. Few centres of gravity, 
preferably one, makes it easier to concentrate our actions. It can, however, be 
difficult to define one aspect as being more important than everything else 
in the complex systems that comprise today’s actors. It may therefore be necess-
ary to work with several centres of gravity. 
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C18. The adversary’s systems are dynamic and will change over time for reasons 
which include the effects of other actors and the surroundings. The temporal 
dimension is therefore of central importance in structural analysis. An actor can 
be forced into rapid operations and to seek rapid conclusions, for example for 
political or logistic reasons. It may be in the interests of another actor to prolong 
a conflict for as long as possible without having decisive confrontations. At the 
operational and tactical levels, the temporal dimension is often about when an 
adversary can have freedom of action to induce an effect on his own adversaries. 
An analysis with the emphasis on the temporal dimension can make it easier to 
plan operations so that the advantages and disadvantages linked to time can be 
used to best advantage.
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